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WILLARD RANGE



Franklin D. Roosevelt's
World Order



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PREFACE

THIS book is essentially a case study of the international thinking of a twentieth century political practitioner—Franklin Delano Roosevelt. The study attempts to answer the three following questions: (1) What was Roosevelt's explanation for the breakdown of the world order of his time? (2) What, in his view, were the implications of that breakdown for the United States? and (3) What kind of a world order did he want to see replace the order that had broken down? Answers to the first two questions are attempted in three skeleton-like chapters, with the bulk of the book devoted to the third question.

Most students of theories of international relations prefer to study the ideas of great thinkers and they rarely devote themselves to the thinking of practical politicians, few of whom are profoundly reflective or philosophic. It is my hope, however, that our understanding of the behavior of statesmen and states will be illuminated by case studies of the sort presented here.

Although Roosevelt was not a thinker of the calibre of Frederick the Great, Edmund Burke, Woodrow Wilson, or perhaps even Winston Churchill, he had a quick, perceptive mind with ability to grasp the heart of a problem quickly and to understand the inter-relation of many factors involved.¹ Roosevelt also appears to have possessed a relatively vast body of knowledge. The idea that he was largely ignorant of economics has, I think, been proved false.² The allegation that his seemingly inexhaustible knowledge of history was a "grab bag" of odds and ends and that he was bored by serious analytical history contains much truth,

but there is a possibility that the charge is exaggerated.³ At any rate, the President had both a sense of history and a theory of history, as we shall see; and it can be argued that whatever the faults in his theory or theories of international relations they are not due to his ignorance of history. In the broad realm of international relations the President in time accumulated a body of knowledge of impressive proportions.⁴ There is no doubt, moreover, that his knowledge of geography was fabulous and his geopolitical theory was of a quality that in his time made a great deal of sense.

Roosevelt is a good subject for a study such as this because he seems to have always been interested in international relations and is one of the very few Americans—about whom much material is available—who gave considerable thought to the problem of foreign policy during the half century in which the American people struggled to find their way out of the intellectual confusion caused by the rise of the United States to the position of a world power. He first expressed interest publicly in world affairs as a school-boy debater at Groton in 1897 at the age of fifteen. During the next year, 1898, he appears to have read Alfred Thayer Mahan's classic study of the influence of sea power on history; and it was at this point that he probably began to develop the geopolitical theory described in Chapter Two.

Throughout his eight years as Wilson's Assistant Secretary of the Navy comments on international affairs cropped out frequently in his letters, and problems of national defense and the role of sea power in world affairs absorbed him. During the 1919 campaign for the League of Nations and his own 1920 campaign for the vice-presidency his interest in international relations broadened to include all the major problems of world affairs, and he made literally hundreds of speeches about them. In 1923, inspired by the Bok peace plan contest and his wife's efforts to relieve the boredom caused by his polio illness, he drew up a plan for a world organization to replace the League, which he thought might appeal to the United States.⁵ During the twenties he became a "pusher" for more attention to international relations in university curricula and was among those who helped establish the Walter Hines Page School of International Affairs.⁶ Although he purposely said little on world affairs during his New York governorship, and the subject played little part in the 1932 presidential campaign, James Farley noted that even in his first year in the White House when he was overwhelmingly absorbed in domestic problems, he "was much more interested in foreign af-

fairs than he indicated in public utterances and press conferences.”⁷ His letters of those first four or five years in the Presidency indicate far more interest in world affairs than is implied in the oft-heard assertion that his first major foreign policy address was not given until 1937. Certainly from the late thirties on world affairs were the most absorbing interest of his life.

By far the most important reason for using Roosevelt as the vehicle for such a study is my belief that he personified to a remarkable degree the ideas and aspirations of a considerable portion of the American people during much of their half century of confusion. During the thirty-five years of his public life, 1910 to 1945, his mind and temperament seem to have been amazingly in tune with the thoughts and feelings of the American people. Their tendencies toward nationalistic imperialism in the early years of the century, toward internationalism in the Wilsonian period, toward disillusionment in the twenties, toward isolationism and finally resurgent internationalism in the thirties and forties were also, to some extent, Roosevelt’s tendencies. He was not always in perfect tune with the mass of people, of course. At the peak of Wilsonian idealism he maintained reservations about it, as we shall see; and during the paralyzing isolationism of the thirties he remained privately an internationalist willing only to work with or toy with the isolationists. But he was not often far out of tune with at least a large segment of the public mood.

Research has strengthened the view that even during his presidency Roosevelt was as much a reflector of public opinion as he was a maker of it.⁸ His great forte as President seems to have lain in his uncanny ability to sense the public mood, to articulate it, to crystallize it from a diffuse and amorphous ambiguity, and to act boldly to implement it. It was this capacity to reflect with such accuracy the thinking and feeling of so many of his compatriots that was the secret of the unparalleled popular support given him. And if this is true, a study of his ideas should at least approximate a study of the ideas of the American people.

There are those who argue, of course, that Roosevelt had no theories about anything, much less a theory of international relations. One biographer concluded, for example, that Roosevelt was clearly “a pragmatist, an opportunist, an experimenter,” with day-to-day policies based solely on expediency. Several students of Roosevelt insist that he actually had an aversion to any kind of sweeping theory, an inherent dislike of eternal absolutes, a disdain of elaborate fine-spun abstractions. And this characteristic is said

to have been even more pronounced in his foreign policies than in his domestic policies.⁹

No student of Roosevelt is likely to deny that the President was something of an intellectual jumping-jack and was often guilty of hopping helter-skelter in several directions at once with the same problem. But it is wrong to assume, I think, that because Roosevelt was at times inconsistent in the way he went about affairs that underneath there lay no basic aspirations, attitudes, or purposes. It was in his means and methods that Roosevelt was inconsistent and opportunistic, not in his ends, his aims, his goals. It is my conclusion, in fact, that Roosevelt's conduct was largely guided by a set of assumptions, principles, and values which he clung to with remarkable consistency throughout most of his life. I would reject categorically the argument that he did not know where he was going or wanted to go. Assuredly, he did not always know how he would get there and he was everlastingly willing to try almost any available means of reaching his goal. But his objective was rarely in doubt. When in 1938 he published the papers of his first term he was frank to admit that they revealed many inconsistencies, but he insisted that they also showed consistency of purpose. "There were inconsistencies of methods," he wrote, "inconsistencies caused by ceaseless efforts to find ways to solve problems for the future as well as for the present. There were inconsistencies springing from the need for experimentation. But through them all . . . there also will be found a consistency and continuity of broad purpose."¹⁰ And that claim can, I think, be borne out regarding his ideas on international relations.

Most of the writers who charge Roosevelt with being an intellectual madcap, moreover, have not yet given much attention to his thinking during the war years—the period in which he did the major part of his thinking about international relations. And when that period is examined sufficiently, I believe his tendency toward consistency will be more apparent.


The materials available to the student of Roosevelt are so voluminous that no one person could ever hope to examine more than a small part of them. Thus this study is limited to those materials the writer considered more likely to be rewarding in a search for the President's ideas on international affairs. Although a variety of memoirs, diaries, journals, and secondary sources were used, especially those written by Roosevelt associates, chief reliance has been on the President's own expressions—the thirteen volumes of his public papers and addresses, the twenty-four volumes of his

press conferences, and collections of letters, memoranda, magazine articles, newspaper columns, both published and unpublished, covering the whole period of his public life from 1910 to 1945. Every effort was made to extract from the sources every idea regarding international relations Roosevelt seemed to have entertained seriously during the thirty-five years of his public life. The only kind of ideas ignored were fleeting notions seemingly tossed off the "top of his head" and never heard of again.

Many people have contributed, of course, to whatever value this study might possess. I am particularly indebted to Professor S. Shepard Jones of the University of North Carolina, who gave invaluable advice on many aspects of the study. Professor C. B. Robson, also of the University of North Carolina, and Dr. C. Mildred Thompson of the University of Georgia both deserve thanks for their reading of the manuscript and the helpful suggestions they offered. Appreciation is due also to Herman Kahn, William J. Nichols, and Robert Jacoby for the help they rendered while research was under way at the Franklin D. Roosevelt Memorial Library at Hyde Park. I am grateful also to Dr. George H. Boyd, who as Director of General Research at the University of Georgia, made it possible for me to have time from my teaching to complete the study.

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THE BREAKDOWN OF WORLD ORDER

WHEN Franklin Delano Roosevelt spoke his first public words on international affairs as a fifteen-year-old Groton school-boy debater in 1897 he was living in a world that had experienced nearly a century of ever increasing international cooperation and harmony. When he spoke his last words on international relations nearly a half century later in 1945, however, he was living in a strife-torn world.

In the half century during which the world order of the nineteenth century was breaking down Roosevelt was often in a position where he could not avoid thinking about what was happening around him. For thirty-five years of the half century he was a public figure. During eight years of it, including all of World War I, he was Assistant Secretary of the Navy. In 1920 he was a vice-presidential candidate and an important although secondary figure in one of the greatest debates in American history on what United States foreign policy should be. And for twelve hectic years he was President of the United States wrestling at the very top with the problems of a fast collapsing world.

Unfortunately, the sources consulted by this writer failed to reveal any Rooseveltian explanation for the decline of the world order that occurred before 1919. But his reasons as to why the world went to pieces after 1919 were both varied and numerous.

His first argument was that the peace settlement ending World War I had been utterly faulty. In particular, it had been too soft on Germany. Throughout the war he had been an advocate of a harsh peace that would teach the Germans a lesson and even

humiliate them. Instead, however, Germany had been allowed to retain her militaristic philosophy and institutions and later had even been allowed to re-arm and get away with all sorts of violations of the peace treaties. The whole peace had been based too much, he declared, on "magnificent idealism" and this had promoted a revival of German aggression.¹

Roosevelt also seems to have credited the breakdown of the world order in part at least to what might be called the corruption of the League of Nations—a corruption caused largely by the failure of the United States to become a member; and by the insistence of France and England on using the League for narrowly selfish purposes.

Like Wilson, Roosevelt looked upon the League as a vehicle designed primarily for mobilizing the moral force of mankind behind world law and order. He looked upon the United States as a nation whose international morality was superior to that of most states and as the only great power free enough from power politics to take a disinterested view of world affairs, and with a moral reputation adequate to provide leadership in mobilizing the moral force of men elsewhere. Only the United States could be the conscience of the state system. Like Wilson, moreover, Roosevelt also had a broad conception of the national interest, holding that enlightened national interests are usually the same as the interests of the international community and that the League should be the instrument through which all the various national interests would be modified and harmonized.

During both 1919 and 1920 Roosevelt issued repeated warnings that if the United States refused to join, the League would degenerate into a new Holy Alliance, as he called it, of European states dominated by power politics.² After the final rejection of the League by the United States Roosevelt lost all hope of its ever succeeding, and during the early twenties he proposed scrapping it for a new organization more acceptable to American public opinion.³

From then on he repeatedly found fault with the League, charging that it had been handicapped from its infancy by the selfish attitude of its European founders, that it had lost what little idealism Wilson had been able to infuse into it, and that it concentrated too much on European affairs. By the mid-thirties he was even asserting that it was no longer even a good debating society.⁴

✓ Roosevelt also seemed to feel that the degeneration of the

League had been due partly to its failure to become a center for the concert of the Big Powers. The League had been founded on the assumption that while all the states of the world would be able to express their views, the Big Powers, who possessed a greater responsibility, would dominate the crucial decisions, keeping in mind, however, the interests of the whole global community. But the absence of so many of the Big Powers from the League had caused the organization to fall repeatedly under the undue influence of the small powers who often were unable to come to agreement or to behave in a responsible fashion.⁵ Thus the League was both morally and structurally defective.

A third basic factor causing the breakdown of the old order stemmed, in Roosevelt's view, from the rise of economic nationalism and the consequent multiplication of barriers to world trade—one of the most significant developments of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

Roosevelt looked upon this development as harmful to both the prosperity of nations and the cause of peace; for he was convinced that all nations were so interdependent that unless trade could flow rather freely among them their economies could not function properly; and if their economies did not operate efficiently, national frustration and foreign aggression would result. All through the twenties and thirties he argued that economic ills were among the root causes of war and that a prosperous world was a prerequisite for peace. Many of his New Deal measures, he insisted, were aimed not only at giving men bread, but at maintaining peace as well.⁶

As a stalwart Democrat and a shrewd politician Roosevelt loved to blame the Republican Party for both the Depression and the excessive economic nationalism that developed all over the world in the interwar years. As early as 1924 he blamed the Republicans for producing an era of "gross materialism."⁷ But it was largely in the presidential campaign of 1932 that he made his chief attack on the Republicans. According to his theory, the Depression was a home-made domestic American calamity produced by Republican economic policies and then exported to the rest of the world.⁸

Among the wicked economic policies of the Republicans, in Roosevelt's view, was their protective tariff policy. Although never a complete free-trader himself, Roosevelt charged that the Republicans had carried protection too far, producing the agricultural depression by means of the Fordney-McCumber Tariff of 1922 and toppling the economic structures of other nations by the

Smoot-Hawley Tariff of 1931. The latter tariff had obliged other states to raise trade barriers and this had resulted in trade all over the world becoming stagnated.⁹ The ever multiplying trade barriers in the world were a "symptom of economic insanity," insisted the President, and "if the present tariff war continues the world will go back a thousand years."¹⁰

The mad scramble by many nations during the thirties to become self-sufficient was especially irritating to Roosevelt. Rather than helping, it was hurting the very nations trying the hardest.¹¹ And he seemed certain that unless the trend was stopped, war would result; for the whole movement was damming up surpluses, promoting unemployment, and provoking frustrations that could end only in violence.¹²

The British upper classes were also partly to blame for all the trouble, thought Roosevelt. They feared German industrial competition and preferred scaling down German reparations payments to German exports. When, moreover, Britain instituted her imperial preference system, Roosevelt became more convinced than ever that Britain's foreign policy for centuries had been designed to serve only the British upper classes and that they were interpreting their national interests very narrowly.¹³

It is quite true that during the campaign of 1932 and the first eighteen months he was in the White House Roosevelt occasionally talked and acted like an economic nationalist. But such talk and action was inconsistent with his basic views, it was often designed only for the exigencies of the moment, and after 1934 he was rarely again to be found on the side of economic nationalism.¹⁴

A fourth basic cause of the collapse of the international system, in Roosevelt's view, lay in the existence of too many governments that had been unresponsive to the problems of modern society.

Roosevelt seems never to have feared strong government. Rather he held throughout his public life the idea that the state was a "good" institution that should be used to promote the full and rich development of all men and that government is responsible for the general welfare. This meant that when a people found it impossible to solve their problems by their private efforts, it was the responsibility of governments to step in and help. Otherwise, argued Roosevelt, revolution was likely. Thus governments were obligated to bring about reforms, to apply occasionally measures of "sane radicalism" as he liked to call it, to meet new conditions.¹⁵

It was while he was Governor of New York during the early years of the Depression that he became clearly aware of the many

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new demands facing governments in the twentieth century: for social security, a good education regardless of class, better working conditions, and all the other needs wrapped up in the term "social justice." And he was convinced that strong government action was essential to satisfy them.¹⁶ Both publicly and privately he insisted that the United States needed to become "radical" for a while if revolution was to be prevented.¹⁷ And as the Depression deepened it became ever more clear to Roosevelt that it was the failure of governments to respond to this demand for social justice that was at the root of many of the convulsions of his time.

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Throughout his presidency Roosevelt hammered away at this theme, pointing to all sorts of governments that had been overthrown or were on the verge of being overthrown because of their failure to meet the new demands. The Communist movement and the Fascist dictatorships owed their rise to weak governments unable or unwilling to respond to the new needs, he argued, and a major objective of his New Deal reforms was to prevent a similar upheaval in the United States.¹⁸ The global movement toward democracy which had looked so promising at the beginning of the twentieth century had floundered, Roosevelt argued, because so many democratic governments had failed to act vigorously to promote social justice.¹⁹ The French government was a good example of the failure of a government to respond to the new demands, thought Roosevelt, and he was delighted in 1936 when the Blum ministry tried to make amends. France had not done anything in the way of social legislation for twenty-five or thirty years, he told the press off the record one day; and the only question was—is it too late?²⁰

The failure of governments to respond adequately to the new demands automatically created conditions conducive to war, thought the President; and his everlasting complaint against the "conservative school of thought" was its failure to "recognize the need for Government itself to step in and take action to meet these problems." Thus it was the conservatives who were responsible for the rise of the dictatorships.²¹ As late as the Yalta Conference he was reiterating the same theme, telling Stalin his old story of how when he became President in 1933 the United States had been close to revolution because the people lacked food, clothing, and shelter; and it had been his launching of the New Deal program that had prevented disaster.²²

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A fifth cause of the breakdown of the world order, in Roosevelt's view, was the existence of a small group of evil or misguided

leaders—devils and “dim wits”—who controlled or greatly influenced public affairs in some of the Big Powers.

We shall notice later that Roosevelt looked upon the great majority of the world's peoples—ninety per cent of them by his figures—as essentially good, generous, and reasonable. The remaining ten per cent, however, were evil, misguided, or both; and it was this ten per cent who were at the root of many of the world's troubles. They included Hitler's Nazis, Mussolini's Fascists, the Japanese war lords, Chamberlain's appeasers, and a variety of other nefarious characters.

The misguided people, in Roosevelt's view, were especially those who during the thirties failed to understand the threat the dictators posed to the rest of the world. Pacifists and appeasers, he insisted, understood neither the interests of their own states nor the interests of the international community. He agreed that Chamberlain had no choice but to capitulate to Hitler at Munich, for he knew that Hitler was ready for war and had a powerful air force prepared to attack even London, which was then virtually defenseless. But he was irritated that Britain and France had allowed themselves to get into such a weak position.²³ All those who believed the United States could do business with Hitler, and defeatists who believed Hitler would win were also on his list of the soft-headed.²⁴

It was the leaders whom he believed to be morally evil, however, that he looked upon as the greatest trouble makers of the world. They included those Americans who wanted war because they stood to make a profit by it, as well as all those Americans who later tried to block the American war effort—the bundists, subversive Communists, and those favoring racial and religious intolerance.²⁵

It was, however, Hitler's Nazis, Mussolini's Fascists, and the Japanese war lords who were the arch criminals of the day in Roosevelt's black book of evil leaders and who were leading the world to destruction. From 1933 on he stated repeatedly that “the great majority of the inhabitants of the world” had no desire for territorial expansion and that the peace was threatened only by a tiny minority of people. It was from Walter Lippmann in November, 1933, that he got his statistical formula for dividing the world's good and evil people into ninety per cent and ten per cent, the Germans and Japanese being the ten per cent who were evil and were blocking the desires of the majority for peace.²⁶ He tried hard for many years to convince himself that the only sin

committed by the masses in the dictatorships had been to let evil leaders get in control. But there were many times when, despite his faith in the inherent goodness of most men, he wondered if the masses were as out of sympathy with their rulers as he wanted to think they were.²⁷ He also hoped for many years that Mussolini's soul might be saved; but after the Duce aligned himself with Hitler, the President lost all faith in that possibility.²⁸

From the mid-thirties until his death Roosevelt's speeches, letters, and even private conversations were peppered with aspersions about the scoundrels he thought bore a great part of the responsibility for the breakdown of the old order.²⁹ To him they represented evil incarnate and were largely responsible for the chauvinistic demagoguery, narrow nationalism, militarism, and sadism that characterized the period.

The armaments movement, which finally evolved into an armaments race, was a sixth cause of the breakdown of the world order, in Roosevelt's view.

Before his conversion to Wilsonianism at the end of World War I, Roosevelt had always been an advocate of big armaments. After the war, however, he became a vigorous campaigner for disarmament and argued throughout the rest of his life that the building and maintenance of armaments was one of the major causes of the world's troubles. For he became convinced that armaments, and particularly an armaments race, would drive nations into bankruptcy or war or both.³⁰

It was bad enough, he wrote British Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald in 1933, to see European nations squabbling over economic questions; but the "insane rush" toward rearmament was "infinitely more dangerous." For "drilling and arming, when carried on on a national scale, excite whole populations to frenzies that end in war."³¹

It was particularly in the little nations that armaments caused both war and bankruptcy, thought Roosevelt. A table he had prepared in 1939 revealed exactly what he had suspected—that the annual governmental deficits incurred by many of the smaller powers amounted almost exactly to the cost of their military forces. And in places like the Balkans, these forces were not only economic burdens; they were also a cause of wars that often embroiled the major powers. Thus armaments were weakening economies, unbalancing government budgets, and creating tensions all over the world.³²

The manufacturers and merchants of arms were partly respon-

sible for all this, thought the President, and he campaigned to get the private traffic in arms under control.³³ But he was even more irritated by the use of armament production in many nations to alleviate the economic depression and solve the problem of unemployment. Prosperity built on armaments was false prosperity and could not last, he argued. It was very likely to end in war. It was also morally wrong and he categorically rejected pleas that he resort to the same expediency in the United States.³⁴

The relation of arms production to national economies created a vicious circle, thought Roosevelt during the Depression. Employment could not be shifted into more constructive pursuits until nations lowered their trade barriers and pepped up the flow of international trade; but trade barriers could not be lowered while international tensions were being worsened by an armaments race. The world was afflicted with an "armament disease," the President concluded about 1937, and would die soon unless a major operation was performed.³⁵

Roosevelt also attributed the breakdown of the world order in part to a seventh cause—a decline in the moral and spiritual fiber of the world's peoples, particularly the peoples of Europe.

It will be shown throughout this study that Roosevelt's reliance on the human spirit and the moral principles of the Christian-liberal-humanitarian tradition was real and profound, and he believed sincerely that there could be no decent civilization unless the spirit of man was robust and the behavior of both men and nations was guided by moral principles.³⁶

As international anarchy became ever more rampant during the thirties, however, the President became ever more convinced that something had gone wrong with the spiritual and moral forces and principles that had become so powerful in the old order of the nineteenth century. The American spirit had been weakened in the twenties, he thought, by the rush toward materialism.³⁷ The Depression had also taken a heavy toll of men's spiritual and moral resources everywhere.³⁸ It was in Europe, however, that Roosevelt saw the worst collapse of spiritual force and moral principles. There people were behaving in both a weary and crazy way, refusing to fight for liberty, believing all sorts of false propaganda, and sacrificing the democracy they had struggled so hard to attain.³⁹ Her capacity to produce creative leaders seemed to have dried up, her peoples hated each other, Britain and France had allowed themselves to degenerate into helplessness, and for the first time in history, Britain was being outmaneuvered at the con-

ference table.⁴⁰ During the war years the President lamented more and more the decline of the old spirit of Europe that had prevailed in his youth when he had been able to ride over a large part of the continent on a bicycle, without a passport, and observe many international exchanges and friendships; and he insisted that unless the moral and spiritual weaknesses in Europe were corrected there was no hope for a good peace settlement.⁴¹

An eighth and final cause of the breakdown of the old order, in Roosevelt's view, was the pacifism or "peace at any price" theory that attained great popularity in the thirties.

Although Roosevelt was an idealist and often dreamed of a warless world, he remained realistic enough to insist that warfare was not going to be abolished in the foreseeable future. During World War I he had referred to all the talk about everlasting peace as "soft mush."⁴² When during the thirties he saw the dictators getting away with ill-gotten gains as a result of the prevailing pacifist climate of opinion, he repeatedly berated the "peace at any price" theory, especially in his private letters.⁴³

The appeasement of the dictators that grew out of this pacifistic climate of opinion was especially irksome to Roosevelt. He warned Chamberlain against it and became disgusted with the British Prime Minister when the latter persisted in his course.⁴⁴

After war started in Europe in 1939 the President derided American pacifists as foolish people who would let America be taken over as Denmark and Norway had been taken over.⁴⁵ The march of the aggressors from 1931 on, he declared, had arisen out of the unwillingness of the European powers to stop them by force, and international anarchy had been the result.⁴⁶

It is worth noting that throughout his explanation of the breakdown of the old world order Roosevelt did not spare the United States. Wilson's soft peace for Germany, the failure of the United States to join the League, Republican protectionist economic policies, and the isolationist-pacifist climate of opinion in the United States in the inter-war years had all contributed to the global collapse; and when Congress refused in the summer of 1939 to repeal the arms embargo in the Neutrality Act, Roosevelt was certain that Congress had thereby encouraged the dictators and was partly responsible for the outbreak of the war in Europe two months later.⁴⁷

It is also worth noting that in one point Roosevelt was patently inconsistent. On the one hand he condemned the "peace at any price" theory and condemned Britain and France for letting them-

selves become so defenseless that they could not stand up to Hitler. But on the other hand he campaigned repeatedly for disarmament and he more than once accused the British of blocking the movement toward disarmament.

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IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES

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THERE was never any doubt in Franklin Roosevelt's mind that the breakdown of the international order of his time would have an enormous impact upon the United States. Despite a temporary flirtation with economic nationalism in 1933-34 his general position throughout his public life was that the United States could not isolate herself from events abroad and that the security and welfare of the United States were dependent on the security and welfare of the entire international community. Had isolationist public opinion in the United States and Secretary of State Hull's excessive caution not restrained him during his first two terms, it is quite probable that the President would have jumped into the international situation with both feet, participating vigorously in the global game of power politics; for there is no doubt that his inclinations were those of an internationalist who would not have hesitated to use the power of the United States to influence events abroad.

Yet Roosevelt's position was also that of a realist dedicated to the proposition that the first concern of every statesman must be the national interests of his own nation. Almost as soon as he entered the White House he told the Latin American nations that "frankly, the interest of our own citizens must, in each instance, come first."¹ When accused by an isolationist in 1941 of aiding Britain largely to save the British Empire rather than the United States, Roosevelt answered both publicly and privately that aid to Britain was being given for "purely selfish reasons," for "what is

best for the United States," and that the British were under no illusions about it.²

Yet to Roosevelt the use of self-interest as the guiding principle of a foreign policy was not necessarily selfish. Even though concerned with herself first, a nation could still be a good neighbor, he insisted; for he was convinced that in most of the problems faced by nations, the national interest was best served by solutions that benefited all. What hurt one hurt all; what helped one helped all, for all were economically, politically, and culturally interdependent.

Another characteristic of Roosevelt's approach to the breakdown of the world order was his global view, his practice of seeing an inter-relation among countless events and situations far distant from one another.

Here Roosevelt's long interest in sea power and geography were significant factors. In both matters he was informed sufficiently to often confound experts.³ It was this knowledge, thought Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau, Jr., that caused Roosevelt to see the global significance of what the aggressors were up to at an early date;⁴ and even to speculate that in time to come the problem of peace would be largely a problem of figuring out how continents rather than mere nations might live at peace with one another.⁵

This global view was particularly evident in Roosevelt's thinking regarding World War II. One wartime associate noted that as of 1940 the President seemed to be the only high personage in Washington who "saw that we might be fighting Germany and Japan all over the world" rather than just defending our own shores.⁶ Throughout the war, moreover, the President pointed out repeatedly the global character of the conflict, noting that it involved every sea, every continent, every island, every air lane in the world and that victories or defeats in one place had repercussions many thousands of miles away.⁷

Roosevelt also often thought of people in world-wide terms, in terms of humanity as a whole. In a lecture at Milton Academy in 1926 he spoke hopefully of a coming day when all peoples of the world would recognize one another as members of "one big family."⁸ On several occasions he emphasized that the Atlantic Charter applied to all parts of the world and to all humanity.⁹ "Do all you can," he wrote a friend in 1943, "to make people realize that the world is round and that more people in the world

live in Asia than in Europe, Africa and the Americas all put together."¹⁰

He seemed to realize, however, that it would not be easy to get everyone else to think in global terms. It had not been done appreciably until the twentieth century, he asserted in 1944, but men were now being compelled to think in world-wide terms and after the war it would be more essential than ever.¹¹

Thus to Roosevelt it was impossible for the United States to isolate herself from events abroad. In 1914, in the first days of World War I, he was astonished to find that no one in the Navy Department in Washington was excited about the crisis in Europe.¹² In his view the interests of the United States were so broad that she needed to be active everywhere. Her territories and foreign trade were vital to her welfare, he argued in 1915.¹³ And by 1920 he was arguing that the nation's food supply had become an international problem.¹⁴ Only by becoming an armed camp living in monastic seclusion, he concluded, could the United States avoid close relations with foreign states.¹⁵ In the thirties he argued that it would be suicidal for the United States to stand idly by, as some senators suggested, while Europe destroyed herself, for war one place was likely to produce war every place, and the American future was bound to be affected.¹⁶

Roosevelt's belief that a policy of isolation was both futile and impossible for the United States was based, especially during the late thirties, on three major considerations: 1) changes in the nature of warfare; 2) a belief that the United States could not escape the economic and cultural consequences of a general war and particularly of a war ending in an Axis victory; and 3) a conviction that the Axis would eventually attack the United States if it got the opportunity to do so.

Early in World War I Roosevelt saw the nature of warfare changing and he ridiculed the old idea held by people like William Jennings Bryan that the country could continue to rely on a citizens' militia springing to arms over night.¹⁷ During World War I also he foresaw the airplane as an invention that would revolutionize warfare; and he repeated his prophecies during the twenties.¹⁸ The airplane, along with other technological developments, had given war, Roosevelt argued, a range in distance and speed never known before. Defenses against attack must also be long range and designed to meet lightning and surprise attack.¹⁹ By the late thirties he was insisting that defense of the United States re-

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quired defense not only of the Caribbean area also, but a cooperative defense of the whole hemisphere from pole to pole.²⁰ It required also the prevention of any hostile power's getting bases anywhere on the globe from which an attack on the United States might be launched.²¹

Roosevelt was aware also that aggression now begins long before military action, by propaganda, economic penetration, fifth column activity, and so on, at all of which the Nazis had become masters.²² Defense was, therefore, a complex matter and it was folly to think the United States could isolate herself from modern types of penetration.

Nor could the United States escape the economic and cultural consequences of war, thought Roosevelt, especially of a war ending in an Axis victory. World War I, he argued, had caused American agriculture to over-expand, had promoted monopoly in the United States, and had destroyed normal relations between creditors and debtors.²³ Another world war might do worse, he began arguing in 1937, for if the dictators got their way, they would destroy all that was fine in the culture of the past two thousand years.²⁴ Even if the United States was not dragged in, moreover, she could not escape the consequences of the collapse of economic and social structures elsewhere; for her economy was part of a world economy. World trade would be affected everywhere. And if the Axis powers won, they might easily dominate the economies of all nations.²⁵

From the late thirties on, the President drew ever more and more ghastly pictures of the consequences of an Axis victory. Hitler would hoist the swastika and establish puppet governments everywhere, he warned. The United States would have to become an armed camp, pouring all her money into defense and she would have none left over for internal improvements. Individual liberty, and especially freedom of religion, would be threatened everywhere. American labor would lose all its gains. Democracy would decline. Militarism and a jungle morality would replace humanitarianism and decency; and the civilization so painfully built over centuries in the West would revert to barbarism.²⁶

From at least 1937 on, moreover, Roosevelt was convinced that if the Axis ever got a chance to do so, it would launch a direct military assault on North America. "Let no one imagine," he declared in 1937, "that America will escape, that America may expect mercy, that this Hemisphere will not be attacked. . . ."²⁷ Hitler's aggressions in 1938 and 1939 merely confirmed his belief

that the ambitions of the Nazi dictator were unlimited.²⁸ Hitler's pious pledges not to bother the United States were not to be believed, insisted Roosevelt, for the desire to expand one's power is so natural that it grows at each opportunity—just as that of Alexander and Napoleon grew with each conquest—and it would be folly to expect Hitler to stop when he got “within one jump” of world domination. The Nazi doctrine of racial superiority would also promote within Germany a desire to subjugate America, the President argued. “And most important of all, the vast resources and wealth of this American hemisphere constitute the most tempting loot in all the world,” said Roosevelt, a loot the Axis could not resist trying to capture.²⁹

Roosevelt responded to the above threats to the United States with a geopolitical theory of global proportions. He had begun developing the theory during the 1890s when he became acquainted with the geopolitical ideas of Alfred Thayer Mahan. As Assistant Secretary of the Navy in the Wilson administration his ideas were further developed; and by April 1917 he was already publicly scoffing at what he considered the foggy thinking of some Americans who believed the United States could rely for defense on the two oceans.³⁰ Twenty-two years later he expressed exactly the same opinion and insisted that people who relied on the two oceans simply had no clear understanding of the position of the United States in the world.³¹

Roosevelt's geopolitical theory started with the assumption that the major struggle for power in his time was a global struggle and its wars were global wars. Violence in Manchuria, Ethiopia, Spain, and the states neighboring on Germany was all part of the same struggle. The major stage of violence began, however, in 1937 with Japan's full-scale attack on China, and in Europe with Hitler's 1939 attack on Poland. The important thing to remember, however, was that the struggle was global and the whole could not be seen by looking only at its parts.³²

Roosevelt's next assumption was that in any such global struggle for power the key to the security of the United States lay in maintaining, with her friends, absolute mastery of the seas; for only by such control could the United States keep her essential international trade going, maintain access to the raw materials her hungry industry had to have, and keep war out of the Western hemisphere. Roosevelt had begun advocating this “defense at a distance” as a young naval enthusiast and he never gave it up. His idea was that the Navy, next to diplomacy, must be the nation's

first line of defense, prepared not only to defend the coasts, but to meet any enemy fleet on the high seas and destroy it.³³

Control of the seas and freedom of the seas apparently meant the same thing to Roosevelt and he tended to use the phrases interchangeably. But whatever it was called, Roosevelt looked upon it as the historic policy of the United States essential to protect her commerce and her prosperity.³⁴ The seas were broad highways, he believed, and the United States could not live long without free access to them.³⁵

Fortunately, thought Roosevelt, the United States could defend the water-borne commerce of the Western hemisphere in the event of foreign war without a U. S. declaration of war against anyone simply by using the Navy as Adams and Jefferson had used it. The United States need only declare certain areas were outside the war zone, and then use the Navy to enforce the declaration.³⁶ The international rule of territorial waters could be made more useful, he thought, simply by broadening the definition of what were territorial waters; and one day in 1939 he told an incredulous press that United States territorial waters went out "as far as our interests need it to go out."³⁷

But control of the adjacent seas was never enough for Roosevelt. He wanted all the seas under Anglo-American control, and he made special efforts around the time of the fall of France in 1940 to get assurances that the British and French fleets would not fall into the hands of the Axis, even going so far as to try to buy the French fleet.³⁸

In Roosevelt's geopolitics, however, control of the seas involved much more than mere naval supremacy. It required also control of the air over the seas, control of the islands of the seas that might be used as air and naval bases, control of the strategic gateways to the seas such as the Suez and Panama canals, the English Channel, and the Strait of Gibraltar, and control of the coastal rimlands of Europe, Africa, and Asia facing the seas.

The islands of the seas were among Roosevelt's major concern, and from 1934 on he kept the State Department busy working on schemes to keep Atlantic and Pacific islands out of hostile hands.³⁹ Although his earliest interest was in the islands and bases close to the Panama Canal and the coasts of America, he became more interested in islands further away as the range of bombing planes increased. For even the Canary Islands and Azores could be used as jumping off places by an enemy bent on attacking America, he argued. When, moreover, he acquired Atlantic island leases in the

famous "destroyer deal" with the British in 1940 he boasted that it was "probably the most important thing that has come for American defense since the Louisiana Purchase."⁴⁰

Keeping hostile powers from getting control of the Eurasian and African continents was equally important in Roosevelt's geopolitics. Although he denied reports that he had said that the American frontier was on the Rhine, he made no secret of the fact that he believed something very much like that; and he pointed out repeatedly that each nation in Europe that fell to a hostile power caused American security to be weakened. For if hostile powers got control of the coasts of the other continents, he insisted, then the rest of those continents and even the high seas would fall into the conquerors' greedy hands. All the resources, markets, and manpower of those three great land masses would be theirs. They would then have two or three times the ship-building and military capacity of all the Americas. They would form a customs union among themselves with the Americas left outside and would then trade with outsiders like the United States only on their own terms. The Western hemisphere would then be a besieged island living at the point of a gun.⁴¹

The Latin American republics and Canada were also important in Roosevelt's geopolitics. He took the Monroe Doctrine for granted and there was no doubt in his mind that the United States, for her own safety, must prevent foreign political systems from being established in the hemisphere. From 1936 on he looked at the problem of American defense as a continental problem rather than as a purely national problem and he promptly proceeded to build a system of hemispheric solidarity.⁴²

It was not until about 1939, however, that Roosevelt began to perceive how a victorious Axis or even only a victorious Germany might gain control of Latin America by peaceful procedures and then be in an ideal position to invade an isolated and softened United States. By controlling only parts of Europe, Roosevelt asserted, Hitler could force Latin American states, which depended on Europe to buy eighty per cent of their exports, to accept fascist principles and Nazi economic domination; and it could all be done without violating the Monroe Doctrine.⁴³

Thus the problem of defending the hemisphere was a military, economic, and ideological problem. Nazi plots, propaganda, and advance guards were already preparing bridgeheads in the New World, said the President in September 1941. But Hitler's grand design could not succeed unless he got control of the seas and he

could not do that unless he first got control of the ship-building facilities of Britain, Europe, and Asia; and that must be prevented.⁴⁴

A logical conclusion of all this to Roosevelt was that Britain, France, China, and later Russia were buffers between the twentieth century Caesars and the Western Hemisphere. Of prime importance were the British and French fleets and the French army. Despite his frequent feeling of hostility toward Britain, he had a clear understanding of the Anglo-American community of interest and he never doubted that Britain's continued independence was vital to the security of the United States. If England went down, he reasoned, the United States would soon find herself surrounded by hostile states; for the combined German and Italian navies in 1939 were equal to that of the United States; Japan's navy was then about eighty per cent as powerful, and the Axis, with this vast power and Britain out of the way, would be greatly tempted to attack if the United States objected to the peaceful penetration of Latin America. The fall of France reaffirmed this view, making Roosevelt more convinced than ever that if Britain fell Germany would attack the Western hemisphere through Latin America and Japan would go on the rampage in the Pacific. Then truly the United States would be forced to fight for her survival.⁴⁵

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ROOSEVELT'S REACTIONS

Roosevelt's ideas as to how the United States should meet the perils resulting from the breakdown of the world order of his time developed slowly. Although he became aware of the dangers facing the nation earlier than most Americans, he long underestimated the power the aggressors were going to be able to mobilize and he overestimated the ability of the British, French, and their allies to restrain them. As late as the time of the Munich crisis in 1938 he felt that Hitler could be brought to his knees by a defensive war and that the most the United States would need to do was furnish supplies. It was not really until the fall of France in mid-1940 that Roosevelt realized to the full the weakness of the Allies and the strength of the aggressors, and it may be that total realization was not achieved even by then.¹

The result of this slow grasping of the world power situation was a slow response. Roosevelt's response evolved, in fact, in three stages. For several years he seems to have believed that the United States could meet the situation adequately by a policy of neutrality, although it was a quite different kind of neutrality from that wanted by the isolationists. In the second stage of his thinking, when he decided no kind of neutrality was adequate, he adopted a policy of quasi-belligerency that put the United States into the war in all but name. It was not until almost the day of the Japanese assault on Pearl Harbor that the President *seems* to have decided that the full military power of the United States would have to be used to extricate the nation from her peril, and a

policy of belligerency was adopted. Thus Roosevelt's thinking was decidedly evolutionary, one policy being abandoned for a new one only with reluctance when the earlier policy proved to be inadequate.

Roosevelt could never support a kind of neutrality that forbade the United States to take sides in major international developments; for it is doubtful that Roosevelt had an impartial bone in his body regarding such matters. In World War I he had been on the side of the Allies from the beginning and had little patience with Wilson's policy of neutrality.² Disgusted as he might have been with England and France in the thirties, he had no doubt that the United States could not afford to let the Nazis sweep over them; and except for a brief period during the twenties, his hostility toward the Japanese had been life long.³

Yet his desire to throw the influence of the United States on one side or another in international quarrels did not mean that Roosevelt believed the country should go so far as to enter foreign wars. Even though he had been a supporter of the "martial spirit" in his youth, by the time he became President he was an ardent advocate of peace everywhere and of keeping the United States out of wars that might occur.

Yet Roosevelt was too much of a realist to believe that the United States could insure herself completely against all war. Nor did he believe the nation reduced the risk of war by doing nothing. When in September 1939 he again asked the Congress to repeal the arms embargo in the Neutrality Act, his objective was to keep the United States out of the war by keeping Britain and France in it; and to do this he had to be able to send them arms. For he was convinced that if England and France went down, the United States would be forced to take up the sword.⁴

Naturally, the isolationists of the thirties had no serious objection to Roosevelt's using peaceful procedures to prevent war provided it was not done in too close cooperation with the League of Nations and did not require political commitments; nor did they have any objection to avoiding incidents or situations that might get the United States embroiled. Thus Roosevelt and the isolationists were in considerable agreement at many points.

Roosevelt readily backed, for example, government control of the private traffic in arms and began supporting legislation to control it shortly after he entered the White House. He adhered somewhat to the "devil" theory of war and repeatedly castigated

the manufacturers and merchants of arms, charging them with menacing the peace and promoting a "mad race in armaments" for the sake of private profit.⁵

Roosevelt and the isolationists were also long in substantial agreement regarding the desirability of preventing American citizens and ships from embroiling the United States in war by incidents that might occur on belligerent ships in combat areas. Woodrow Wilson had erred in World War I, he thought, by insisting that all America's neutral rights be respected by the belligerents. American citizens and ships traveling about the world had often embroiled the nation in incidents in which the American public in general had no direct interest and such travel, Roosevelt thought, should be subject to control in wartime.⁶

Roosevelt was also long in close accord with the isolationists in their desire to prohibit the use of American money to finance foreign wars. If foreign governments were forbidden to get loans in the United States, their urge toward war might be restrained somewhat, he thought; and American embroilment might also be avoided. He was also an advocate of taking the profit out of war. Thus he favored the clauses in the neutrality acts of the thirties aimed at those goals.⁷

All this makes it obvious that although Roosevelt opposed some of the provisions of the neutrality legislation of the thirties, he also saw much good in it; and when Ambassador Dodd in Germany wrote that he wanted to resign as a public protest against the passage by Congress of the Neutrality Act of 1935, Roosevelt answered that the Act was by no means the "unmitigated evil" Dodd thought it to be.⁸

In one respect Roosevelt was in favor of going further than most isolationists. He wanted power to embargo *all* trade to belligerents beyond normal peacetime quantities, not just arms and ammunition. And when Congress refused to go along with his request for such power, he virtually ridiculed its behavior and proceeded to impose moral embargoes in the hope that some businessmen might be restrained and that the belligerents would be made aware of the attitude of the administration.⁹

But if Roosevelt and the isolationists were in agreement regarding many matters concerning neutrality, they were poles apart on the most important matter of all—that of taking sides. To those who clung to what is often called the "traditional" concept of neutrality this attitude of Roosevelt looked very unneutral. But

to Roosevelt the throwing of the weight of the United States on one side was absolutely essential to his objectives and he wanted to use most of the controls given him for that purpose.

The whole difficulty arose from different conceptions of neutrality. The "traditionalists" adhered to the concept of neutrality developed in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries which held that war and the behavior of states was amoral and one nation could not sit in judgment on the conduct of another. A neutral must, therefore, treat all belligerents alike, impartially, and while geographical or other factors might accidentally favor a particular side in its dealings with a neutral, the neutral herself was obligated to refrain from actions that were partial. By the same token, neutrals also had rights that belligerents were obligated to respect.¹⁰

But Roosevelt preferred what has been called a modified Grotian concept of neutrality that won some popularity among internationalists in the interwar years. It began with the Grotian thesis that distinguished between "just" and "unjust" wars and held that states that were not belligerents had the duty "to do nothing to strengthen those who are prosecuting an unjust cause, or which may impede the movements of him who is carrying on a just war. . . ." Starting from this argument, many internationalists in the interwar years held that both the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Kellogg-Briand Pact had destroyed the "traditional" concept of neutrality, and all nations were, under modern conditions, obligated to cooperate to impede aggressors and to aid the victims of aggression. This had been the Hoover-Stimson conception of neutrality when in January 1933 they had asked Congress for power to embargo arms, the assumption of the administration being that it would be only the aggressor to whom arms could not then be exported.¹¹

Roosevelt supported this modified Grotian concept of neutrality from the day he took office. Thus when Roosevelt told an incredulous press the day after his famous Quarantine Speech that he saw no conflict between the Neutrality Act and his quarantine proposal, he was not being as naive or deceptive as some of his hearers probably thought. It would be folly to deny that Roosevelt occasionally talked out of both sides of his mouth regarding neutrality during the thirties; but his real position was that "true" neutrality required a nation to refrain from helping an aggressor and allowed her to help a victim, and that is what he wanted to do.¹²

Although Roosevelt wanted the controls discussed above partly in order to keep the United States out of war, he also wanted many of them for use as weapons to deter or stop aggressors. But in order to use such controls as weapons he needed authority to use them at his discretion in whatever way and against whomever the national interest required at the moment. And it was over this matter of discretion that Roosevelt and the Congress quarrelled for six years, from April 1933 to November 1939. In some of the legislation of the thirties Congress did grant the President discretion in some matters. But it was discretionary power over trade of nearly all kinds and especially over the arms traffic that Roosevelt wanted most and the only kind he ever wanted. When in 1935, therefore, the Congress made the arms embargo mandatory rather than discretionary and required that it be applied to aggressors and victims alike, the President immediately pointed out his dissatisfaction with it, arguing that it might drag the United States into war rather than keep her out. He signed the bill not only to appease isolationist sentiment, but also because, as it so happened at the moment, it was believed it would work more against Italy, the aggressor, than against Ethiopia, the victim, in the then impending war.¹³

When Japan attacked China in 1937 Roosevelt faced the kind of situation he had feared in 1935. In this case it was China, the victim, who would be hurt most by an embargo, so Roosevelt reasoned. So he stalled, putting off imposing the embargo, "beating about the bush," as he later put it, and gave as his excuse the fact that since neither China nor Japan had officially declared war, a proclamation from him was not mandatory. When at the same time lifting the embargo from the Spanish Civil War would have helped Franco, Roosevelt declared that that "would not have been neutrality; I would have been playing into the hands of Franco."¹⁴ The Spanish Civil War was a perfect example of Roosevelt's contention that the embargo should be flexible and discretionary; for as the fortunes of the war changed the President also needed to be able to change. Unable to do so he became so confused he did not know what was best to do and he ended by making mistakes he regretted later.¹⁵

In time the restraints of the neutrality acts so chafed the President that he wished there had never been any neutrality legislation at all. As war clouds became more menacing, therefore, Roosevelt began urging repeal of the legislation, or at least repeal of the arms embargo; and when in the spring and early summer

of 1939 Congress refused to heed his request he went so far as to wonder if it might be within his constitutional powers simply to ignore the law.¹⁶

The hostile reaction to the President's Quarantine Speech of October 1937 caused him to postpone temporarily any vigorous efforts to implement his own conception of neutrality. He was delighted, however, that his speech had "stirred up the animals"; and by the time of the Munich crisis a year later, he seems to have decided that he could no longer afford to wait. He had no intention of asking the American people to remain neutral in thought, as Wilson had done in 1914. Rather he intended to "strongly encourage their natural sympathy" towards the democracies.¹⁷ When in the spring of 1939 Congress refused to repeal the Neutrality Act, moreover, Roosevelt decided he would try to deter the dictators and help their victims in spite of Congress.

When war in Europe broke out in September 1939, therefore, Roosevelt refused to ask the American people to remain neutral in thought. Instead he even encouraged hostility toward the Axis. When Russia moved into Poland, he decided not to apply the Neutrality Act for fear it might push the Soviets further into Hitler's arms. He also again asked Congress to repeal the arms embargo in a speech impregnated with subterfuge, never once admitting that his real objective was to aid England and France. By the end of 1940, after the fall of France, the "destroyer deal," and the third-term election, and when he knew the country was willing to become the "arsenal of democracy," he no longer cared whether his policy was called neutrality or unneutrality. Whatever it was, he declared, it was no more unneutral for the United States to send aid to her friends than it was for "Sweden, Russia and other nations near Germany to send steel and ore and oil and other war materials into Germany every day." The impartial type of neutrality had not protected Norway, Belgium, or the Netherlands, he declared, and the United States had no intention of emulating them.¹⁸

Naturally, the implementation of Roosevelt's views required many evasions. Like Lincoln, he was no slave to the law—except when it suited his purposes—and like Lincoln, he put the security of the nation above the law. At the time of the Munich crisis, therefore, he told the Cabinet that in the event of war, the neutrality laws should be carried out with all doubts resolved in favor of the democracies.¹⁹ On the eve of Hitler's attack on Poland in 1939 he told the Cabinet that if war was declared, he intended

using all possible devices to delay application of the Neutrality Act. He wanted the State and Justice Departments to be slow getting proclamations to his desk while all manufacturers were urged to rush all possible arms aboard ship and out to sea or over to Canada.²⁰ He ordered that the German liner *Bremen* be detained in port on one pretext or another for forty-eight hours so she could not dash to safety.²¹ And he later described many other subterfuges that might be tried to deter the aggressors and to aid Britain and France.²² He did not think minor violations of international law would get the United States into the war, for he did not feel that such factors would be important in influencing the dictators' decisions as to whether or not to attack the United States.²³

During the last year and a half or so before Pearl Harbor Roosevelt placed the United States in the role of a quasi-belligerent. He continued to assert that the United States was a neutral. But he was convinced that the breakdown of the world order required vigorous action from the United States and that the democracies must be aided regardless of what that aid was called.

His aid to the democracies by what he called "methods short of war" was based on the assumption, however, that while the democracies would need the help of America's industrial power, they would not need American fighting men unless they were pushed to the wall. On the eve of Munich he felt assured that a defensive war by the democracies, aided by American industrial power, would be all that was necessary to bring Hitler to his knees.²⁴ He wanted it made clear to the dictators, however, that American aid to the democracies would be available. Wilson had erred in 1914, he thought, in not making it clear early enough where the United States stood and he did not want that to happen again. When, therefore, Congress refused to repeal the arms embargo in the spring of 1939 the President was convinced that if the dictators started a war "an important part of the responsibility will rest" on Congress.²⁵

Nor was he worried that his "methods short of war" might get the United States embroiled. Germany was too clever, he thought, to bring America into the war against herself over minor incidents. Thus he felt safe in getting the arms embargo repealed, giving Britain some destroyers, sending lend-lease aid, patrolling the North Atlantic, arming merchant ships, and engaging in a variety of other actions "short of war."²⁶

The sources used for this study do not reveal when Roosevelt

decided the United States would have to enter World War II as a belligerent. There is no certainty, in fact, that he ever came to such a conclusion before Pearl Harbor. All anyone seems to have gotten from the President was a *feeling* that he had made such a decision.

The possibility of the United States getting embroiled in war in a fast disintegrating world was, of course, always a reality in Roosevelt's mind, although probably a remote possibility. As noted previously, Roosevelt was never an advocate of peace at any price and as early as 1932 he had remarked privately that a war with Japan then might be better than one later. At each later crisis the possibility of America's fighting also occurred to him.²⁷ It was largely from the early spring of 1941 on that occasional comments dropped by Roosevelt to his associates produced a *feeling* that he had decided that the United States must enter the fray. But all were merely speculating; no one really knew what was in the President's mind; and all we are safe in concluding is that by the fall of 1941 Roosevelt *seems* to have decided that the aggressors could not be stopped without the use of American military power, and he was giving some thought to the manner in which the United States might become a belligerent.²⁸

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THE ROOSEVELTIAN APPROACH TO A NEW ORDER

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THROUGHOUT the long period during which Franklin Roosevelt was watching the disintegration of the old world order and was worrying his way toward a geopolitical answer of that challenge to the United States he also spent a great deal of time thinking and dreaming of the kind of world he would like to see in the future.

Naturally, his thinking and dreaming about a New Order were conditioned largely—as so with all men—by the nature of his own mind, his own temperament, and his own life experiences. Mentally and temperamentally, for example, he was an optimist, a practical idealist, a humanitarian, and a reformer; and it was inevitable that his grand design for a new world order would reflect those characteristics. His background was that of an American who had lived all his years within the Western-Christian-liberal tradition and it was equally inevitable that his grand design would contain the basic principles of that tradition, particularly those principles current in his own lifetime such as individual liberty and democracy, principles that he assumed were of universal validity and should be applied everywhere.

In addition, Roosevelt was the heir of a liberal program for a new world order that began developing before World War I, a program that Woodrow Wilson finally accepted and that was kept alive during the interwar years by a small group of internationalists scattered throughout the Western world. The basic assumptions of this liberal program were that: (1) power politics were

wicked and should be replaced by a democratically controlled diplomacy; (2) that armaments should be limited or abolished and their production placed under international control; (3) that such waterways as the Panama, Suez, and Kiel canals and straits like those of Gibraltar and the Dardanelles should be internationalized; (4) that self-determination be allowed all dependent peoples to whom it was feasible; and (5) that an international organization be established with economic and military force behind it.¹

Roosevelt was also the heir of the three great goals of mankind in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries—Equality, Liberty, and Plenty. The goals of Equality and Liberty were essentially popularized, of course, in the latter half of the eighteenth century, were glorified in the American Declaration of Independence and the French Rights of Man, and became entrenched throughout much of the Western world in the nineteenth century via Bills of Rights, an ever-expanding suffrage, and the opening of educational opportunities to the masses. The equally magnificent goal of Plenty did not capture the imagination of much of the world until the latter part of the nineteenth century when it became clear that the industrial revolution could in time provide all men everywhere with an abundance of worldly goods. By the time Roosevelt appeared, however, all three of these goals—Equality, Liberty, and Plenty—were fascinating the minds of men and he accepted them without question.

At this point, however, it is Roosevelt's temperamental biases at which we might well take a good look; for the way he looked at the world, the way he felt about human affairs in general, the manner in which he approached problems, especially the problem of building a new world order, had an enormous influence on the grand design to be described later.

The first thing to be noted about Roosevelt's approach to the world around him is that it was almost invariably the goals, the aims, the great objectives he was seeking that fascinated him and on which he constantly kept his eyes. It was where he was going rather than how he would get there that interested him. Although he sometimes showed an interest in the methods necessary to reach his goals, he asserted repeatedly that methods were details of secondary importance and that on big issues it was only the objective that was important.

There were many ways to great objectives, he seemed to think, and compromise on getting to them was simply the better part of

wisdom. Quarreling and quibbling about methods was either useless or perhaps evidence that the quarrelsome ones were really foes of the objective. This was especially evident in his attitude toward the League of Nations in the early years when United States participation was being debated. To him the League was simply an experiment. There was no reason to expect the Covenant to be any nearer perfect than our own Constitution which had been amended many times. Valid objections could be raised to details in the Covenant. He had read the draft three times, he said in 1919, and each time he had found something in it to which he objected. He thought the question of reservations was of little significance and was quite willing to compromise with Lodge and the Senate reservationists to achieve the grand goal. As late as 1925 he was willing to say, "I don't care how many restrictions or qualifications are put on our [participation]. In other words, I seek an end and do not care a rap about the methods of procedure."²

In calling for bold, persistent experimentation by government early in 1932 Roosevelt again expressed this preference, saying: "Let us not confuse objectives with methods True leadership calls for the setting forth of the objectives and the rallying of public opinion in support of them."³ Defending the New Deal in 1937 he sounded the same note: "You know," he said in Iowa, "a lot of people mix up objectives with methods; and sometimes, when they do not like the objectives they say, 'Oh yes, we do like the objectives, but we don't like the methods proposed by this particular fellow.' Well, I am not in love with any particular method; but I am in love with the particular objectives. . . ."⁴

This attitude led Roosevelt time and again, in the handling of international relations, to concentrate on the development of general principles and the achievement of major objectives and to look upon many important matters connected with his objectives as mere worrisome details that could be settled later by subordinates. He regarded his May 1933 proposals to the World Disarmament Conference as general principles that should be accepted and asserted the Administration had not bothered yet to consider such "details" as sanctions or other means to enforce the principles.⁵ At Teheran one objective, he said later, was to get agreement around the table on the question of recreating a completely self-governing and independent Poland, and that "details" like Poland's boundaries could be postponed.⁶

This view seemed to be especially prominent in his postwar

planning. When quizzed by the press about his plans he often insisted he was busy only with developing general principles, working out objectives, and the press was too interested in insignificant minor matters. "When people ask the details about an objective," he told the press one day, "I say, 'I am not interested' or 'I am not ready to talk' or 'we haven't studied the methods and the details.' " What was important was a meeting of minds on objectives. "I never worry much," he added, "if we have a six months' debate in Congress . . . as to methods or details . . . as long as we are agreed on objectives." Thus to him the many conferences among foreign ministers or national representatives such as those at Bretton Woods or Hot Springs, Virginia, in 1943 were exploratory and designed so that basic principles and objectives regarding world problems could be agreed to. The exact nature of the international organization's structure was to him mere details. The 1943 Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers was "engaged in considering the big things—the objectives," he asserted, and he was irritated by those people who wanted to see all the t's crossed and all the i's dotted.⁸

In his Annual Message to Congress in 1945 he begged Congress not to expect "perfectionism" in the postwar world and reminded the Congress that it was an insistence on perfectionism in 1919 that had prevented the United States from joining the League and cooperating with other nations to prevent the anarchy that had caused the world so much trouble.⁹ A month later while urging adoption of the Bretton Woods Agreements he again asked the Congress not to quibble and let details get in the way of great objectives. Regarding the agreements he said, "It would be a tragedy if differences of opinion on minor details should lead us to sacrifice the basic agreement achieved on the major problems."¹⁰ Thus the attainment of a major objective was always worth a few compromises, or errors that could be corrected later.

It was this emphasis on grand objectives that gave Roosevelt a reputation as an idealist—and an idealist he was. There seemed to be no doubt at all in his mind that throughout the ages mankind had been inspired and lifted to great achievements by lofty ideals. Thus there was nothing to lose and there was everything to gain by urging men everywhere to hitch their wagon to a star, to everlastingly focus their aspirations on utopian goals such as those embodied in the Ten Commandments, the Sermon on the Mount, the Declaration of Independence, and his own Four Freedoms. And men also, he thought, had to be reminded repeatedly

of their great ideals and from time to time given new or reformulated ones lest they become weary of striving toward ever more glorious planes of life.

Yet the President knew very well that the magnificent ideals and dreams that men had built up throughout the centuries were not really attainable. At best they could only be approached or approximated. He was realistic enough, in other words, to realize that the best man could ever do was to make painfully slow steps along a path strewn with countless obstacles and the heights of heaven would never really be reached. But no progress would be made at all, he thought, unless one first had ideals, kept one's eyes on those ideals, and then moved toward them in the most practicable manner the circumstances allowed. It was equally important, moreover, never to become discouraged by the fact that progress toward ideals moved at a snail's pace.

It was this remarkable combination of realism and idealism in Roosevelt's nature that has caused him to be called a "practical idealist"; and there is no doubt that it greatly influenced his grand design for a new world order.

This practical idealism was not dominant in Roosevelt until his relatively mature years, for in his youth he seemed to have little sympathy with idealism. In 1914 he interpreted Josephus Daniel's sadness concerning the outbreak of World War I as due to the shock it was causing Daniel's "faith in human nature and civilization and similar idealistic nonsense. . . ."¹¹ Straining at the leash as Assistant Secretary of the Navy to get the United States militarily prepared, he wrote his wife that what the country needed was the truth about the weaknesses of the Army and Navy "instead of a lot of soft mush about everlasting peace which so many statesmen are handing out to a gullible public."¹² In 1916 he scoffed at the advocates of world government as soft-headed "extremists," arguing that while he too agreed in the hope there might some day be world government, differences among the earth's people were still so great that it was silly to expect such a millennium in the foreseeable future and the need for armaments and adequate military forces would long remain.¹³

By 1919, of course, Roosevelt, like millions of other people, got caught up in the wave of Wilsonian idealism sweeping the land—and he rode the wave. But he remained reserved, cautious. Admitting his late conversion he said, "Last spring I thought the League of Nations merely a beautiful dream, a Utopia." But it was a time of idealism, he went on; the people wanted something

done about peace; the world looked to the United States for action; and the experiment with the League was worth a try. But it always remained merely an experiment that might or might not succeed.¹⁴

Nor did this strong streak of realism ever desert him. There were no painless panaceas for the world's ills, he warned regarding the Bok peace awards in 1923. "The world patient cannot be cured over night," he said, "by a simple surgical operation. A systematic course of treatment extending through the years will prove the only means of saving his life."¹⁵ Speaking in 1938 he again scoffed at "people with panaceas for reforming the world overnight. . .," declaring that while such members of the "lunatic fringe" were not really lunatics, "a little push would shove them over the line."¹⁶ During the war he justified the Darlan deal in North Africa on the grounds of realism, arguing that it was often necessary in this practical world to make deals with the devil; and he frequently illustrated his point thereafter by repeating an old Balkan proverb, approved by the Orthodox Church he insisted, that asserted: "It is permitted to you, my child, in time of danger to walk with the Devil until you have crossed the bridge."¹⁷ Again during the war, Roosevelt boasted of his realism, saying when asked to describe Stalin after his meeting at Teheran: "I would call him something like me—he is a realist."¹⁸

The idealism that began to dilute Roosevelt's realism in 1919 continued to grow, however, until the two were in workable balance. Although he continued to berate those he thought were seeking to reform the world into utopia overnight, the value of dreams and ideals became ever more apparent.¹⁹ As he matured, his admiration for Wilson's ability to arouse people on profound questions increased. He believed the people of the United States responded well to great moral visions, yet he realized, as he wrote to Ray Stannard Baker in 1935, that it was difficult, because of the nature of man, to keep men's minds "attuned for long periods of time to a constant repetition of the highest note in the scale."²⁰ But he had no doubt that a democracy should be concerned not only with what *is*, as the realists insisted, but also with "things as they ought to be." And he added, "I am not talking mere idealism; I am expressing realistic necessity."²¹ He had always felt, he wrote in 1938, that in spite of the "soulless decade" of the twenties, the idealism of the Theodore Roosevelt and Wilson eras had never been snuffed out; democratic ideals had simply lain dormant in that decade; and although it had taken the catastrophe of the

Depression to "focus public attention once more on ideals in government. . .," the awakening had occurred.²²

With the outbreak of World War II Roosevelt's idealism came into full bloom and he drew on it repeatedly to arouse people both at home and abroad to greater efforts. When planning a post-war refugee program in 1939, Roosevelt became impatient for quicker action on a large scale and wrote to Sumner Welles: "Somebody has to breathe heart and ideals on a large scale into this whole subject if it is to be put into effect on a world-wide basis."²³ But even during the war he could not forget the need to be practical at the same time. When criticized by some members of the American Youth Congress in 1940 for not achieving more reforms he reminded them that Lincoln had been a sad man "because he could not do all he wanted to do at one time, and I think you will find examples where Lincoln had to compromise to gain a little something. He had to compromise to make a few gains. Lincoln was one of those unfortunate people called a 'politician' but he was a politician who was practical enough to get a great many things for this country. He was a sad man because he couldn't get it all at once. And nobody can. . . . If you ever sit here, you will learn that you cannot, just by shouting from the housetops, get what you want all the time."²⁴

The proclamation of the Four Freedoms and the Atlantic Charter represented Roosevelt's most conspicuous attempts to set before mankind a set of ideals toward which he thought all should strive. He virtually sneered at those who looked upon the Four Freedoms and the Charter as "crazy altruism" or "starry-eyed dreaming" and compared them to all those who throughout history had been scornful of the great and inspiring goals raised in their time.²⁵ At Ottawa in 1943 he lashed out at such critics, saying:

I get everlastingly angry at those who assert vociferously that the four freedoms and the Atlantic Charter are nonsense because they are unattainable. If those people had lived a century and a half ago they would have sneered and said that the Declaration of Independence was utter piffle. If they had lived nearly a thousand years ago they would have laughed uproariously at the ideals of the Magna Carta. And if they had lived several thousand years ago they would have derided Moses when he came from the Mountain with the Ten Commandments.²⁶

It was the ideals of men like Washington that had made the American Revolution successful, said Roosevelt, for ideals were

essential to the accomplishment of great deeds. Neither the violation of the Ten Commandments nor the unattainability of all the goals of the Four Freedoms or the Atlantic Charter detracted from the value or necessity of such documents. There was never any doubt in his mind that there would have to be compromises with the principles of the Atlantic Charter just as there had been with Wilson's Fourteen Points. He had been as realistic as possible when drafting the Charter, he thought, particularly in his insistence on toning down the clause concerning a future international organization to something he thought his public at home would accept and he himself, then hostile to international organization in general, could also accept. Obviously, the postwar peace structure would be imperfect, so imperfect that "the world will be mighty lucky if it gets 50% of what it seeks out of the war as a permanent success. That might be a high average."²⁷ But these imperfections did not destroy the fact that documents like the Fourteen Points and the Atlantic Charter were "major contributions" toward mankind's struggle toward a better life.²⁸

Doubt has sometimes been cast on the sincerity of Roosevelt's idealism; but Harry Hopkins, the President's closest confidant for many years, once gave eloquent testimony to the fact that there was nothing false about it. Robert Sherwood has reported, at any rate, that one night after hearing the President dictate some speech material of a petulant and vindictive tone, Sherwood went, depressed, to tell Hopkins about it. Assuring Sherwood that the President was probably just getting some anger off his chest and would have forgotten the whole thing by morning, Hopkins added, in "a way that was very unusual for him":

You and I are for Roosevelt because he's a great spiritual figure, because he's an idealist, like Wilson, and he's got the guts to drive through against any opposition to realize those ideals. Oh—he sometimes tries to appear tough and cynical and flippant, but that's an act he likes to put on, especially at press conferences. He wants to make the boys think he's hard-boiled. Maybe he fools some of them now and then—but don't let him ever fool you, or you won't be any use to him. You can see the real Roosevelt when he comes out with something like the Four Freedoms. And don't get the idea that those are any catch phrases. *He believes them!* He believes they can be practically attained.²⁹

Roosevelt himself summed up his general attitude in 1943 in a letter on peace plans to General Jan Christian Smuts saying, "As you know, I dream dreams but am, at the same time, an intensely

practical person. . . ."³⁰ Such deep-seated practical idealism in the Roosevelt temperament could not help influencing his thinking on international relations.

A temperamental characteristic that greatly influenced Roosevelt's planning for a new world order was his urge to reform things. He could no more help trying to re-make the world, when he got a chance to do so, than he could help eating and sleeping. Throughout his life he showed a zest for change and experimentation and gloried in visions of the new and better future that change would bring.

When he entered public life in 1910 the reform age known in American history as the Progressive Era was still moving along at a merry clip with reforms galore being applied to the nation's governments at all levels. Roosevelt quickly embraced many of the progressive ideals, delighted in the progressivism of both Theodore Roosevelt and Wilson, and won his own first national fame by fighting conservative bosses in his first session of the New York legislature.³¹ Always eager to reform something, during the twenties he tried to inaugurate a reformation of the Democratic Party, largely to make it again the progressive party it had once been.³² As Governor of New York his progressivism again showed through in programs mildly anticipating the New Deal and in a propensity for new departures and experimentation.³³ According to his own testimony, written in 1938, Roosevelt was also a reformer from the day he entered the White House. Revival and recovery were then needed most, he agreed; but reform was also needed to cure, not just arrest diseases in the American system. "Old abuses had to be uprooted," he wrote in the introduction to the 1933 volume of his public papers, "so that they could not readily grow again."³⁴ "When a man is convalescing from illness," he said in his Annual Message of 1935, "wisdom dictates not only cure of the symptoms, but also removal of the cause."³⁵ And he loved such change, looked forward to it, telling the Young Democrats in 1936 that in this rapidly changing world in which the forces of modern society must be brought under control "the period of social pioneering is only in its beginning" and it needed the same faith, heroism, and vision that pioneers of old had used to subdue nature.³⁶

Society would be in much healthier condition, thought Roosevelt, were it not for the fact that public apathy toward reform was very great and progressives were not in control of public affairs long enough or often enough. Progressives might be in con-

trol of affairs more often and get more done, he told a Milton Academy audience in 1926, if they were not so frequently divided among themselves on the means by which their goals were to be reached. The result was that conservatives were in control of human affairs most of the time and social and economic experiments were few and far between.³⁷ He had learned this from Wilson, he wrote a friend in 1931, who had told him early in his public life that "it is only once in a generation that a people can be lifted above material things. That is why conservative government is in the saddle two-thirds of the time."³⁸ This meant, however, that when progressives were in the saddle they had to move fast, strike while the iron was hot, reform and reform while public feeling was sympathetic, for soon both apathy and the conservatives would return and it would be too late.³⁹

But there was no doubt in Roosevelt's mind that unless a reform movement appeared occasionally there would be revolution. Unless the United States had effective government of a progressive nature, he insisted in 1920, we would experience "the spread of doctrines which seek to effect change by unconstitutional means."⁴⁰ When the Depression revealed danger from both the Communist left and what he considered a Greek-style oligarchy of the right, Roosevelt wrote privately to a friend in 1930 that "there is no question in my mind that it is time for the country to become fairly radical for at least one generation. History shows that where this occurs occasionally, nations are saved from revolutions."⁴¹ As the Depression deepened his letters increasingly argued that what America needed most was a good dose of "sane radicalism."⁴² By this he meant reform, of course, the kind of radicalism that preserved institutions by bringing them up to date, not the kind of radicalism that overthrew institutions.

As President this attitude continued. In his 1932 acceptance speech he warned that the radicals of the country rather than being stopped would simply be provoked and challenged by a reactionary program.⁴³ By 1936 he was claiming that it was the reform programs of the New Deal that had saved the democratic and capitalistic systems of the United States from overthrow. "We were against revolution," he told a Syracuse audience. "Therefore we waged war against those conditions which make revolutions. . . ."⁴⁴ One of Roosevelt's favorite maxims, Rosenman has declared, was Macaulay's dictum, "Reform if you would preserve."⁴⁵ Thus it was little wonder that Roosevelt finally concluded that if civilization was to be saved, the relations among states must be reformed.

Roosevelt brought to his thinking on international relations a humanitarianism that had considerable impact on his new order. It was an interest in and feeling for man as a human being that grew out of both a sincere affection for man in the concrete and the moral rules of the circle in which he was reared that held that man is responsible for the welfare of his fellow man. He thought constantly in terms of people, illustrated his points repeatedly in terms of individual persons he knew or fictitious individual characters he dreamed up, and set his goals and methods in terms of their impact on real people.⁴⁶ He was responsive to the ethical climate of the Progressive Era and soaked up its sense of social justice, Frances Perkins reported, concluding that poverty was destructive, wasteful, demoralizing, unChristian, and at the same time preventable, so that there was no good reason why decent human beings should be subjected to it.⁴⁷ Moley verified the realness of Roosevelt's humanitarianism, reporting even after his break with the President that Roosevelt really felt for the underprivileged, that from the bottom of his heart he wanted other people to be as happy as he was, that he really liked the people to whom he waved as his train went by, that he honestly wanted to protect the weak from the strong.⁴⁸ In a radio address in behalf of crippled children in 1941 Roosevelt himself referred to "the right of the unfortunate" to a good life as part of American philosophy, and declared "we believe in and insist on the right of the helpless, the right of the weak, and the right of the crippled everywhere to play their part in life—and survive."⁴⁹

In 1935 he told the press that his social objective was "to try to increase the security and happiness of a larger number of people . . . ; to give them more of the good things of life, to give them greater distribution not only of wealth in the narrow terms, but of wealth in the wider terms; to give them places to go in the summer time—recreation; to give them assurance that they are not going to starve in their old age; to give honest business a chance to go ahead and make a reasonable profit, and to give everyone a chance to earn a living."⁵⁰ When the 1940 Democratic Convention was bucking the acceptance of Henry Wallace as his running-mate, Roosevelt wrote out a statement declining the nomination (to be sent if Wallace was not accepted), charging the Party with putting money before human values and declaring he would have no part of it.⁵¹

In international affairs Roosevelt reacted with revulsion against Hitler's racial persecution and against the sadistic cruelty of the

German Army in Poland; against editorials in American newspapers objecting to the use of some of our food to keep people in devastated countries from starving; and against a host of war crimes.⁵² Although he finally accepted the inevitability of total war and vigorous offensive action as the best way to save lives in the long run, as of 1938 and 1939 he was still hoping the West would fight a purely defensive war with a minimum of suffering and the least possible loss of life and property consistent with the need to bring Hitler to his knees; and he hoped both sides would refrain from bombing civilians and unfortified cities.⁵³ The European refugee problem particularly disturbed Roosevelt, and although not much ever came of his efforts to alleviate the situation, he looked upon whatever was done as common-sense humanitarian activity that decent people would do for any people who were starving and helpless.⁵⁴

Thus there should be no surprise that Roosevelt's theory of international relations was impregnated with a heavy dose of humanitarianism.

By far the most important characteristic in Roosevelt's temperament, however, was his perennial optimism. This he made visible in three ways: (1) his idea of progress; (2) his view of the nature of man; and (3) his faith in improvement by education.

Roosevelt's idea of progress was most eloquently expressed in an address he made at Milton Academy in 1926. At that time he was still trying to recover from his polio illness, was still trying to learn to walk again, and his political future seemed only a dark void. Yet he revealed himself as a man of infinite optimism, veritably glorying in the exuberance and swift changes of modern civilization, seemingly without doubt that nearly all the changes spelled progress toward a better life. He sounded as if he was bursting with enthusiasm for the new day, the new generation, and the ever newer times to come.

There he expounded his optimistic theory of history, confessing he had acquired it from his old schoolmaster, Dr. Endicott Peabody at Groton, who had taught him that progress in the world has its periodic ups and downs, but that the up-curve is always longer and there is a net advance in the end. Thus the long-run trend of history is ever upward. Tracing the history of Western civilization from antiquity to the present, Roosevelt concluded that the world since 1875 had experienced the most rapid spurt of change and progress in its history and the tempo of change and progress was still increasing. He ridiculed the idea of oppos-

ing change by attempting to put a halo around the world of the past and declared that for himself he preferred to think of the future and the enormous progressive changes he saw ahead in medical science, transportation, agriculture, the physical sciences, in all fields of human endeavor.

Applying this idea to international affairs, Roosevelt told his Milton Academy audience that every trend in modern science pointed toward greater unification of mankind and made isolation more difficult. Seeing laws of progress at play in history, he pointed to the then popular notion that political institutions began with small communities which coalesced into small states; these in turn came together into nations, and these nations then formed alliances, until at last the alliances were now concerted into a permanent congress of nations—the League of Nations. Surely science was forcing cooperation among all peoples and continents.⁵⁵

This hopeful looking toward the future was a basic characteristic not only of Roosevelt's inherent nature, but also of his political life. In his 1920 acceptance speech he had emphasized the idea of progress, seeing in a "return to normalcy" then so widely advocated, a turning back in a futile effort to recapture "good old days" that were gone forever. Again he preferred to look to future and better days.⁵⁶ Even defeat failed usually to puncture his optimism. After his 1935 failure to persuade the Senate to ratify United States membership in the World Court, for example, Roosevelt confessed to Elihu Root that the "wind everywhere blows against us"; but he refused to lose hope, saying, "In time we shall win the long fight for judicial decisions of international problems."⁵⁷ Even the catastrophe of war failed to dishearten him completely, and in his 1939 message to the Pope he recalled that although the world had gone through similar dark ages in the past, such periods had invariably been succeeded by a rebirth of order, culture, and religion.⁵⁸ The outcome of the war, he declared later, would determine whether or not man's "march of progress" would proceed or be temporarily halted.⁵⁹ When reports came to him that some instructors in the army were "pooh poohing" the idea that men were fighting for a better world, the President told Rosenman that he wanted to counter this in his next speech, adding, "The best advice I can give to the boys in our service is to pay little attention to instructors who have never had a thought of a better world in which America can live in the future."⁶⁰ In his Fourth Inaugural he again quoted Dr. Peabody's theory of history, emphasizing that "the great fact to remember

is that the trend of civilization [despite its ups and downs] itself is forever upwards. . . ."⁶¹ Through press conferences he also liked to assure the people fighting the war that the world certainly will get better "if we work for it . . .," or to proclaim, as he did enroute home from Yalta, that during the war "there has not been a period of six months going by without some marked step toward a better world."⁶²

Unlike the advocates of the idea of progress in the eighteenth century, however, Roosevelt was talking about society or civilization, not individual man. He gave no indication whatever that he believed the individual was improving in quality and he certainly indicated no faith in the perfectibility of man. Always it was the group, the community, which by new ideas and new techniques of managing human affairs, or by broader visions, we assume, that was rising to ever and ever higher levels of existence.

Roosevelt's view of the nature of man was equally optimistic; for he had what Hanson Baldwin has called a "great inner well-spring" of faith in man.⁶³ So great was his faith in the courage and ability of men, his wife declared, that she never heard him say there was a problem he thought human beings could not solve. He often recognized difficulties, declared Mrs. Roosevelt, and he often said *he* did not know the answer; but he was completely confident there *was* an answer and somewhere a man could be found who knew it. The problem was to find that man.⁶⁴

One reason for his faith in man was his belief that the vast majority of men—90% was the figure he usually used—were "good." They were morally good, that is, living as best they could by the Ten Commandments and the Golden Rule as interpreted by Endicott Peabody (as Burns puts it), or good in that they tried to live according to the "simple rules of human conduct to which we always go back" or according to old-fashioned standards of rectitude learned at Sunday school or in respectable families, standards he never thought to question and saw no need to question.⁶⁵ "To his dying day," wrote Frances Perkins, "he held to the philosophy that 'If you treat people right they will treat you right—ninety per cent of the time.'" And by right he meant "fair" and "decent."⁶⁶

In his research one biographer noticed that Roosevelt's simple distinction between Good and Evil cropped up repeatedly, so that his speeches often sounded like sermons, deadly serious moral guides for the people to follow, and no political motivation was noticeable. Foreign leaders, even those seemingly beyond redemp-

tion, were sent sermon after sermon, some for the record, to be sure, but more often expressions of faith in the ultimate goodness and reasonableness of all men.⁶⁷

It was this ninety per cent of the "good" peoples of the world that in the thirties wanted peace and disarmament but were blocked by the other ten per cent, Roosevelt asserted.⁶⁸ Ninety per cent of all journalists were "good" and only ten per cent violated the rules and ethics of his press conferences.⁶⁹ Ninety per cent of all business men were patriotic and cooperative with the Department of State's moral embargo against Spanish belligerents, while only ten per cent were greedy enough to violate it.⁷⁰ Ninety per cent of the "plain people" everywhere wanted to remove trade barriers, end the war of nerves, and devote themselves to better standards of living rather than to armaments.⁷¹ When there was apathy in the war effort, he was certain "the real trouble is not in the people," but rather in a small gang of old isolationists.⁷²

Unfortunately this great body of good people in the world were often ignorant, thoughtless, and misled, but even that could be corrected, thought Roosevelt; for man was not bound by fate; he had free will, even to prevent the catastrophe of war. "Men are not prisoners of fate," he said in 1939, "but only prisoners of their minds. They have within themselves the power to become free at any moment."⁷³

The answer was education; for to Roosevelt man was not only "good," he was also a reasoning animal, blessed with common sense, and endowed with a deep desire to do the right thing when he learned what it was. Unfortunately men were slow to learn and the educator had to be tirelessly patient. But he seems to have sincerely believed that "the greatest duty of a statesman is to educate": for the act of governing includes not only the act of formulating policy, but also the act of achieving as much of the policy as will receive public support by the political techniques of "persuading, leading, teaching always. . . ."⁷⁴

Throughout his public life Roosevelt clung to his faith that virtually all men (his 90 per cent) would respond to education. One biographer noted that when Roosevelt found himself unable to arouse officialdom to take preparedness seriously before World War I, he forthwith set himself up as a one-man school teacher for the nation, educating the people about their need of military defenses and treating hecklers with the patience of a schoolmaster facing dull pupils.⁷⁵ During the market boom of the twenties he preferred education to government regulation to stop investors

from losing money on securities.⁷⁶ During the 1928 campaign he expressed hope that education would someday obliterate the religious bigotry heaped on Al Smith.⁷⁷ To overcome the opposition of a Republican legislature while he was Governor of New York he assumed again the role of the "benign schoolmaster," as Freidel puts it, whose task it was to lecture the people on the principles of government, often by radio; and he wrote a friend that he was inclined to think the day might come when every citizen would be compelled to attend a school of information once a week throughout life in order to overcome public ignorance.⁷⁸

With his New York experience fresh in mind he declared later that he made his first Fireside Chat from the White House only eight days after his inauguration because he felt "the average men and women of the nation" should be educated in non-technical language about the banking situation and what the Government intended doing about it.⁷⁹ Even the urge to imperialism then stirring abroad could be cured by education, he seemed to think in 1933. "It seems clear to me," he said, "that it is only through constant education and the stressing of the ideals of peace that those who still seek imperialism can be brought to live with the majority."⁸⁰ Even with the world disintegrating around him in 1937 he wrote Viscount Cecil, "I still believe in the eventual effectiveness of preaching and preaching again. That is the method I have used in our Latin American relationships and it seems to have succeeded."⁸¹

Samuel Rosenman has reported that Roosevelt usually tried to make sure before he proposed novel measures that "the people had all the facts before them, that they knew the reasons and the necessities, that they understood. . . ." For the President considered these prerequisites for popular support. In this light, therefore, Rosenman believed that in failing to do these things before his famous Quarantine Speech in 1937 the President made one of his rare mistakes.⁸² But Roosevelt wrote Colonel House that the speech produced less criticism than he expected and he implied that the speech itself was simply part of the slow process of making the people realize the dangers of isolation, a process he was certain would work; for "there is no question," he wrote, "that the people respond to simple common sense words and to some actual accomplishments which set them thinking along the right line."⁸³ Educating the people to the dangers of Nazism was a long process, he wrote a friend in London a few months later, but it "seems to be working slowly but surely."⁸⁴

Even a complicated global war could be understood by average people, Roosevelt thought, provided it was properly explained to them. One of Roosevelt's objectives in establishing the Office of War Information, Rosenman asserted, was "to keep Americans accurately informed on the progress of the war and on governmental war policies."⁸⁵ It was in his Fireside Chat of February 23, 1942, that the President revealed himself most dramatically as a patient schoolmaster with great confidence in the ability of the people to grasp at least the general meaning and strategy of the war. With the people notified beforehand to have maps before them, Roosevelt tried to give the public a sense of geographical distances, the relationship of seas and land masses, and the problems of battle and supply so that all would know where the Allies stood and the obstacles to be surmounted.⁸⁶ The next year while giving the press a great deal of similar information about the war, Roosevelt explained, "it takes me a certain amount of time to dig up stuff like what I have been talking about this morning, and last week. It's time consuming . . . but . . . it does lead up to a more sound public opinion. It gets them interested; teaches them geography; it teaches them problems of . . . supply; moving men overseas; the need for more ships; and the need for more planes, more everything else." Nor did he think the majority were harmed by the false information sometimes fed them by uninformed writers or political opportunists. "I think they understand that it's part of democracy" to have to separate fact from fancy; and he had such faith in "the common sense of the common people" that he was certain the overwhelming majority of them "know how to discriminate in their reading and radio listening" between truth and falsehood.⁸⁷

His most "profound respect" was reserved for the American people; for the Americans, wrote Frances Perkins, "seemed to him the best of all possible people; not necessarily the smartest on earth or the most powerful . . . but the ones with more goodness per thousand of population than in other countries"; and by goodness he meant good-heartedness, kindness.⁸⁸ James Farley noted that in 1933 Roosevelt sincerely believed his countrymen could be rallied to meet the test of the Depression.⁸⁹ "He had a firm belief in the collective wisdom of the American people when their interest was awakened," his wife wrote, "and they really understood the issues at stake."⁹⁰ "Give them all the facts," Rosenman had heard Roosevelt say, "and I would much rather trust the judgment of 130,000,000 Americans than I would that of any artificially selected few."⁹¹

As the years went by his respect for the American people increased until his faith in them was virtually "unbounded." By war's end he had seen them rise out of the Depression, pour out weapons for half a world, train vast military forces, and push back the aggressors. When listing some of these achievements in the 1944 campaign he said, "I admit that the figures seem fantastic—but the results were not impossible to those who had faith in America." All these accomplishments, moreover, had made the Americans "a seasoned and a mature people."⁹² Nor was this mere campaign "soft soap." Privately in 1943 he had written that Americans had learned much in the last quarter of a century and were not likely again to fall for the old line of the isolationists. "I am carrying on with the certainty in my own mind," he wrote John F. Carew, "that the common sense of the American people, in which Lincoln trusted so sublimely, will make it possible this time for us to work out a just and lasting peace."⁹³

Despite his belief in both the goodness of most men and the capacity of most men to respond to education, Roosevelt was practical enough to realize that there were also limitations on both their goodness and capacity. He was quite aware of the existence of evil on earth and never forgot that some of the world's people (ten per cent of them) were essentially evil or somehow or other misled.

Ignorance stood close to the top of Roosevelt's list of man's obstacles to understanding, and although he was quite aware of the widespread existence of ignorance he was repeatedly surprised when he discovered it. The results of a survey of opinion among farmers in New York on issues before the 1929 session of the state legislature appalled him. "What hits me most," he wrote Henry Morgenthau, Jr., "is the very high percentage of ignorance. I am not concerned about prejudice, personal stupidity or wrong thinking so much as by the sheer, utter, and complete ignorance displayed by such a large number of farmers." And it was then he expressed the view already mentioned that someday it might be necessary to make school attendance compulsory one day a week throughout life.⁹⁴ Although he felt sure that since 1914 the American people had become the best informed people in the world regarding international matters, he knew they were "still very badly informed" and had a long way to go.⁹⁵ And after receiving a confidential Gallup poll report in 1942 he was again "appalled by the percentage of people who have no clear idea of what the war is about."⁹⁶

Man's slowness to learn was also on Roosevelt's list of human

frailties. During the war he wrote Norman Thomas, the leader of the Socialist Party, that probably less than one per cent of the American people (including Thomas) understood the changes that had occurred in modern warfare during the past century. Ninety per cent still think of war in terms of 1812, 1861, or 1898 warfare simply because it takes several generations to catch up, he declared. "Very few people came to understand the lessons of the World War," he wrote, "even though twenty years went by."⁹⁷ When urged to speak more on the radio to arouse people from their apathy toward the war effort, Roosevelt answered that it would not work, for people could be moved along only so fast and if he talked too frequently, as he believed Churchill had done in England, he would lose his effectiveness.⁹⁸ It was the impatience of the radicals with man's slowness to learn, thought Roosevelt, that was a major cause of revolution and strife. He had seen too many radicals "trying to rush law and order off its feet, or seeking to put into effect new doctrines without consultation, without thought, without consideration of the whole mass of the people." Everyone of us, he added, "would like to see a state of perfection on earth. . . . But we know too that every great reform takes time and good judgment, and that too great haste often defeats its own ends."⁹⁹

Roosevelt also knew that high intelligence was rare and that people did not like to think unless they had to do so. Thus in one way the Depression was a blessing, he wrote a friend, since it forced people to think about fundamental principles, something they would not do in periods of prosperity.¹⁰⁰ One of the proudest achievements of the New Deal, he wrote H. G. Wells, was that it made people think, and although their thinking was not always straight, it was headed in the right direction.¹⁰¹ His belief in the rarity of high intelligence is also illustrated by a letter to Wells. Wells's idea of publishing a world encyclopedia was fine, wrote the President in 1937, "but I must tell you frankly that you are more good to the world writing books which hundreds of thousands of people read and discuss, than in catering to the intelligentsia—there are so few of them."¹⁰²

Yes, most men were good, fair, decent, kind, generous, endowed with considerable common sense and enough reasoning power to understand general principles and the broad outlines of major objectives when the facts were placed before them; and they had a great urge to respond and do the right thing once they were made to understand what the right thing was. But one should not

expect miracles of man. Ignorance, slowness to learn, reluctance to think, and the scarcity of high intelligence had to be lived with, tolerated, and accepted with patience by political leaders. At times public opinion would be wrong and things like the Ludlow Amendment, requiring a popular vote for a declaration of war, might result in disaster if adopted—as public opinion did so lead in 1898 when it forced President McKinley into war.¹⁰³ For people could occasionally be misled, as no doubt they had been in Germany by the Nazis and a controlled press—and as they might have been in the United States by the Republican press in 1936 had Americans been equally gullible!¹⁰⁴ In a Fireside Chat in 1938 he even told the people that he did not expect all of them to understand all public problems.¹⁰⁵ There would be even in America periods of hysteria, misinformation, and volcanic popular eruptions.¹⁰⁶ But in the long run the goodness, common sense, and reasoning power of men would carry the day. No wonder belief in the possibility of a better world never died.

It can be seen that as an architect of a new world order Roosevelt was essentially an optimistic, idealistic, humanitarian reformer whose major interest lay in formulating the great goals man was to seek and in drawing up the guiding principles he was to follow while seeking them. It is also clear that Roosevelt was at the same time a very practical down-to-earth student of human nature and a politician who had few illusions about the capacity of man to create a better world and was quite aware that no more than the foundation stones for the new edifice could be laid in his lifetime. He had no expectation of ever seeing in this imperfect world the complete fulfillment of his dreams.

Repeatedly he urged people not to expect too much too soon. For not only were many political reforms needed; economic and social reforms were needed as well. And he was quite aware that such vast movements move slowly. Perfectionism can be just as harmful as isolationism or imperialism in international affairs, he told Congress in January, 1945, and he hoped the postwar plans he presented would not be attacked, as the League proposal had been attacked because it was not perfect. We preferred international anarchy in 1919, he recalled, to cooperation with other nations who did not see and think exactly as we did; and we gave up hope of “gradually” achieving a better world because we did not have the courage to assume our responsibilities in an imperfect world. That we must not do again.¹⁰⁷ For “this generation has a rendezvous with destiny,” he declared a month later; and the

big question for this generation was: does it have the courage and vision to avail itself of the tremendous opportunity purchased at so great a cost to get civilization going again, and this time properly?¹⁰⁸ If civilization got going again in the right direction he would be satisfied; and at least that much he hoped to see.

Whatever was to be done presupposed, however, a period of peace—a durable peace; not for all time, but for at least a generation or so. Although an idealist, Roosevelt was too practical to see any hope of banishing all war for all time. When World War I began in 1914 he said, "I look for the time that war will cease, but it is not likely to be in my age nor that of my children."¹⁰⁹ And from that view he never deviated. In December 1939 he wrote his old friend William Allen White that "I do not entertain the thought of some of the statesmen of 1918 that the world can make, or we can help the world to achieve, a permanently lasting peace—that is a peace which we would visualize as enduring for a century or more. On the other hand, I do not want this country to take part in a patched up temporizing peace which would blow up in our faces in a year or two."¹¹⁰ The Munich peace was the kind of "patched up temporizing peace" he did not want, for it had been only an armed truce and no reconstruction of the world could be carried on during a mere truce.¹¹¹ The Versailles peace was also inadequate since it did not provide security and did not endure a long enough period.¹¹²


How long a period of peace Roosevelt envisaged is debatable. He told Molotov in May 1942 that he believed a peace could be established and guaranteed for at least twenty-five years, or as long as any of his, Stalin's, or Churchill's generation could expect to live; and that, declares Sherwood, is what Roosevelt meant when he spoke of the "foreseeable future."¹¹³ More often Roosevelt spoke in terms of a peace lasting fifty years, and sometimes even longer.¹¹⁴ Returning from Teheran he spoke of a peace lasting "many generations"; but he was also careful to note that "I don't say forever. None of us can look that far ahead."¹¹⁵ Apparently Roosevelt had never been deluded into believing that he or his generation possessed all the wisdom of the ages and he was quite willing to leave the distant future to posterity.¹¹⁶

But peace for a reasonable period was essential or nothing could be done, declared the President. At Cairo and Teheran, he told the Congress, the supreme objective of the conferences was security—economic, social, and moral as well as physical security "in a family of nations." Stalin, Chiang, and Churchill were all deeply

interested in the talks he had with them regarding "programs toward a better life" for their peoples, he declared. All wanted opportunities to develop their resources, to build industry, to improve education and individual opportunities, and to raise standards of living. But all knew that none of these advances would be possible if war or threats of war characterized the years ahead. Thus all wanted a "durable system of peace."¹¹⁷

No one could tell, of course, how the reforms would work out and Roosevelt himself had only modest hopes for them. Regarding the forthcoming United Nations Organization, he told the press in October 1944 that while the cooperating states were after a great objective, "we don't know if it is going to work. It doesn't guarantee peace forever, but we hope at least it will guarantee world peace while any of us today are still alive. That will be something." And at Yalta he expressed similar views.¹¹⁸

Given this reasonable period of peace the world could be reconstructed and started on a road that Roosevelt believed would lead toward a more satisfying life for almost everyone. His vision was not that of a revolutionist, but it was that of a reformer. What reforms he had in mind we shall now see.



THE GOOD NEIGHBOR IDEAL IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

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IN HIS grand design for a new world order Franklin Roosevelt aimed at nothing less than the creation of a new system of international relations.

For thousands of years men appear to have been divided into two great schools of thought as to how political societies in general and international relations in particular can and should be operated: the pessimistic and the optimistic schools.

The pessimistic school, dramatically represented by many Greek sophists, ancient Chinese legalists, by Hobbes and Machiavelli, and by such far different characters as Alexander Hamilton and Adolf Hitler, is called pessimistic simply because it takes a pessimistic view of the nature of man. The essence of the thinking of this school is that whatever might be man's capacity to be good, to love, to cooperate, and to reason, man is at least 51% motivated by hostility toward his fellow man. His behavior is at least 51% irrational and is dominated by selfishness, greed, hate, envy, and fear. Thus men are in constant fear of each other; they distrust each other and constantly suspect each other. Law, government, religion, and moral codes may restrain and limit man's evil nature, but they cannot completely eliminate the climate of hostility within which all political society moves. Thus politics is essentially a struggle for power wherein individuals and groups fight through political parties, elections, interest groups, violence, or what not for the control of the seats and instruments of power; for only when one possesses those seats and instruments can one feel secure and protect one's interests.

In international relations, assert the pessimists, the same climate of hostility prevails. But among nations the struggle is much worse than among individuals and domestic groups. For in the wide realm of interstate affairs there are few or no restraints. Law, government, religion, and moral codes are weak or non-existent. The conscience that restrains the behavior of man as an individual is also lacking, for there is no such thing as a collective conscience. Thus nations too are constantly in a state of war toward one another—suspicious, fearful, envious, greedy, and hostile; and a wise statesman will devote himself to accumulating as much power for his state as expediency permits, and will keep a vigilant and wary eye on all his neighbors. For no matter how friendly a neighbor might be today, he might well be a rival or enemy tomorrow. Faith and trust in other nations must ever remain limited while rivalry and hostility among them must ever be expected. To work for peace and goodwill on earth is wisdom but to expect to see more than a small amount of it is folly. Conflict, struggle, and hostility are inherent in the nature of politics in general and in international relations in particular. The first laws of statecraft are “Beware” and “Be Prepared,” for you know not with whom you deal.

Here, indeed, is the school of thought that has dominated political society, both domestic and international, from the beginning of time.

Yet it is a school of thought with which Franklin Roosevelt would not and could not be aligned. For he was a natural born optimist who was firmly convinced that despite man's failings and weaknesses, most men were essentially good and reasonable and quite capable of developing and ordering a political society not dominated by a climate of hostility.

Naive as such an optimistic view of the nature and capacity of man appears, it has been held by a distinguished group of thinkers reaching back into the dim vistas of antiquity. Confucius, Mencius, Mo Ti, Lao-tzu, and other Chinese moralists of the fourth, fifth, and sixth centuries before Christ opposed war, imperialism, and a double standard of morality for states and individuals in the firm belief that man was capable of being dominated by goodness, friendship, and cooperation. The Greek Stoics, to say nothing of the early Christians, believed human society was a global brotherhood held together by the goodwill predominant in the nature of man. In his sixteenth century *Utopia* Sir Thomas More argued that society could be directed into rational and co-

operative behavior by proper training and environment; and he refused to accept the premise that nations are natural enemies.

From Locke on through the eighteenth century age of enlightenment to Paine and Bentham a host of distinguished philosophers supported the optimistic view, arguing that by nature man was essentially a rational creature of goodwill capable of perceiving his own interests intelligently and perceiving that his own interests and the interests of all the world were complementary and harmonious, not conflicting. If man's attitude toward one another had been corrupted throughout history and needed to be changed, so be it; it could be done. So argued Thomas Paine in his *Age of Reason*. Throughout the nineteenth century, moreover, men like David Jayne Hill, United States ambassador to Germany under the first Roosevelt, refused to accept the doctrine of the balance of power theory which held that states are naturally hostile and power must be used to check power. Then came Woodrow Wilson, who not only adhered to the optimistic view of the nature of man but also wielded the great power of his office in a valiant but futile effort to bring into being a system of interstate relations based on his premise.

Which school of thinkers is right—the pessimistic or the optimistic? Here, indeed, we have the Gordian knot in the problem of international relations. If the pessimists are right, the chances of peace and goodwill on earth are very remote. If the optimists are correct, the chances are considerable.

The traditional American view of the nature of man has been that Americans were good, rational, cooperative, and generous but that the peoples of other lands—or at least their leaders—were wicked, selfish, narrow, and uncooperative. Only during the heat of World Wars I and II, under the leadership of Wilson and Roosevelt, have the people of the United States as a whole accepted the optimistic view of the nature of men elsewhere and agreed to work for a new system of international relations based on that premise. But faith in the idea that the rest of the world could be trusted did not last. Once the smoke of battle was gone this optimistic view of other peoples began to vanish also.

But much as Roosevelt adored the American people, he was not so biased, and there is no doubt where he stood. He was quite aware that man was inherently schizophrenic: capable of both hate and love, competition and cooperation, fear and trust, selfishness and altruism, irrationality and rationality. But he was also firmly convinced that under the proper guidance the better quali-

ties of men could be brought to prevail. If the international relations of the thirties were Hobbesian—beastly, brutish, and nasty—they need not remain so. For, as he declared in his Annual Message in January 1943, World War II was really between those who had faith in mankind and those who did not; and those with faith and hope in a decent and better world were on the march.¹

Thus Roosevelt wanted to reform international relations spiritually and morally. He wanted the good neighbor policy applied universally; or to put it another way, he wanted a world in which relations among nations would be carried on in what might be called a good neighbor climate of opinion. He wanted to abolish the age-old atmosphere of power politics. He believed that the national interests of all states could be served better by a spirit of friendly cooperation than by the old spirit of hostile competition. He did not seem to believe that the struggle for power was inherent in the nature of the international community. He believed rather that most men were men of goodwill and that if the evil gangs of the totalitarian dictatorships could be eliminated and kept out of power, the spirit of goodwill could become dominant in world affairs. He was well aware that such a climate of opinion or such a spiritual or moral atmosphere had never before existed in any recorded community of states. But as one who accepted the idea of social progress, he seemed to believe that such a climate of opinion was possible. He thought that he had produced a good neighbor climate of opinion in the Western Hemisphere; and he seemed to feel that a similar situation could be achieved globally.

It must be emphasized, however, that good neighborliness did not mean to Roosevelt altruism or “do goodism.” What he wanted was an atmosphere of *enlightened self-interest* wherein nations would recognize the interdependence of the modern world and realize that the security, welfare, and progress of each nation was dependent on the security, welfare, and progress of the whole community of nations. He was quite aware, as he once told the Americas, that in every state the interests of her own citizens must come first.² But to Roosevelt the interest of the citizens of each state were so similar to the interests of the global community that he did not anticipate significant conflicts between them.

Roosevelt first proclaimed his idea that nations should behave like good neighbors in his Inaugural Address in 1933, and at that time he applied the idea to the entire world. In reality, however, the whole concept was an outgrowth of his thinking regarding the kind of relations the United States should have with Latin

America, a subject to which the Coolidge and Hoover administrations had already given some consideration.

Roosevelt was once something of an imperialist. During the early twenties, however, his attitude toward empire began to change; and it was then that the good neighbor idea began to evolve.

In a personal attempt to draft a Democratic Party platform for the 1924 election he included a plank completely opposing intervention in the domestic affairs of other nations. He called instead for a "definite effort to end the hate and dislike of America now shared by every other civilized nation in the world."³ In 1927 he complained of Coolidge's use of the Marines in Nicaragua, declaring it provided "a further reason for dislike of the United States by every Central and South American nation."⁴ The following year, 1928, he suggested to Senator Carter Glass that the Nicaraguan affair perhaps provided a good reason to revive Wilson's 1913 proposal that other American republics be invited to join the United States when intervention became necessary.⁵ Freidel concludes that in those same years conversation and correspondence with Norman Davis, Hamilton Fish Armstrong, and especially with his old friend Sumner Welles did much to steer Roosevelt toward a Latin American policy based more on cooperation than on force.⁶

A 1928 article in *Foreign Affairs* indicates that by then Roosevelt was almost entirely won over to a good neighbor policy and collective action in the Western Hemisphere. He claimed that the United States had done a remarkable job for Santo Domingo, Haiti, and Nicaragua by her interventions there and ought to be thanked for it; but the chief result was that she was hated more than ever in Latin America. The reason was, as he now saw, that the *method* of intervention and aid had been wrong. The nations in Latin America, he asserted, were as proud of their sovereignty and dignity as was the United States; they too had rights and feelings; and it was clear that the United States had no right to intervene in their domestic affairs of her own accord. Intervention was justifiable only in the name of all the Americas and only in cooperation with other republics.⁷ ✓

Thus, as Sumner Welles has pointed out, long before his inauguration Roosevelt felt the need for a new kind of relationship with Latin America.⁸ But it is very questionable if by the time he entered the White House Roosevelt had anything specific in mind other than opposition to unilateral intervention. What he seemed

to want was largely a change in attitude, a change in the state of mind of nations, a change in the climate of opinion or in the spiritual and moral atmosphere governing international relations. His proclamation of the good neighbor idea in his First Inaugural was a paragraph of platitudes urging nations to respect themselves, respect the rights of others, respect their international obligations, and generally be good neighbors.⁹ A month later when in an address to the Governing Board of the Pan American Union he had his first opportunity to enlarge on this theme he still seemed to have nothing specific in mind. His speech abounded in pleas for such things as mutual understanding, sympathetic appreciation of other people's points of view, friendship and good-will, respect for the rights of others, and international cooperation.¹⁰

But those phrases, general, trite, dull, and platitudinous as they may have been, expressed exactly what Roosevelt wanted. He wanted nations to act like good neighbors—precisely that; and he had no apologies for preaching sermons about it. Frequently in his speeches he likened nations to individuals, indicating thereby a belief that nations should observe the same principles in their behavior toward each other as do individuals. His moral code was simple. He believed in such things as fair play and decency, and he believed that all normal people knew what was fair and decent. Thus there was no need to be specific. What was needed among nations was the right spirit, the proper attitude, the right climate of opinion; then all specific problems could be solved.

As vague and general as was the idea of good neighborliness, it became clear over the years that in Roosevelt's mind it forbade certain kinds of behavior and required certain kinds of behavior. Obviously, it forbade nations to intervene unilaterally in the domestic affairs of their neighbors. To be sure, thought Roosevelt, all nations in a community had an interest in their neighbors' domestic affairs. The stability or instability of the government in a neighboring state affected all. Revolutions and internal anarchy often threatened the lives and property of one's nationals and interrupted foreign trade. Thus domestic affairs were often of interest to the whole community of states. But it was the business of all, not just one state, to intervene if intervention became necessary.

On this matter Roosevelt loved to use his handling of the Cuban revolution of 1933 as an example. There despite the Platt Amendment allowing United States intervention, Roosevelt had resisted all pleas to send troops and instead had used Welles to restore

stability via the medium of persuasion and negotiation; and while he had not gone so far at that time as to consult his Latin American neighbors, he had at least taken the unprecedented step of personally informing all their representatives in Washington of his actions and of explaining the reasons for them,¹¹ a gesture in the direction of treating them more as equals than as pesky little brothers. This particular revolution was of Cuba's own making, he thought; it was purely an internal affair, and Cuba was fully competent to settle it herself. And here was proof, argued Roosevelt, that the United States had been converted to a policy of partnership in the common good, to good neighborliness in fact and not just in theory.¹² The abrogation of the Platt Amendment in 1934 simply strengthened this new attitude, thought Roosevelt, and increased the goodwill and confidence of all Latin America toward the United States.¹³ His completion of the withdrawal of the Marines from Haiti in 1934 was further evidence to all the world, he believed, that unilateral intervention and good neighborliness did not mix.

It is quite clear that in Roosevelt's mind good neighborliness also forbade dollar diplomacy. It was dollar diplomacy that had caused much of the ill-will toward the United States abroad, and especially in Latin America, he thought, and this had caused almost as much fear of the United States as had military intervention. During 1925-30, he once wrote privately, New York banks had forced on most Latin American republics unnecessary loans at high interest rates and huge commission fees; and as late as the first four years of the Depression United States policy toward Latin America was largely based on dollar diplomacy. And it was this, along with the troubles caused by military intervention, that had caused him, he wrote, to visualize a wholly new attitude toward Latin America, an attitude that would remove all fear of aggression, territorial and financial, and that would bring all the states of the continent into a kind of hemispheric partnership in which no state would have undue advantage. It was during a discussion of this attitude, while preparing his First Inaugural, that Raymond Moley had drawn an analogy with a small community of neighbors and Roosevelt had then seized on the phrase "good neighbor."¹⁴

His opposition to dollar diplomacy asserted itself during his first year in the White House when the State Department inquired if the United States should continue resisting pressure from the Firestone interests to send a warship to Liberia to help rescue

Firestone financial interests there or continue cooperation with the League of Nations to rehabilitate Liberia. Roosevelt's answer was that cooperation in helping Liberia should continue by all means; and he wanted it clear that "we are not guaranteeing monies due the Firestones or making our continued interest depend on Firestone's financial interests." The Firestone people had gone into Liberia at their own risk, he added, and it was not the business of the United States to pull Firestone "financial chestnuts out of the fire except as a friend of the Liberian people."¹⁵

It was in the Mexican oil expropriation of 1938 that Roosevelt's attitude toward dollar diplomacy was best revealed. He again resisted all appeals for armed intervention and insisted that no high-handed or domineering attitude be taken even by civilian officials.¹⁶ He believed that Mexico should pay just compensation for the property she nationalized, and he was particularly interested in getting fair play for Americans with small investments who had gone to Mexico to farm and whose land had then been nationalized. But he had little sympathy for the big investors who like Hearst "bought a state legislature, bribed officials and acquired title . . . to hundreds of thousands of acres" and then claimed excessive damages; and certainly he had no intention, he told the press, of asking Mexico to pay for "prospective profits."¹⁷

Although the evidence is thin, good neighborliness to Roosevelt also seems to have forbade a nation having a very large favorable balance of trade. Welles has testified that one of the objectives of the good neighbor policy was to help the Latin American republics find markets in the United States for more exports so that their economic distress might be relieved.¹⁸ In his 1934 Annual Message the President noted that one of the objectives of the recent conference at Montevideo had been to restore "commerce in ways which will preclude the building up of large favorable trade balances by any one Nation at the expense of trade debits on the part of other nations."¹⁹ What he preferred, he declared in 1940, were "mutually beneficial international economic relations" with each nation having "access to materials and opportunities" to raise her standards of living.²⁰ No country could be prosperous and happy, he argued later, unless all were prosperous and happy;²¹ and apparently a too favorable balance of trade for some states would prevent this achievement.

There are also bits of evidence that to Roosevelt good neighborliness forbade the practice of power politics. Here it can be argued that Roosevelt did not practice what he preached. But there is no

doubt that after his conversion from his early imperialism he often spoke out publicly against what he, like many other Americans, came to look upon as an evil European practice. While on his South American tour in 1936, for example, he declared that balances of power were "false gods" that had no place in the Western Hemisphere.²² In a 1940 address to the Governing Board of the Pan American Union he talked in the same vein, quoting with approval Secretary of State James G. Blaine's 1888 statement that "a spirit of common justice, of common and equal interest between the American states will leave no room for an artificial balance of power like unto that which has led to wars abroad and drenched Europe in blood."²³ When in 1941 Senator D. Worth Clark suggested that the best way to stamp out the Fascist movement in Latin America would be for the United States simply to take control of the continent from pole to pole and establish puppet governments to our liking, Roosevelt wrote him a letter soaked in sarcasm and asserted that talk of such use of power as that was harmful beyond words and Axis propagandists were already using it to prove that the good neighbor policy was a sham.²⁴

According to the President's son Elliott, one of Roosevelt's purposes in emphasizing the winning of the war as swiftly as possible and without regard to power positions when the war ended was his belief that "war is too political a thing"; that nations tend to wage war in a manner that will bring political advantages; and that China and Britain were both guilty in World War II of this unsavory intent. What Roosevelt wanted to do was fight the war in whatever way would militarily end it the soonest; and then, when tempers cooled, discuss the settlement.²⁵

In his 1945 Annual Message Roosevelt declared that "in the future world the misuse of power, as implied in the term 'power politics,' must not be a controlling factor in international relations. That is the heart of the principles to which we have subscribed." He could not deny, he added, that power was a factor in world politics just as it was a factor in domestic politics. But in a democratic world, as in a democratic nation, power must be linked with responsibility and could be justified only when used in subordination to the common good.²⁶ On his return from Yalta, the President brought up the matter again, expressing a hope that the Yalta Conference had spelled the end of power politics—of the system of unilateral action, exclusive alliances, spheres of influence, balances of power, and all other expedients that have been tried for centuries and always failed.²⁷

✓ But if good neighborliness forbade unilateral intervention, dollar diplomacy, a too favorable balance of trade, and power politics, it also required certain behavior.

Good neighborliness required, for example, cooperative action to keep the peace and to give stability to the international neighborhood. In Roosevelt's mind collective security was one of the basic principles of good neighborliness. For he believed that if unilateral intervention and power politics were to be ended, something had to replace them, and that something was cooperative action by all members of the community. If the maintenance of constitutional government in Latin American states was no longer to be a "sacred obligation" of the United States, he said in December 1933, it very definitely was the concern of the "whole continent in which we are all neighbors."²⁸ By 1936 he believed that he had produced an atmosphere of friendliness in the Americas sufficient to begin institutionalizing this idea and to take steps toward the creation of machinery for consultation and the settling of disputes by negotiation instead of by force. That was the major purpose of the special inter-American conference held at Buenos Aires in 1936 to which Roosevelt journeyed in person and in which he took great pride. The maintenance of peace within the hemisphere as well as the meeting of aggression from abroad was on his mind and he was delighted that practical steps were taken toward both objectives.²⁹

✓ It was this idea of peace by cooperation that Simon Bolivar had proposed in 1826, Roosevelt declared later; and to Roosevelt, it was a unique proposal. Before Bolivar's time, he declared, peace by conquest and temporary peace by balances of power were the only two peace systems known. Thus Bolivar's idea of a "cooperative peace" among friendly equals settling disputes by pacific processes was something new. "Never before had any group of nations been asked to renounce the splendors of indefinite conquest," he declared, "and to achieve their true grandeur by peaceful cooperation." And although the idea was not successful in Bolivar's time, it was kept alive through the imperialistic nineteenth century by poets and dreamers until 1888 when the Pan American system began to evolve. And now at last (1940) while the rest of the world was at war, there was still peace in the Americas.³⁰

But such cooperation could be achieved, thought Roosevelt, only if all countries were made to feel important and were treated as equals. He claimed that prior to the outbreak of the war in

China in 1937 he had tried "to put the spirit of the Good Neighbor policy into practice in that region."³¹ What he did to that effect he did not make clear. But Hull has testified that when preparing for the Brussels Conference of 1937, which was to attempt to find a solution for the Sino-Japanese conflict, Roosevelt told both Chamberlain and Eden that neither the United States nor Britain should take the lead at the conference. He preferred that the leadership be left to the smaller countries so they could be made to feel important; and he declared his belief that the successes of the conferences at Montevideo and Buenos Aires were due to the fact that El Salvador, the smallest republic of the conference, was made to feel that she was on the same plane as Argentina, Brazil, and the United States.³²

It is quite clear that Roosevelt did not actually favor equality among all states in crucial questions or when the exercise of real power was essential. As already noted, he saw no reason for small powers to have armaments. But the treatment of small nations in a manner that would please their ego or feed their desire for prestige was vitally important, he thought, for good neighborliness. This belief in the necessity for bending over backwards to keep from hurting national feelings or to bolster egos was expressed again at a press conference in October 1943. When asked by a reporter if he agreed with some Senators who felt the United States should exercise sovereignty after the war over airports built in foreign countries with American money, the President's laconic answer was, "How would we like that if they said that to us?"³³

But there is no doubt that to Roosevelt the specific behavior of states was not nearly so important to good neighborliness as their attitude toward each other, the spirit in which they approached each other, the climate of opinion in which their representatives met and worked. And the key to this attitude, spirit, or climate of opinion lay in the kind of personal relationships peoples and their leaders developed toward each other. So deep was his conviction that *most* men were men of reason, fairness, and good-will that he was convinced once they got to know and understand each other there were no differences among them that could not be ironed out, no conflicts that reason and goodwill could not resolve.

Naturally, therefore, Roosevelt was a strong advocate of people getting together to know one another; and to achieve this he vigorously supported the development of more and better means of communications among nations. In 1933 before the first inter-American conference of his administration met at Montevideo he

made it clear that he thought it important that the coming conference take steps to bring the two continents closer together. All the states of the Americas should be made more united by air, highway, water, and rail communications, he declared. More motor roads especially "would greatly increase tourist travel and greatly benefit a better Pan-American understanding."³⁴ He was especially interested in the Pan-American Highway project that was designed to tie the whole hemisphere together. The road "will help cement the friendship" between the United States and the other Americas, he declared; for "with frequent intercourse will come greater knowledge and understanding."³⁵ The new highway, he told a Wyoming audience in the 1936 campaign, would also promote peace since it would help all the peoples of the Americas to get to know each other. "That is the kind of thing which is going to help keep peace in the world," he asserted, ". . . a better knowledge of the peoples of the world."³⁶ On his Latin American tour in late 1936 he expressed the same view, declaring that scientific improvements in communications, especially by air and sea, were going to make it more than ever possible for peoples to get to know each other well and become friends and thereby have international understanding.³⁷

But Roosevelt's major interest was in the personal relationships among the public officials of nations. He seemed to think that if national officials could develop the kind of personal relationships neighbors have who drop in for a drink, borrow each other's garden tools, and have conferences about community problems on each other's front porches half the world's problems would disappear automatically and the other half would be readily soluble. When he said in 1934 that "the relations between Nations are after all dependent upon the relations between the individuals of those various Nations"³⁸ he meant every word of it.

It is well known that Roosevelt had great confidence in his own ability to develop this kind of personal relationship. Mrs. Roosevelt has testified to this, asserting that the President thought highly of his own ability to understand other people and to make them understand the United States. He had a feeling, his wife said, that he could convince leaders of other governments much better by personal contact than by letter or telephone. He accepted what other men in high position said and believed that if he kept his word they would keep theirs; and he did not easily forgive those who proved faithless.³⁹

It was to promote such personal contacts as well as to make the Latin American countries feel important that in his first year in the White House he invited the President of Panama to visit the United States, gave a dinner for a Brazilian delegation, received a special ambassador from Argentina, and had the Mexican envoy in for lunch.⁴⁰ Regarding his personal discussions with the President of Panama, Roosevelt commented that it was "a very practical way to deal with problems arising among nations."⁴¹ When about the same time he began correspondence with the Soviet Union regarding recognition he declared his belief that "difficulties between great nations can be removed only by frank, friendly conversations."⁴²

Repeatedly he praised the great good that could come from people sitting around a table and talking informally. The United States-China silver agreement of 1936 was a "fine illustration," he thought, of what can be done by people sitting down around a table and working things out in a peaceful way.⁴³ This was the way to stem the tide toward war, he thought, and from 1936 on he gave considerable attention to the idea of getting the heads of the European powers to sit around a table, on a warship at sea or in Washington. As late as April 1939, he included "sit around table and work it out" among a list of things he jotted down that might be useful in solving the European problem;⁴⁴ and in his appeals to Hitler later in the year he beseeched the German dictator to settle his quarrels with his neighbors around a conference table rather than plunge the world into war. In 1939 also he told the new Italian ambassador to the United States that he regretted not having had an opportunity to meet with Mussolini personally. He thought they both "spoke the same language" and such a meeting would be useful. At the moment what he preferred was a small conference which he thought Mussolini might call to keep Roosevelt from appearing to butt into European affairs.⁴⁵ Once the war had started, he agreed that peace might not be easy to work out but he still believed that "when men of honor and good intentions sit down together" they can get something workable.⁴⁶ When Welles went to Europe early in 1940 one of his assignments was to promote a meeting between Roosevelt and Mussolini in some remote spot such as the Azores so that Roosevelt could personally persuade Mussolini that Italy's best interests would not be served by cooperation with Hitler, a meeting Welles believed was prevented by Hitler.⁴⁷ As is well known, in 1941 Roosevelt

also looked forward to a meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Konoye and gave up the idea only after hearing vigorous objections from Hull.⁴⁸

R1-T2
R1-T3

Despite the number of meetings Roosevelt attended during the war with the leaders of other nations, they were not all that he would have liked to attend by any means. Before going to his post as Ambassador to Spain in 1942 Carlton J. H. Hayes was instructed by the President to tell Franco that Roosevelt would be happy to meet and talk with him in the Canary Islands or elsewhere outside Spain if a real crisis threatened Spain.⁴⁹ And about the same time he wrote Prime Minister Salazar of Portugal that he wished they could have a talk. He was especially interested, he told Salazar, in promoting postwar cultural relations among Portugal, Brazil, and the United States, for relations among the peoples of those nations had not been close enough in the past.⁵⁰

As might be expected, the wartime conferences delighted Roosevelt. At Casablanca he told the press that he was elated over the fact that for the first time in history chiefs of staffs of different nations had been sitting around tables and living in the same hotel for a week or ten days, long enough to get on intimate terms with each other and to become personal friends. In World War I, he said, they had never been together more than a day or two.⁵¹ When meeting the President of Mexico at Monterrey a few weeks later he seemed to gloat over the fact that it was the first time in thirty-four years the heads of those two states had got together personally and he hoped they would make it a habit, visiting "just as neighbors visit each other" and talking things over as neighbors.⁵² The visit, he told the press, was simply "part of the old game of getting to know each other better."⁵³ While in Canada the same year he pointed proudly to the fact that the Combined Staffs had been sitting around the table in Quebec the last few days "in the manner of friends, in the manner of partners . . . in the manner of members of the same family." That was a "good custom" and the way to get things done.⁵⁴

It is worth recalling at this point that Roosevelt's whole objective in all these things was to dispel the atmosphere of hate, suspicion, and fear that had been growing in the world for more than a generation and to replace it by an atmosphere of reason, trust, and friendship based on enlightened self-interest. He believed before the war that such an atmosphere was necessary to stem the tide toward war; during the war such an atmosphere was needed to forge and hold together the United Nations alliance;

and after the war such an atmosphere would be necessary for peace and progress.

His practice of personal diplomacy was based on the assumption that "you cannot hate a man that you know well." In August 1944 he told the delegates to the Dumbarton Oaks Conference that in international relations there was great value in nurturing personal friendships among officials. Before the war, he illustrated, he did not know Churchill, Eden, Stalin, or Molotov and yet what was done by their countries was largely a matter of personalities. Since, therefore, "you cannot hate a man that you know well," the future peace of the world would depend largely on the leaders of the Big Four being friends, on "putting their feet on the table" and conferring all the time. It was that spirit that was winning the war. It was "something new," and it was a spirit that should be spread around the world.⁵⁵ At Yalta he told a story to illustrate this. Some years ago, he said, while the guest of the Chamber of Commerce in a small Southern town, he had been seated between a Catholic and a Jew, both of whom were members of the Ku Klux Klan. When he enquired about these unusual Klan memberships he was told that it was quite agreeable to all concerned for them to be in the Klan for everybody in town knew both men and liked them. And this illustrates, declared Roosevelt, how difficult it was to have prejudices—racial, religious or otherwise—against people you really know.⁵⁶

It was the prejudices and suspicions in Stalin's mind that Roosevelt hoped to dispel by personal meetings and he was quite confident of his ability to do this. Before even his first meetings with Stalin the President wrote Churchill, "I think I can personally handle Stalin better than either your Foreign Office or my State Department. Stalin hates the guts of all your top people. He thinks he likes me better, and I hope he will continue to do so."⁵⁷ The trouble with Stalin, Roosevelt told his associates on the way to Teheran, was that his whole life experience had made him suspicious of everything and everybody. He was an Oriental rather than a Russian, declared the President. His youth had been devoted to robbery and murder and Marxist theories which held that the end justified any means. Then he had been forced into dictatorship by the struggle for power in Russia. He had never traveled, was very provincial, and distrusted everybody. All this would be hard to break down, but the President was counting on Stalin's realism. He thought Stalin was probably tired of sitting on bayonets and he must realize the war would break down the

iron curtain. If, therefore, Roosevelt could convince him that cooperation offered by the United States was "on the square," that the United States really wanted to be friends rather than enemies, he was ready to bet that Stalin would come around. And Stalin was the only man in all Russia he had to convince; "he's the whole works."⁵⁸

It was the responsibility of the United States to do this conciliating among the great powers, Roosevelt told his son Elliott in 1943. No other power could do it. Britain was on the decline; China was too weak and backward; Russia was too suspicious. It was a tremendous responsibility, but the only way a start could be made toward conciliation was by personal face to face talks with the various leaders.⁵⁹

Face to face meetings were important also, thought Roosevelt, because they gave one a feel for a situation that could not be acquired any other way. After his Casablanca trip he told the press repeatedly that to understand the North African situation he had to go there, talk with people like Generals Girard, De Gaulle, Nogués, and others, get the feel of things, see the native populations, and grasp the environmental conditions of the matter.⁶⁰

But he did not think big formal conferences were of much value in promoting good neighborliness. When considering a conference in 1936-37 to resolve the European problem he wrote Ambassador Dodd that he wanted nothing big and formal. "The trouble about any world conference, as you know," he wrote Dodd, "is that it would bring fifty-five or sixty nations around a table, each nation with from five to ten delegates and each nation, in addition, with no authority to agree to anything without referring the matter home. From a practical point of view, that type of conference is an impossibility unless, as in the case of B. A. [Buenos Aires], there are one or two simple principles on which all will agree beforehand."⁶¹

Any situation that prevented frank speaking and the development of friendships at a conference was objectionable to Roosevelt. Conferences in a big city like Washington were especially handicapped, he thought, because there was always someone present who had a "pet" newspaper reporter to whom he would talk "out of school" and then cause all the others to be careful in what they said and cease being candid. A main objective of a conference was to get people to know each other and speak frankly and it could not be done in big cities.⁶²

What Roosevelt wanted were small conferences of the utmost

informality with no one even taking notes. When writing Dodd his objections to a formal international conference in 1937 he added that while he did not see any value in any large gathering, yet "if five or six heads of the important governments could meet together for a week with complete inaccessibility to the press or cables, or radio, a definite, useful agreement might result."⁶³ He was especially proud of the fact, he told the press one day in 1940, that he had been able to get his relations with Latin American officials on an informal and social basis so that "things are not purely official as they were for many years." Relations were on a more "personal basis" than formerly, he said, and that very day some of the chairmen of the Havana Conference were to have lunch with him.⁶⁴ When trying to arrange his first meeting with Stalin in 1943 he emphasized in a letter to Stalin his desire that the meeting be small and informal. At that time he told Stalin he wanted to take no staff other than Harry Hopkins, an interpreter, and a stenographer (not to take notes, however), so "that you and I could talk very informally and get what we call 'a meeting of minds.' I do not believe," he added, "that any official agreements or declarations are in the least necessary."⁶⁵

Certainly, he did not like note-taking at a conference. In a note to Hull in 1943 opposing publication until after the war of documents of the 1919 Paris meetings among the Big Four, Roosevelt wrote, "Incidentally, in those meetings of the Big Four in Paris no notes should have been kept. Four people cannot be conversationally frank with each other if somebody is taking down notes for future publication. I feel very strongly about this. . . ."⁶⁶

Roosevelt was particularly pleased with the friendly, informal, personal relations he developed with Canada. In 1936, a short time before he returned a visit Prime Minister Mackenzie King had made to the United States, Roosevelt wrote the Prime Minister that he hoped many visits between the two leaders would follow and that they would be kept as informal and unostentatious as possible. "It will be a good thing for both countries," he wrote, "if Governors General, Premiers, and Presidents can, in the days to come, 'drop in and visit' with each other without making such visits the occasion for extraordinary comment."⁶⁷ When Lord Athlone succeeded Lord Tweedsmuir as Governor General of Canada in 1940 Roosevelt wrote Athlone that since 1933 most of the formalities between the two countries had been done away with, to the benefit of both, and he hoped Athlone would "run down" to Hyde Park some week-end very soon for an informal

visit.⁶⁸ At a press conference attended by Mackenzie King a month before the President died, Roosevelt told the reporters that since King had become Prime Minister "we have developed that friendship into a practical way of handling common problems . . ." and it was "an outstanding example of what you can do by common consultation and laying one's own problems before the other fellow. . . ."⁶⁹

Time and again he emphasized that the major purpose of officials' getting to know each other was to swap points of view, get a better understanding of each other's problems, and arrive at only general understandings, a meeting of minds, a consensus. Then arranging the details would be an easy matter for people, apparently, on lower levels. He had strong objections to conferences in which the participants were bound to certain specific positions and at times he seemed even to have an aversion to agendas. "The idea of a conference," he told the press one day in 1943, a year of many conferences, "is to confer, get the other fellow's point of view. It is quite possible that you might get a good idea from somebody else outside your own borders. It is quite possible that you might persuade the other fellow that some idea you had was a pretty good idea."⁷⁰ One day in 1943 when queried by reporters concerning details on the proposed world security organization he told the reporters that their tendency for detailed agreements irritated him. They seemed to want the people engaged in the postwar planning conferences to "write some kind of a constitution for this, and a constitution for that, and dot the i's and cross t's." But that, he said, was not his objective in the conversations at all. His objective in the talks, at least at that stage, was to have the planners of the different countries get to know each other and get only general understandings, to work out objectives regarding postwar problems.⁷¹ Two weeks later he talked to the press on the same theme, again emphasizing that all the current conferences on postwar affairs were purely exploratory and designed largely to help the conferees get to know each other. "I don't like to reduce things to signed documents," he added. "A general plan will cover everything pretty well. . . . You know, you can do a lot by Gentlemen's agreements."⁷²

It might not be far from the truth to say that Roosevelt's whole theory here was that he wanted a climate of opinion in which all the major decisions of the world could be put in the form of gentlemen's agreements. According to his code only gentlemen whose word was their bond should be allowed in positions of

power and once the Axis criminals were eliminated he hoped that situation would prevail. As suggested previously, Roosevelt's general attitude toward details was one of irritation and he seemed to look on constitutions, treaties, executive agreements, and other such documents as of very minor importance in comparison to the broad agreements on objectives to be made on higher levels by gentlemen—men of reason, integrity, and goodwill—in whose word the whole world could have faith. Treaties themselves were literally only scraps of paper. It was the spirit behind them that was important.

Roosevelt's optimistic view of the nature of man and his faith in the idea of social progress seemed never to have a dim moment. The President never doubted that a good neighbor climate of opinion should or could be made world-wide. Obviously he was premature in an inscription he wrote in 1922 for a monument in Geneva. In that inscription he said: "Mankind will ever be grateful to the heroes living and dead who taught the world the teaching 'Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself' applies to nations as truly as to individuals."⁷³ The years after 1922 proved that the world had learned no such lesson.

But the breakdown of world order and the spread of national hatreds failed to make Roosevelt pessimistic regarding the long run. If the good neighbor policy announced in his First Inaugural address was ignored by most of the world, he was convinced it had opened a "new era" in the Americas.⁷⁴ By 1936 he proclaimed that the policy had already been a great success. It was "no longer a hope, no longer an objective remaining to be accomplished. It is a fact, active, present, pertinent and effective," he declared.⁷⁵ When writing notes in 1938 to some of his public papers he insisted that Latin America's resentment against United States intervention and dollar diplomacy, her suspicions of Yankee imperialism, her antagonism, misunderstandings, and prejudices had been largely dispelled.⁷⁶ In 1940 he declared that the Western Hemisphere had no need for a new order, for "we have already found it," and it had been created by the "work of men of goodwill" and by "common devotion to a moral order."⁷⁷ In 1942 he told the press that he thought the good neighbor policy had become "ingrained" in all the Americas and he seemed convinced it could become permanent if it could be kept going another ten or twenty years.⁷⁸

Roosevelt stated repeatedly that this accomplishment of the good neighbor climate of opinion could be duplicated on a world-

wide scale. He recognized that the global difficulties were much greater and the process would take more time. But he seemed to have no doubt of the possibility. In mid-1938 he recalled that his good neighbor policy had never been limited to the Americas. It had been so successful in the Western Hemisphere, he thought, however, that it could succeed also in the rest of the world if the spirit behind it were better understood abroad. Nor had the policy ever been limited to the problem of war, he added; it applied equally to problems of trade and matters affecting the interchange of culture.⁷⁹

Roosevelt insisted that the problems of the Americas were no different from those in the rest of the world and since good neighborliness had been developed in the Americas it could, therefore, be developed elsewhere. "The 300,000,000 citizens in the American republics are not different from other human beings," he said in 1938. "We have the same problems, the same differences, even the same material for controversy, which exist elsewhere." What was different and unique in the Western Hemisphere was the common objective all had of working together.⁸⁰ A year later he reiterated the same contention, declaring that the success of the good neighbor policy in the Americas was not attributable, as some people argued, to "good fortune." "There are not wanting here," he insisted, "all the usual rivalries, all the normal human desires for power and expansion, all of the commercial problems." Just as in the Old World, the Americas were afflicted, he went on, with "diversities of race, of language, of custom, of natural resources; and of intellectual forces at least as great as those which prevailed in Europe."

But the Americas were kept from going the way of Europe, from becoming a cockpit of power struggles by "a new, and powerful idea—that of the community of nations . . ." that was long nurtured, especially by his administration. Thus "if that process can be successful here, is it too much to hope that a similar intellectual and spiritual process may succeed elsewhere?"⁸¹

In 1940 he said again much the same thing, asserting that the principles developed in the inter-American system were "in great measure at least, the principles upon which I believe enduring peace must be based throughout the world."⁸² In 1943 he told Congress that "the policy of the Good Neighbor has shown such success in the hemisphere of the Americas that its extension to the whole world seems to be the logical next step."⁸³ And finally, only six months before his death, he declared it was his conviction

that the good neighbor policy "can be, and should be, made universal throughout the world."⁸⁴

In arguing that the situation in the Americas was the same as elsewhere Roosevelt was obviously in error. The power structure in a hemisphere containing only one great power was quite different from the power structure in Europe and Asia where several major powers were in close proximity.

But whatever his error in comparing the situation in the Americas and elsewhere, Roosevelt was quite aware that the creation of a good neighbor global atmosphere would not be easy. In 1943 he wrote his old friend George W. Norris that he knew he faced a herculean task. His many visits to Europe had made him realize, he wrote, how during a thousand years Europe had become divided "into a hundred different forms of hate." But he recalled to Norris his experience in the Americas. "In 1933," he wrote, "there were many times twenty-one different kinds of hate. [The American republics] disliked each other; they sought territorial expansion and material gain at the expense of their neighbors; and all of them united in a common fear of the United States." All were skeptical of the good neighbor idea and Roosevelt's promises for some time. But gradually the new spirit took hold. "It took nearly ten years," the President told Norris, "to sell the idea of peace and security among the American Republics." And this great change in the feelings of the peoples of the Americas was achieved easily in "comparison with the task before us in Europe and in the Far East." But he seemed to believe it could be done if the right methods were used.⁸⁵

Some writers on Roosevelt have stated that shortly before his death the President began to have doubts about the possibility of developing good neighborly relations with the Soviet Union, a matter to be discussed later. It is also worth noting that shortly before his death Roosevelt began to question the possibility of settling the Arab-Jewish dispute in Palestine in a good neighborly atmosphere. Both Hull and Welles have testified that Roosevelt was such a firm believer in the ability of men to settle disputes rationally on the basis of enlightened self-interest and goodwill that he long believed that if Arab and Jewish leaders could be brought together around a table in friendly conversations their basic differences could be resolved.⁸⁶ After talking with King Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia on his return from Yalta, however, the President's faith in such methods in that particular case was shaken.⁸⁷

When we recall, however, that Roosevelt was a perennial optimist, it is hard to believe that such temporary set-backs could blight his faith in the possibility of improving man's attitude toward man. He was ready, moreover, to use the international police force after the war to keep situations such as that in Palestine under control; and he was also a practical man of patience who did not expect to see a good neighbor climate of opinion engulf the world overnight. Thus it is not likely that either Stalin or Ibn Saud would have been able to move him from his purpose.

What Roosevelt hoped to achieve was nothing less than the moral reconstruction of humanity. He wanted nations to abide by a moral code based on such concepts as honor, trust, good faith, respect, and justice. Here religion was of prime importance, for it was belief in God, religion—of which there were “lots of different kinds”—that made the bulwark of such a code.

As already noted, Roosevelt was fond of likening nations to individuals. He believed that a nation also had a conscience, a moral sense of right and wrong, and if there was ever to be a well ordered world the moral sense of nations must be an active guide to conduct. He believed that in his era the moral sense of nations had broken down and evil had become rampant. Thus without moral reconstruction peace and order were impossible. He would have agreed with Francis Bacon's argument that good faith is more expedient than deceit in international relations in the long run; and with the assertion of Erasmus that there could be no dignity among either individuals or nations unless statesmen followed Christian principles. He would have agreed also with Jefferson and the natural law school of the eighteenth century which insisted that nations were just as bound by a universal moral code as were individuals; that the code was the same for both nations and individuals; and that the true self-interest of states almost always coincided with that code. Like both Mahan and Wilson, Roosevelt's moral code was drawn from the basic principles of Christianity; and while the principles of international morality might be vague, he felt like Hume that most men had a general understanding of them.

In his arguments in favor of United States membership in the League of Nations in 1919-20 Roosevelt argued repeatedly that the United States had entered the war for a moral purpose, that the League was to be essentially an instrument for the exercise of moral force, and if America provided the proper leadership, a

whole new conception of international relations based on goodwill and morality might be made to prevail.⁸⁸

During the thirties Roosevelt seemed to place great reliance on the power of moral force to stem the tide toward war. When in 1933 he proposed a global non-aggression pact and was asked what reason he had to believe that nations which had violated the Briand-Kellogg Pact would not also violate a new one, he answered that his only reason was "the general hope that nations will more and more respect their treaties."⁸⁹ Henry Morgenthau also noted in his diary in 1933 that it was through the collective moral sense of the nations of the world that the President hoped to prevent war.⁹⁰ In his Quarantine Speech in 1937 Roosevelt appealed for nations in their dealings with each other to return to belief in the pledged word and to a recognition of the fact that national morality was as vital as private morality. If civilization is to survive, he declared, "the principles of the Prince of Peace must be restored. Trust between nations must be revived."⁹¹ Before leaving for the Brussels Conference in 1937 Norman Davis was instructed by Roosevelt to do everything he could to mobilize the moral force of the peace-loving nations against Japan's aggressive program and to prolong the conference long enough for it to arouse the world's people to put moral pressure on Japan.⁹² During the European crisis in the spring of 1939 Roosevelt told the Italian Ambassador to the United States that the United States opposed military aggression as a moral matter; and he implied that the moral influence of the United States would be important in the European situation.⁹³

Once the war had started Roosevelt asserted time and again that for a peace to be effective at the end of the war it must have a moral basis. In his 1940 Annual Message he told Congress that the international morality of the past was not good enough and, therefore, a higher morality was being sought.⁹⁴ When sending Myron Taylor to the Vatican about the same time he emphasized that one of the purposes of sending him there was to help begin to mobilize the religious forces of the world to achieve a postwar order built upon firm moral foundations.⁹⁵ Early in January he called American church representatives to the White House and urged them to begin considering the ways the moral and religious influences of the churches could be brought to bear to achieve a just peace.⁹⁶ A few weeks later in an off-the-record talk to the American Society of Newspaper Editors he claimed that he had

long felt that everyone who believed in God, members of all the great religious faiths, ought to be mobilized for the moral force they could have on the peace. All he was doing then, he said, was making contacts with such faiths. Contact in the United States was easy through the Federal Council of Churches and other organizations; and he had sent a representative to the Vatican; but he was having trouble finding the proper liaison with the Greek Orthodox Church and with the Moslems because of uncertainty as to who headed those faiths.⁹⁷

After Pearl Harbor Roosevelt made fewer direct references to international morality and he tended to talk more concretely in terms of cooperation in the postwar international organization. But there remained in his wartime speeches a strong moral undercurrent with many references to spiritual and moral forces. Near the end of 1944, for example, he declared that the new world order would depend not only on the peace machinery created, but also on "friendly human relations, on acquaintance, on tolerance, on unassailable sincerity and good will and good faith." The Allies, he thought, had already achieved a great deal of this and he thought it "a new thing in human history for allies to work together" so closely; and he warned that if it were not continued there could be no enduring peace.⁹⁸

But how should one go about promoting a good neighbor climate of opinion and the acceptance of a higher international morality?

Until the outbreak of World War II Roosevelt's answer was the same one that has been given by American foreign policy spokesmen from George Washington on. The moral and intellectual transformation of international relations was to be achieved *by example*.

Roosevelt long hoped that the behavior of the United States would be an example in stemming the trend toward militarism and in defending democracy. "Long before I returned to Washington as President of the United States," he said in 1936, "I had made up my mind that pending what might be called an opportune moment on other continents, the United States could best serve the cause of a peaceful humanity by setting an example."⁹⁹ In 1935 when feeling helpless, apparently, to do much to slow the European armaments race he told a group of students, "What we can do to prevent the militaristic tendencies which are increasing over there every day that goes by, I do not know, except it be by the force of example."¹⁰⁰ Three weeks later he wrote to Amba-

sador Dodd that "I do not know that the United States can save civilization but at least by our example we can make people think and give them the opportunity of saving themselves. The trouble is that the people of Germany, Italy, and Japan are not given the privilege of thinking."¹⁰¹ A few months later in extemporaneous remarks in Texas he expressed a similar thought. "I have tried to keep the feet of this country on the ground," he said, "hoping that by our example—our example of unity, our example of world unselfishness, our example of trying to build up trade between all Nations—we might have some effect on the rest of the world. . . ."¹⁰²

Democracy was to be saved for the world by the United States proving that it could be successful in meeting modern problems. In his 1936 Acceptance Speech, after noting the moral decline in the world and the loss of the will of many peoples to fight in defense of their freedom he declared that "I believe in my heart that only our success can stir their ancient hope [for democracy]. They begin to know that here in America we are waging a great and successful war. It is not alone a war against want and destitution and economic demoralization. It is more than that; it is a war for the survival of democracy. We are fighting to save a great and precious form of government for ourselves and for the world."¹⁰³

Roosevelt also liked to point to United States-Canadian relations as a pattern the other states in the world should follow. A few months after he first entered the White House he called the attention of his old summer-time neighbors at Campobello to "the good example of the United States and Canada" who had no thought of war with each other.¹⁰⁴ In 1935, after referring to the recent trade agreement made with Canada, Roosevelt expressed "hope that this good example will reach around the world some day, for the power of good example is the strongest force in the world. It surpasses preachments; it excels good resolutions; it is far better than agreements unfulfilled."¹⁰⁵

When Britain's King and Queen visited the United States in 1939 Roosevelt pointed to the friendly honorable relations between the United States and the British Commonwealth and Empire as an example the rest of the world ought to follow. Referring again to United States-Canadian relations he declared that "the greatest single contribution our two countries have been enabled to make to civilization, and to the welfare of peoples throughout the world, is the example we have jointly set by our manner of conducting relations between our two nations." Then he told a

story of how the United States and Britain had amicably settled a dispute over some Pacific islands that both claimed, by the simple expedient of a gentlemen's agreement for joint use of the islands and the deferring of the question of sovereignty until 1989. If that method of settling disputes could be "universally followed," he added, "men and women everywhere could once more look upon a happy and prosperous and a peaceful world."¹⁰⁶

But it was United States good neighborliness with Latin America, and of the Latin American republics with each other on which Roosevelt relied the most to inspire moral reconstruction around the globe. Thus the settling of the Leticia dispute between Colombia and Peru in 1934 furnished "an example to the entire world" of how with the proper will disputes could be settled by peaceful methods.¹⁰⁷ During a moment of undue optimism in the 1936 campaign he told one of his "whistle stop" audiences that the good neighbor idea seemed to be catching on "among the people" in other parts of the world and "if in the long run the people themselves get it, then those who rule in those countries must get it too."¹⁰⁸ Just before leaving on his Latin American tour at the end of 1936 he wrote Ambassador Dodd that while he did not think his trip would have much practical or immediate effect in Europe, the good neighbor idea, by force of example, might spread if it could be got down to the masses of the people in Germany and Italy. "Incidentally," he added, "I think the results of last Tuesday [Roosevelt's re-election] may have made the German and Italian populace a little envious of democratic methods."¹⁰⁹ While on his South American trip he wrote an old friend that "things in the Americas are in every way most hopeful and I hope there will be at least some moral repercussions in Europe."¹¹⁰

In his Annual Message delivered shortly after his return from Buenos Aires he had nothing short of glowing words for the spirit existing in the Americas and the seeming determination of all to settle their disputes peacefully around a table. "Here was an example," he claimed, "which must have a wholesome effect upon the rest of the world."¹¹¹ As late as April 1939 he expressed the hope that the example of the Americas would prove to the world that the impending war was not inevitable. He seemed to feel quite convinced that wars are made in the minds of men, that the trend toward war largely reflected a mental attitude and that the task for the nations beyond the seas was to "break the bonds of the ideas that constrain them toward perpetual warfare." And

here, surely, the example of the Americas could show that it could be done.¹¹²

Needless to say, the outbreak of the war in Europe, although long expected, was a depressing development for Roosevelt. When in the summer of 1941 he sat in his study at Hyde Park writing introductions for the forthcoming volumes of his public papers, he recalled his hope that the good neighbor policy would be an influential example to the rest of the world. And then he added plaintively, "Unfortunately, that hope has proved to be in vain."¹¹³

But vain or not, it is doubtful if Roosevelt ever gave up his faith in the power of example to promote the moral reconstruction of nations. To be sure, once convinced that the Axis was incorrigible he led the campaign to destroy the Axis by violence; and as already noticed, he was quite ready to achieve many of his reforms by force. But Rosenman insists that all through the war the President continued to believe that the new kind of world he wanted to see emerge out of the fires of battle could be mightily influenced by example. Thus, claims Rosenman, the President continued to insist that even during the war the United States must set an example of decent and just behavior. Wartime reassurances of independence to the Philippines, steps toward self-government for Puerto Rico, and the renunciation of extra-territorial rights in China, although motivated by several factors, were also efforts to show the world that the United States practiced what she preached and other nations should do likewise.¹¹⁴

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THE ERADICATION OF EVIL FORCES

THE previous chapter made it clear that Franklin Roosevelt aimed at nothing less than the moral and spiritual reformation of international relations. The spirit of hostility and rivalry implicit in the term "power politics" was to be replaced by the trustful and friendly spirit of the good neighbor.

It was quite apparent to the President, however, that no such reformation could make any headway until the bulwarks of the old evil spirit were destroyed. It will be recalled from Chapter One that Roosevelt blamed the breakdown of the world order of his time partially on that ten per cent of the world's peoples who through evil, stupidity, or impatience had accepted scoundrels as leaders and had turned for salvation to wicked totalitarian ideas and institutions. It was quite logical for him to conclude, therefore, that the creation of the kind of world order he wanted would be impossible unless those evil ideas and institutions were rooted out, their exponents punished and discredited, and their followers reformed.

The ideas, institutions, and leaders Roosevelt wished to purge were embodied chiefly in Italian Fascism, German Nazism, and Japanese militarism. He disliked Russian Communism also; but he had hope—as we shall see later—that this form of totalitarianism and wickedness would undergo sufficient modification in time to make it possible to live with. But he had no such hope for the various brands of fascism. All of them had to go.

Here, indeed, was Roosevelt's major war aim.

The President has been widely and vigorously criticized to the effect that he had no political objectives in the war; or rather, that he made the vast error of putting the winning of the war above all political objectives. Hull, Welles, Churchill, and the President's son Elliott, all agree that this was true. They argue that virtually all political decisions made during the war by Roosevelt were made with primary regard for their effect on military operations and that Roosevelt actually had an aversion to discussing post-war power positions or of gearing military operations to such post-war problems while men were dying on the field of battle. The war should be fought, he argued, in whatever way would most quickly produce military victory and stop the killing, not in whatever way would produce the best power position for the United States or any other nation. Such matters were to be left for the Conference Table after the war and after even a period of transition, during which the nations' tempers would cool and reason and good neighborliness might at least partially prevail.¹

Clearly there is much truth to these charges against Roosevelt. Yet this is hard to understand. For as an old navy man and a student of Mahan, Roosevelt was quite aware, in his naval days at least, that the sole purpose of warfare and military operations is to *aid* diplomacy and *help achieve* the political objectives of the nation; that always and invariably the military machine and military operations should be subordinated to political objectives.

At least two explanations for Roosevelt's wartime attitude are possible, however. The first is that Roosevelt simply forgot what he knew and succumbed to an old Anglo-Saxon weakness noticed as far back as the eighteenth century by Hume who pointed out the old British tendency to enter wars so wholeheartedly that sight of political objectives was lost.²

A second possible explanation is that Roosevelt was quite satisfied with making the rooting out of the totalitarian regimes of the Axis his sole political objective. Obviously, that in itself was an enormous task; and its achievement, as we shall see, was to open the way to such additional post-war goals as disarmament. The likelihood of the Soviet Union's reviving her long dormant campaign of expansion and of so quickly gathering enough strength to implement it was considered remote. Thus all other possible political objectives paled into insignificance in the face of the overriding goal of eliminating Axis evils. We know now that Roosevelt was wrong in his predictions regarding both Soviet

objectives and strength. But those who guessed correctly were then in a decided minority and the President remained content with his single political objective until the end.

If we recall Roosevelt's attitude regarding the nature of man and morality it is easy to understand why Roosevelt looked upon the leaders, ideas, and institutions of the Axis countries as evil incarnate. As already mentioned, Roosevelt, like many other Americans, maintained for some time a somewhat benevolent attitude toward Mussolini and his Italian Fascist movement. To be sure, Mussolini's attacks on constitutional government and his disregard of the safeguards of individual liberty were drawing caustic remarks from Roosevelt by 1930.³ Mussolini's invasion of Ethiopia also caused Roosevelt on at least one occasion to liken him to a gangster.⁴ But until war actually broke out in Europe Roosevelt never put Mussolini and his Fascists in the same class with Hitler and the Nazis and he retained hope almost until the last that Mussolini was on the side of world peace.⁵

There was never any such benevolence in his attitude toward the Nazis or the Japanese war lords. Frances Perkins has testified that the Nazi treatment of the Jews filled Roosevelt with horror; the degree of brutality practised by the Nazis seemed unbelievable to Roosevelt; and when he became convinced that the brutality was the conscious program of the German government, he looked upon it as "evil rampant."⁶ Grace Tully, the President's secretary for many years, has also testified that Roosevelt took a strong moral position against the Axis, feeling that anyone who opposed them was "on the side of right."⁷

Assuredly many of the President's public statements made about the Nazis after the 1940 election were the usual hate-filled remarks war leaders often make regarding their enemies. But there was a strong note of sincerity in Roosevelt's charges that the Axis countries and their leaders were "inhuman, unrestrained seekers of world conquest," "madmen" with unscrupulous ambitions, "international outlaws," "political and moral tigers," and "forces of evil."⁸ When in a report to Congress in August 1941 he referred to "The utter lack of the validity of the spoken or written word of the Nazi Government," he seems to have been revealing his sincere view.⁹ For earlier in 1941 he had privately expressed similar thoughts. He had agreed with Ambassador Grew's opinion, for example, that Japan was a "predatory" power.¹⁰ When an old friend, Harold S. Vanderbilt, had begged the President in May 1941 not to urge the nation toward intervention in the

European war, Roosevelt had answered that Vanderbilt's letter was "truly a plea for inaction against evil . . ."; and he added that "it seems so clear that the ultimate choice is between right and wrong that smug inaction on our part is in effect an aid to wrong. Even if our continental limits remained intact I, personally, should hate to live the rest of my days in a world dominated by the Hitler philosophy. In the last analysis, I think you would hate that too."¹¹

Throughout the war Roosevelt continued to equate the behavior of the Axis with evil. In his first Annual Message after Pearl Harbor he described Japan's activities from 1894 on as a "conspiracy" to subjugate all the peoples of the Far East and the Pacific; Italy's policy in the Mediterranean was called a "policy of criminal conquest"; but these schemes were all modest in comparison with the "gargantuan" aspirations of Hitler. "We are fighting," Roosevelt declared, "to cleanse the world of ancient evils, ancient ills." The Axis was "guided by brutal cynicism, by unholy contempt for the human race." But the Allies were motivated by the ideal of the Book of Genesis that "God created man in his image" and the ideal that "all men are equal in the sight of God." Clearly it was a contest "between good and evil."¹² The Nazis and Japanese militarists were virtually inhuman, he declared later. Nazi brutality "transcends a hundred-fold the brutality of 1917," he asserted. The Nazi seemed to have an "utter inability to understand and . . . respect the qualities or the rights of his fellow man. His only method of dealing with his neighbor is first to delude him with lies, then to attack him treacherously, then beat him down and step on him, and then either kill him or enslave him. And the same thing is true of the fanatical militarists of Japan." The instincts and impulses of these people are essentially "inhuman," he added, and they cannot comprehend how decent, sensible people live as good neighbors.¹³ Toward the end of the war Roosevelt, still speaking in the same vein, referred to Hitlerism and Fascism as a "poison" that had spread throughout Europe.¹⁴ Both publicly and privately he indicated he had been shocked by what he considered Japanese brutality and inhumanity in such activities as that of the Bataan "death march," the beheading of American aviators, and reports of atrocities in Japanese prisoner-of-war camps. Such things show the Japanese "lack of civilization," he declared; and he reiterated many times the idea that in the post-war period he would never again "trust the Japs around the corner."¹⁵

To Roosevelt these evils were also deeply rooted in both Germany and Japan, if not in Italy. There is no evidence known to this writer that he traced the militarism of Germany back as far as Frederick the Great or traced the ambitions and militarism of Japan back to the old samurai tradition. But he did seem to think that iniquitous behavior had been characteristic of both since the latter part of the nineteenth century. While a student at Harvard in 1902, he told Stimson years later, a Japanese friend had unfolded to him a hundred-year plan made in 1889 whereby Japan would conquer Asia and the Pacific.¹⁶ This plan of conquest was revealed to the whole world, he told Congress shortly after Pearl Harbor, by Japan's 1894 attack on China, by her subsequent occupation of Korea, by her attack on Russia in 1904, by her illegal fortification of mandated Pacific islands after 1920, by her seizure of Manchuria in 1931, and finally by her invasion of China in 1937.¹⁷ When in 1913 an American-Japanese war scare was provoked by agitation over California land laws, Roosevelt reflected the teachings of Mahan and the attitude of the Navy by taking a bellicose stand, insisting that Japan was the most powerful potential enemy of the United States and the Navy should be kept prepared for trouble with her.¹⁸

During the twenties Roosevelt's attitude toward Japan mellowed temporarily—but only temporarily. In 1923 he published a magazine article which revealed him as thinking that Japan was no longer as evil as she had been, or had seemed. She had become frightened, he argued, when in 1898 the United States had moved into her “backyard” by conquest of the Philippines. The American debate as to how the Philippines should be defended accentuated those fears. But in 1922 Japan had accepted the limitations of the Washington treaties, all of which she had carried out faithfully in spite of the fact that they had required many national sacrifices—sacrifices to her prestige, political ambitions, and dignity. Her desire to partition China had also been dissipated by the World War, he thought, and the old American suspicions about her were no longer justified. In another article in 1928 he again indicated a friendly disposition toward Japan.¹⁹

But this benevolent attitude toward Japan was only temporary and probably was completely dispelled by the 1931 Manchurian Incident. By the time Roosevelt entered the White House in 1933, at any rate, he had already endorsed Stimson's non-recognition doctrine and reverted to his old belief that Japan had an evil nature. At a private dinner at James Farley's home in January

1933 he again accused Japan of imperialistic ambitions that were likely in the coming decade to cause the world much trouble.²⁰ At his second cabinet meeting, moreover, he discussed military strategy against Japan.²¹ And by the mid-thirties he was saying privately that the Japanese were the "Prussians of the East, and just as drunk with their dream of dominion."²²

The evil nature of Germany was also traceable as far back as the Kaiser's dismissal of Bismark in 1890, after which militarism had increased rapidly.²³

It was an easy step to the next conclusion that there could be neither security nor peace in the world unless such evil was rooted out. To temporize with it would be "a compromise with evil itself"; and in struggles between good and evil, there can be no compromise.²⁴ Thus peace could return to the world "only when the forces of evil which now hold vast areas of Europe and Asia enslaved have been utterly destroyed."²⁵

Roosevelt seems never to have given more than incidental consideration to the idea of a negotiated peace; and even then he opposed any negotiated settlement that might leave evil regimes like the Nazis in power. In March 1939 he told Congress that free representative governments like that of the United States could not approve the rise of forms of government that were tyrannical.²⁶ A few days after war broke out in Europe in September 1939 he also sent word to his Ambassador in Great Britain that he did not want any peace movement initiated that would consolidate or make possible the survival of the Nazi regime.²⁷ It was only during the first few months of the European war that he was willing to give any consideration at all to the possibility of stopping the carnage short of total victory.

During the "phony war" of late 1939 and early 1940 the President seemed to feel for a while that a peace negotiated with Hitler might be at least preferable to a peace dictated by him. Thus he listened with interest to emissaries with ideas for ending the war by negotiation and he sent Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles to Europe early in 1940 in order to find out whether or not there existed any basis for a negotiated peace. But once assured the British were dedicated to a "fight to the finish" and assured also that Hitler had no intention of making peace on any terms except those completely favorable to him, Roosevelt gave up all thought of a negotiated peace.²⁸

When sending Admiral Leahy as his Ambassador to France in late 1940, moreover, he told the Admiral to urge upon Marshall

Petain the President's conviction that the world could live in liberty, peace, and prosperity only by the defeat of the German and Italian regimes and "that civilization cannot progress with a return to totalitarianism."²⁹

What Roosevelt seems to have feared most was that unless the evils plaguing the world were exorcised once and for all, they would continue to cause trouble and in due time there would be a repetition of all the iniquities then being perpetrated. A negotiated peace would be "only another armistice, leading to the most gigantic armament race and the most devastating trade wars in all history."³⁰ It would merely give Germany a chance to catch her breath and time to prepare for another war for the control of Europe, Asia, and the Western Hemisphere.³¹ Thus a major surgical operation would have to be performed on the body politic of "Germany, Italy, and Japan to such good purpose that their threat against us and all other United Nations cannot be revived a generation hence."³² For it was clear to Roosevelt, he asserted, that if Germany and Italy and Japan were not purged of the evil in them "they would again, and inevitably, embark upon an ambitious career of world conquest."³³

As an optimist concerning the nature of man, a believer in the idea of progress, a reformer, a man of simple religious principles, and a man with considerable faith in the value of education, Roosevelt seemed satisfied that the Axis could be cured. To be sure, rehabilitation might take years, and it would be up to each nation to work her own way back into the family of nations, but it could be done. "Years of proof must pass by," he declared, "before we can trust Japan and before we can classify Japan as a member of the society of nations which seeks permanent peace and whose word we can take."³⁴ The same was true of Germany. But "I should be false to the very foundations of my religious and political convictions," he added, "if I should ever relinquish the hope—or even the faith—that in all peoples, without exception, there live some instinct for truth, some attraction toward justice, some passion for peace—buried as they may be in the German case under a brutal regime," for "we cannot believe that God has eternally condemned any race of humanity."³⁵

Germany had once been a respectable nation; why not again? In 1933 when Nazi evils were first drawing attention he wrote to George Earle, his Minister in Vienna, of his hopes that "German sanity of the old type that existed in the Bismarck days when I was a boy at school there in Germany will come to the front

again.”⁸⁶ A few weeks before his death he told the press of his hopes for the reformation of Germany and Japan, arguing that Germany and Japan had been converted from peace-loving to militaristic nations and if such a conversion could take place in one direction he saw no reason why it could not be turned in the opposite direction. Germany had not been militaristic when he first went to school there in 1889, he asserted. But she had gradually become so. By 1896 he saw her railroad employees and school children in uniform, her children being taught to march, and many similar signs of militarism. Thereafter militarism had become worse and worse. “Now, if a nation can do that in fifty years,” he asked, “why couldn’t you move them in the opposite direction? Why can’t you move in a non-militaristic method?” Japan also had become a great modern military nation between 1865 and 1903, and her people also could be turned around; it all depended on leadership and objectives.⁸⁷

Unfortunately, Roosevelt’s ideas as to what should be done to cleanse the Axis states of evil were at once so general and so fragmentary that it is impossible to know with much precision what he planned to do. Clearly his ideas were a synthesis of both old and new ideas of criminology. Old-fashioned ideas of punishment and new-fashioned ideas of education were both there. Both physical and psychological punishment were necessary to change public attitudes, he seemed to think, while at the same time all implements and facilities for engaging in criminal activities should be taken away. Then, supposedly, long term re-education would follow.

What Roosevelt wanted first was a hard peace, a peace so hard that every German and every Japanese, if not every Italian, would learn that war is hell, would be convinced that his country had been defeated, and would carry forever after a sense of personal guilt for what had happened. They must be humiliated, shamed. Their evil leaders, ideas, and institutions must be discredited and made to stand revealed in all their brutality, treachery, and inhumanity.

Roosevelt had always been an advocate of a hard peace. In World War I his belief that the Germans were inhumanly brutal had increased steadily and he had favored publication of the stories of their atrocities.⁸⁸ He had also favored something akin to unconditional surrender of the German fleet.⁸⁹ He believed further that the German people should know that they were defeated. In 1919 while in the Rhineland, he had a fit of rage

when he found no American flag flying over a famous German fort occupied by a United States Marine brigade. When asked "why the Hell the American flag was not floating over Ehrenbreitstein" and told it was kept down on orders that nothing should be done to disturb the peace of mind of the Germans, he complained directly to General Pershing, declaring "the German people ought to know for all time that Ehrenbreitstein flew the American Flag during the occupation."⁴⁰

Thus Roosevelt believed that Wilson's Fourteen Points and his policy of peace without victory had been mistakes. Violation of the Fourteen Points had plagued the post-war world, led to the rise of Hitler and World War II, he reasoned, and he had no intention of repeating those mistakes.⁴¹

When during the fall of France a pacifist editor begged Roosevelt to push toward peace rather than war, the President answered that he would like to do that very much. "But in these days," he went on, "I am reminded of a story about the early pioneers who crossed the mountains into Tennessee and Kentucky. They were peaceful people. They wanted to live peaceful lives and set up communities in which lawlessness and physical danger could have no place. But they found wolves and Indians which made the safety of their lives uncertain. They organized, killed the wolves, shot some of the Indians and drove their remnants west of the Great River. After this was accomplished they lived under organized peace in their new lands."⁴²

Thus the Axis movements were not to Roosevelt the kind of movements that could be appeased. "No nation can appease the Nazis," he declared at the end of 1940. "No man can tame a tiger into a kitten by stroking it. There can be no reasoning with an incendiary bomb. We know now that a nation can have peace with the Nazis only at the price of total surrender."⁴³ Thus the aim of the United States regarding Hitler, even before Pearl Harbor, was to "destroy him, to destroy all his works. . . ."⁴⁴

Throughout the war Roosevelt talked in the same vein, repeating again and again his determination to impose a hard peace, to destroy the cancerous growths afflicting the world. When Mussolini resigned in July 1943 he again refused to make a deal, proclaiming instead that "we will have no truck with Fascism in any way, in any shape or manner. We will permit no vestige of Fascism to remain."⁴⁵ And this same surgical operation was going to be performed everywhere, he told Congress a few months later, for "we shall not be able to claim," the President argued, "that

we have gained total victory in this war if any vestige of Fascism in any of its malignant forms is permitted to survive anywhere in the world.”⁴⁶

When toward the end of the war pressure mounted on Roosevelt to soften his peace terms, the President categorically refused; but the pressure began to worry him. “It is amazing how many people are beginning to get soft in the future terms of the Germans and the Japs,” he wrote a senator in 1944. “I fear it is going to be a real trouble to us next year or the year after.”⁴⁷ A few days later he wrote Queen Wilhelmina in the same vein, declaring that he had no sympathy with those who are “hoping by loving kindness to make them [the Germans] Christians again.” He was not bloodthirsty, he asserted, but “I want the Germans to know that this time at least they have definitely lost the war.”⁴⁸

An unconditional surrender was essential to Roosevelt's objectives. In the first place, an absolute, clear cut, total military victory was, he thought, imperative to teach the Axis peoples the grim lesson that war is hell and that this time they had been defeated. “Practically all Germans deny the fact they surrendered in the last war,” he said, “but this time they are going to know it. And so are the Japs.”⁴⁹ The President's second objective in his unconditional surrender policy was to make certain that the Allies would have a free hand to carry out any reforms they saw fit when the shooting ended. Roosevelt feared that if the Allies made any promises or commitments or granted any terms whatsoever to the Axis countries when they surrendered, the Allies might then find themselves hampered in their post-war attempts to purge the conquered countries. He was quite willing to allow the Axis peoples to be told as many times as necessary that although their leaders would be punished, they the people, would not be destroyed. They could be told also that the Allies wanted the Axis peoples to be able to live like other respectable people. They could be assured also that the Allies would treat them with decency and humanity. But no terms that might later hamper the occupation could be granted.

The best way of getting this whole policy understood, he thought, was by telling his version (historically inaccurate) of Lee's surrender to Grant at Appomattox. Despite all pleas from Lee, the President's story went, Grant had refused to allow any surrender terms. Lee was told that he must place himself and his troops completely and unconditionally at Grant's mercy. Lee's pleas for promises that his men would be fed and would be al-

lowed to keep their horses were unavailing. Grant continued to demand "unconditional surrender." But once Lee had surrendered unconditionally and placed his trust solely in Grant's hands, Grant treated him and his men with great consideration. Grant fed Lee's men and then ordered them to take their horses home and get on with their spring plowing. "There you have unconditional surrender," said Roosevelt. "I have given you no new term. We are human beings—normal, thinking human beings. That is what we mean by unconditional surrender."⁵⁰

To Roosevelt, therefore, the unconditional surrender policy was a flexible policy that would allow one occupied country to be treated one way, another country another way. Although the Italian surrender looked to some people as if conditions had been allowed, Roosevelt insisted that the general principle of unconditional surrender had been applied and the Italian surrender was an example of how the principle might be applied in a flexible manner.⁵¹

Thus unconditional surrender—the unhampered, unfettered, unrestrained right to control, purge, and reform the Axis countries was essential to Roosevelt's plan of ridding the world of the evils that must be rooted out before a new world order could be created.

The unconditional surrender of the Axis countries was to be followed immediately by an attack on the militarism of those countries. That they were to be completely disarmed was taken for granted. In Germany in particular all military equipment was to be removed or destroyed and all industry usable for military production eliminated or placed under international control.⁵²

According to Mrs. Roosevelt the President also hoped to influence the Germans psychologically by forbidding them to have aircraft of any kind, not even a glider, by not allowing anyone to wear a uniform of any kind, and prohibiting marching.⁵³ The German General Staff was to be broken up also and the Prussian base of German militarism weakened beyond repair. "When Hitler and the Nazis go out," Roosevelt told Congress, "the Prussian military clique must go with them. The war-breeding gangs of militarists must be rooted out of Germany—and out of Japan—if we are to have any real assurance of future peace."⁵⁴ For a while at least, he contemplated breaking up the military clique by moving the Prussians out of East Prussia as the Greeks had been moved out of Turkey after World War I. The removed population would then be dispersed throughout Germany.⁵⁵ Although

the President left no similar suggestions regarding Japan, he spoke repeatedly of blotting out the "shameless militarism of Japan" and supposedly planned to apply drastic remedies.⁵⁶

As is well known also, Roosevelt was determined to abolish all manifestations of totalitarianism in all the Axis countries. "All leaders and active members of the Nazi party should be eliminated from any participation in the administration of Germany," he wrote Queen Wilhelmina, "and forbidden any political activity whatsoever. I fully agree that we cannot risk having these Nazis resume any of their nefarious activity and I assume that one of the principal objects of the occupation will be to root out the Nazi Party in all its manifestations."⁵⁷ All Nazi laws, organizations, and institutions would also be wiped out.⁵⁸

It is also well known that in Roosevelt's program to reform the Axis he was determined to punish all Axis leaders and their associates who had been involved in crimes against peace, against humanity, against civilization.⁵⁹ Although the President never seemed quite certain in his own mind as to how much share of the guilt for the world's trouble should be placed on the populations of the Axis countries, his statements assuring retribution for the activities of their leaders usually contained promises that there would be no mass recriminations.

The kind of trial Roosevelt wanted for the Axis leaders is debatable. On occasion he seemed to favor quick "drumhead trials in the field" for the German General Staff, or of simply shooting 50,000 Nazi officials or army officers without trial.⁶⁰ But at other times he indicated he favored formal trials under international law with caution taken to prevent the creation of any martyrs. In either case, punishment was to be swift with no long period of waiting as after World War I when the whole attempt finally collapsed.⁶¹ The impression got from reading Roosevelt's statements is that he looked upon the Axis leaders and their aides in the same way he looked upon murderers and thieves or any other type of common criminal who should be punished for their crimes. He wanted the Axis leaders punished, not only in the hope that punishment would deter them from a repetition of such heinous behavior, but in the hope also that those who followed as leaders in the Axis countries—or elsewhere—would know that the world will no longer tolerate such criminals.

While the above prescriptions for cleansing the world of evil were to be applied to all three of the Axis states, nearly all Roosevelt's thinking on the matter was done with only Germany in

mind. Italy and Japan were usually mentioned only in passing and, as it turned out, Italy was treated with far more benevolence than Roosevelt's earlier statements would have led one to expect. But Germany was to Roosevelt the arch-criminal of the age and he concentrated his thinking upon her. Once purified, she must be kept pure, he reasoned, and that would require more reforms than the mere "rooting out" or even the changing of attitudes. It would also require safeguards that would make impossible a repetition of the recovery of power Germany had achieved in the inter-war years.

Roosevelt's answer to this problem was the dismemberment of Germany and the weakening and subsequent control of her industrial power. By dismemberment he meant essentially the restoration of the federal system that had prevailed in Germany during the empire. In those days, he argued, the concept of the highly centralized Reich was hardly known. Each local community dealt almost solely with her provincial government and it had only been in recent years that virtually everything had been centralized in Berlin.⁶²

When talking to British Foreign Secretary Eden early in 1943 the President stated that he preferred merely to encourage separatist movements in Germany which he believed public opinion would demand after the war, but if such movements failed to materialize, Germany would be divided anyway, with matters so arranged that Prussia would no longer be dominant.⁶³ By the time of the Moscow Conference in October 1943, Hull has reported, the President categorically favored the division of Germany into three or more completely sovereign states joined, however, by postal, railroad, electric power, communications, and other such agreements. East Prussia would be completely detached and her population forcibly dispersed. When Hull and his advisors raised objections to partition, the President admitted the scheme might not work, but he showed no sign of changing his goal.⁶⁴ At Teheran, therefore, he proposed the whole matter in more detail, suggesting this time dismemberment into five states with the areas of the Kiel Canal, Hamburg, the Ruhr, and the Saar made into international trusteeships.⁶⁵ At Yalta he insisted he was still in favor of dismemberment to prevent a repetition of the concentration of power in Berlin,⁶⁶ and there is no evidence that he ever changed his mind.

Roosevelt's hope of making Germany so economically weak

that she could never again build a war machine was symbolized when at Quebec in 1944 he initialed the famous Morgenthau Plan. This plan called not only for a more drastic dismemberment of Germany than Roosevelt had ever proposed, but for the almost complete destruction of German industrial plants and the ruining of Germany's mines as well. What territory was not given to neighboring states or placed under international control would be so de-industrialized that the German people in the remaining independent areas would be left to live in virtually a pastoral economy and obviously would never again be able to build a war machine.⁶⁷ It is true that under pressure from Hull, Stimson, and others the President later repudiated his acceptance of the Morgenthau Plan on the grounds he was not really aware at the time he approved it that the plan was so drastic. His general objective he declared was to help Great Britain recover economically after the war and he did not believe she could do so in competition with an economically strong Germany. He thought Britain should inherit, for example, the manufacturing and export business of the Ruhr. Britain was already near bankruptcy and certainly would have a depression after the war, he feared, if Germany remained competitive. He had not intended, he said, when he approved the Morgenthau Plan to go so far as to make Germany an agricultural country.⁶⁸

It would be wrong to assume, however, that Roosevelt was not in general sympathy with the major objectives of the Morgenthau Plan. As the war went on his bitterness toward Germany increased steadily as it had in World War I. In a moment of anger in August 1944 he told James F. Byrnes of his irritation with "misguided" officials in the State Department who favored a "soft" peace for Germany. His own idea was, he said, that the German people must be taught their responsibility for the war and for a long time should have only soup for breakfast, soup for lunch, and soup for dinner. To Byrnes this "did not sound like President Roosevelt. He was angry."⁶⁹ But Roosevelt seemed to be angry in this fashion a great deal toward the end of the war. At Yalta he repeated that while he did not want to make Germany wholly agricultural, he did not want her to be able to compete economically with Britain nor did he want her to be in an industrial position whereby she could again re-arm for another war in twenty years. Mere inspection of plants would not be enough of a safeguard to prevent re-arming. Complete de-industrialization

of the Ruhr and the Saar were not desirable, but some was desirable. Before the war Germany had been so productive that she had been able to prepare for war and export at the same time, and he wanted no such capacity to exist again. "I envision a Germany that is self-sustaining but not starving," he said; and he saw no reason for a standard of living there higher than the standard of living in the Soviet Union.⁷⁰ Mrs. Roosevelt has denied categorically reports that the President was ever sorry he approved the Morgenthau Plan; and Morgenthau told her that in his last interview with the President, Roosevelt was as much as ever in favor of a hard peace for Germany, presumably somewhat along the general lines of the Morgenthau Plan.⁷¹

Obviously Roosevelt's thinking on the problem of purging the world of evil was cut short by his death and he never got down to the working out of many details. As already noted, his ideas regarding the reformation of Italy and Japan were limited to a few passing generalizations. When being badgered by Hull and Stimson for having approved the Morgenthau Plan the President finally put them off with a note to Hull stating he had concluded it was not wise to make detailed plans about a country not yet occupied.⁷² The treatment of Italy after her surrender in 1943 was so subordinated to military considerations that even that is not a very good illustration of what Roosevelt wanted to do.

As we shall see later, Roosevelt longed for the abolition of totalitarianism everywhere; and it is quite likely that he believed that the fall of Nazism and Fascism in Germany and Italy would presage its doom everywhere. In September 1944 he noted the "paradox" of the rise of those philosophies in Argentina at the very moment they were facing defeat elsewhere; and while he made it quite clear that he was not pleased with the Argentine development, he gave no clue as to what he proposed to do about it.⁷³ Only a month before his death, moreover, he wrote to his Ambassador in Spain that the Fascist government of the Spanish Falange under General Franco was not at all appreciated by the United States and after the war it would have to go. Its totalitarian character and its aid to the Axis would not be forgotten, he promised. And while it was not the practice of the United States to interfere in the internal affairs of other nations unless they threatened peace, he added, "I should be lacking in candor, however, if I did not tell you that I can see no place in the community of nations for governments founded on Fascist principles."⁷⁴

The President was bent on a campaign of massive international reform, more mild than the medieval Inquisition, to be sure, but so broad in its implications that in due time even he, like his successors, might have drawn back.

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WORLD DISARMAMENT

THE WORLD ORDER of Franklin Roosevelt's dreams was an order not only cleansed of the evils of Nazism, Fascism, and militarism; it was also an order wherein all nations would be substantially disarmed, the only arms allowed being those needed for domestic or international policing. The criminal Axis states were to be totally disarmed as a matter of course, for Roosevelt looked upon the attitude of militarism and the institutions and practices embodied in militarism as moral evils that had no place in a decent society of nations. This did not mean that Roosevelt equated all armaments, military establishments, and the use of force with militarism and moral evil. But he did seem to believe during approximately the last twenty-five years of his life that armaments and military establishments, even if not accompanied by the attitude and practices of militarism, were undesirable and that all armaments not necessary for policing should be abolished.

Here is one concept wherein Roosevelt experienced almost as complete a conversion as Paul of Tarsus. If his conversion did not come with the lightning suddenness experienced by Paul on the road to Damascus, it was nevertheless relatively rapid, seemingly occurring during the years 1919-21.

In his public career before 1919 Roosevelt was a militarist of the Mahan-Theodore Roosevelt variety. According to this school war was an established institution in society and the only institution through which many disputes could be settled. It held that while the goal of a world ruled by law with disputes settled by

arbitration was a laudable goal, the time was not yet ripe for such a world and disputes would have to be settled for the foreseeable future by the play of natural forces—by force. However undesirable war might be, no nation could be certain it would not break out; and preparation for it must be perpetual. Particularly so long as the world was divided into a variety of nations and peoples with different ideals and goals, there would be some irreconcilable objectives among them and some war was inevitable. Those who believed war could be abolished were “extremists,” and Roosevelt was not one of them.

Becoming Assistant Secretary of the Navy in 1913, he immediately won a widespread reputation as a “big navy man” and was often much closer in his thinking to the admirals than he was to his more pacifist minded superiors, Daniels and Wilson. He believed that war was always a possibility and the United States must, therefore, maintain “a fighting force of the highest efficiency.” There were in the Navy, he argued, as many advocates of arbitration and international peace as in any other profession, but the likelihood of war should always be kept in mind.¹ During the 1913 crisis with Japan, provoked by California’s land laws, Roosevelt’s sympathies were entirely with the militarists. He favored the Joint Army-Navy Board’s desire for fleet movements that would have been equivalent to brandishing the saber in Japan’s face and he thereby put himself into opposition to Wilson and the cabinet, who wanted to avoid all provocative action.² During the Mexican trouble of 1914, Roosevelt virtually itched, claims Freidel, to expand the Vera Cruz crisis into a war, and Daniels had to restrain him. “Sooner or later . . .,” Roosevelt argued, “the United States must go down there and clean up the Mexican political mess. I believe the best time is right now.”³

Meanwhile, Roosevelt had called for the United States to build the largest navy in the world, a navy second to none, thereby going beyond even the recommendations of the General Navy Board, which was willing to accept a navy inferior to England’s. Not even the fire-eating Richmond Hobson, notes Freidel, publicly advocated a navy of this size.⁴

In Roosevelt’s view, in those days strong military forces were needed for more than defense. They were needed also to back up diplomacy. Shortly after World War I began Roosevelt wrote to his wife of his irritation at finding his superiors in Washington almost totally unaware of what he considered the implications of the war to the United States, and unwilling to make what he be-

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lieved were essential preparations. The fleet was scattered to the four winds, he wrote Eleanor, and "some fine day the State Department will want the *moral* backing of a fleet in being and it won't be there!"⁵ When World War I ended Roosevelt also supported proposals by "big navy" men who argued that an effective fleet should be maintained to back United States diplomacy and the State Department, especially regarding Japan in the Pacific and in order to promote trade and friendship in Latin America.⁶

The protection and promotion of American commerce also required strong military forces, particularly a navy, thought Roosevelt in those days. When in 1916 a retired admiral warned Roosevelt against Britain's commercial greed, Roosevelt responded privately that he believed all nations, including the United States, were equally greedy for one another's trade and whoever controlled the seas would behave the same way Britain behaved. The only answer for the United States was to "build the ships." Thus he suggested that after the war the United States must have an all-powerful fleet to maintain her new dominant position in international trade. Once the war was over and the German fleet was no longer a threat, Roosevelt modified his position to the extent of preferring Anglo-American to solely American control of the seas, although he continued opposing abandonment of the nation's enlarged merchant marine.⁸ At the same time he advocated the maintenance of air power, along with sea power, for the protection and development of American commerce.⁹

In 1914 while agitating for a preparedness program, Roosevelt also argued—as so many others have before and since—that powerful military forces were the best insurance for the prevention of war.¹⁰

In those early years Roosevelt was also a strong advocate of universal military training. As early as 1913 he supported the creation of a Naval Reserve, and in this he never lost interest.¹¹ As already noted, moreover, Roosevelt had lost faith in the value of the old-fashioned militia when he saw the nature of war changing, and had only mocking contempt for William Jennings Bryan's idea of men springing to arms overnight to defend their country. He argued that a man with less than a year's training was virtually useless in modern war; for a soldier needed to know something more than the manual of arms. He needed to know also how to care for his body under service conditions, be able to march twenty miles a day, know how to dig a trench, and be able to "hit a five-foot square target at six hundred yards." And not one

American boy in a hundred could do those things.¹² He preferred to call such training "national service," leaving out the word "military," and argued that there was nothing militaristic about it. All people, he declared, should be made to realize that they had a personal obligation to their nation and their government in time of need; and every boy who gave one year of his life to his country would benefit himself as well as the nation; for such training would result in better bodies, better citizenship, and more unity among sections of the country as a result of the mingling of boys from all parts of the nation.¹³ Such training also "stands against anarchy and Bolshevism," he argued later, "against class hatred, against snobbery. It stands for discipline, good fellowship, order, and a broader Americanism."¹⁴

But 1918 was probably the last year of Roosevelt's life in which he talked consistently like a semi-militarist. Freidel thought it significant that as early as January 1919 Roosevelt made a speech—on board ship enroute to Paris—wherein for the first time in years he failed to call for increased armaments.¹⁵ Years later he incorrectly denied that in 1919 he had advocated conscription and he insisted that in 1919 and 1920 he had "believed that the League of Nations would really work out a sufficiently permanent peace to bring about a steady reduction of arms and armies!"¹⁶

Although Roosevelt in that statement exaggerated his 1919-20 faith in the League and the advisability as well as possibility of disarmament, there is no doubt that after 1920 he never again advocated strong military forces except when faced with the Axis peril, and he did so then only with reluctance. Immediately after his own election defeat in 1920 and the defeat of the League in the Senate, he began advocating disarmament. In March 1921 he publicly registered his conversion by proclaiming "I am wholly out of sympathy with this talk about our having the greatest Navy in the world." He still favored the maintenance of a trained reserve, but he wanted Harding to call an international conference to stop the expensive naval competition among the United States, Britain, and Japan.¹⁷ In due course he strongly supported the work of the Washington Naval Conference of 1922, declaring a half dozen years later that it was the one bright spot in the Harding administration.¹⁸

In a 1923 magazine article Roosevelt went so far as to disagree with his old navy friends, arguing that the United States no longer needed to be prepared to meet all possible foes. There was a new spirit of international cooperation abroad in the world, he de-

clared, and this new spirit called for an end to armaments races. The trend was away from colonial expansion, more and more disputes were being settled by peaceful procedures, and all nations should cooperate to prevent war. He praised the American agreement not to fortify further her holdings in the Pacific and condemned British and Dutch increases of strength there.¹⁹ In another article in 1928 he condemned the Coolidge administration for not following up the Washington Treaty with limitations on other than capital ships, and for permitting the Navy to appeal for appropriations for expansion. There were no longer any military threats on the horizon, he added; even our relations with Japan could be worked out amicably; a big navy was no longer needed; and a long term program of naval construction was simply indefensible. It would be handing a cudgel to the State Department to use over the heads of other nations.²⁰

Meanwhile Roosevelt had also become worried about the horrors to civilization implied in the world's developing military air power. The long effort to humanize warfare from Grotius on, he declared in 1925, was now threatened by the airplane which made no distinction between combatants and non-combatants. Unless something was done about this, he warned, "we shall go back to the unlimited and horrible conditions of warfare in the Dark and Middle Ages." In fact, it was more important to work on this problem, he thought, than on the problem of scrapping battle-ships, and the United States should take the lead.²¹

When Roosevelt entered the White House in 1933 he was more in favor of disarmament than ever and made vigorous efforts to instill new life into the Disarmament Conference then floundering at Geneva. He sent word privately to Hitler that he considered Germany the only obstacle to an agreement reducing armaments and he promised Hitler that while he opposed any increase in German armament, he would make every possible effort to get the armaments of other nations down to Germany's level.²² A general reduction of armaments, he told the American people at the same time, was one of the major objectives of American foreign policy.²³ He heartily endorsed the MacDonald proposal recently made at Geneva calling for the gradual abolition of offensive weapons such as gas, heavy mobile artillery, airplanes, and tanks; and he appealed to the heads of the fifty-four governments represented at the Conference to take at least a small first step to achieve the plan.²⁴ If nations could be limited to the possession of such light arms as rifles, machine guns, and light artillery, success-

ful invasion would become virtually impossible, he argued; for these light weapons would be of little use against permanent frontier defenses such as trenches, barbed wire, and forts.²⁵ Under conditions of this sort, he was fond of saying, Germany's population of 70,000,000 could be kept at bay by Switzerland's 4,000,000 population entrenched in forts on their borders.²⁶

Roosevelt supported also the French proposal for "continuous inspection" to see that no one rearmed. When the War and Navy Departments protested this idea Roosevelt retorted that "supervision and inspection must be all-inclusive, including all plants in all nations. That is my policy. . . ."²⁷

Although Roosevelt's efforts to reinvigorate the General Disarmament Conference came to naught, no year went by thereafter, including even the war years, without Roosevelt both privately and publicly expressing his desire for disarmament. In 1934 during preparatory discussions for the Naval Disarmament Conference of 1935 he set himself like a rock against relaxation of the limitations on navies established in the 1922 and 1930 treaties, despite pressures from even some members of his official family who favored slight increases in tonnage to appease Japan. He wanted reductions in tonnage, he told his aides, not increases, and he asserted that he would neither sign nor submit to the Senate or the American people any treaty allowing an increase of even one ton over the limit of the earlier treaties. The most he would do was assure Japan that the United States would not keep more naval power in the Pacific in peace time than Japan herself kept there.²⁸

To Norman Davis, his delegate to the pending conference, Roosevelt wrote a ringing defense of the Washington Treaty of 1922, declaring it had "brought the world the first important voluntary agreement for limitation and reduction of armaments," and it was, therefore, "a milestone in civilization." The 1930 treaty had taken the world a step further, and he did not want to turn back. Any weakening of those treaties, he feared, would so upset the power structure that a naval arms race would be inevitable. Davis was instructed, therefore, to work for a 20% tonnage reduction. If that could not be had, he should try to get 15%, 10%, 5%, or at the worst an extension of the present treaties. But no increase would be acceptable.²⁹

A month later, irritated by England's reluctance to cooperate to reduce tonnage, the President wrote Davis again, instructing him to impress upon British Foreign Secretary Sir John Simon

and other Tories the fact that if England was even suspected of playing with the Japanese rather than with the United States on the naval arms matter, Roosevelt would be compelled to make it clear to the people of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa that "their future security is linked with the United States." He told Davis also to ignore the Japanese argument that an increased allowance in her naval tonnage was needed to appease Japanese sentiment which was resentful of United States immigration policy. That argument, thought the President, was "nothing more nor less than a smoke screen" laid by Japanese militarists and ambassadors.³⁰

Despite the continued worsening of the international situation in the late thirties, Roosevelt continued advocating disarmament. At a cabinet meeting in 1936, for example, he expressed his desire for the neutralization and demilitarization of practically everything in the Pacific except Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and Singapore. Such places as the Philippines, Shanghai, Hong Kong, the Dutch East Indies, and British North Borneo should be stripped of weapons; and while it would not be reasonable to demilitarize Hawaii, which was not in the Japanese part of the Pacific, he would be quite willing to disarm Samoa and the parts of Alaska nearest Japan.³¹ In both 1937 and 1938 Roosevelt again pushed the earlier idea of prohibiting the manufacture of "offensive" weapons, going so far on one occasion as to get both the German Ambassador and one of his own ambassadors to try again to sell the idea to Hitler.³² In the late thirties Roosevelt also continued linking disarmament with trade barriers, arguing that one could not come down without the other also coming down. Again he appealed to the dictators, promising that if they would agree to a limitation of armaments, he would do everything in his power to satisfy their complaints about trade barriers that hampered them.³³

During the war Roosevelt continued urging disarmament. When in June 1941 Adolf Berle sought permission to try his hand at drafting peace terms the President told him to start with the idea that disarmament was the crux of the international situation.³⁴ And when Myron Taylor was sent to the Vatican as the President's representative a few months later Roosevelt told him also to stress disarmament as the first necessity of the post-war world. But by this time the President had made one major modification in his thinking. He was now thinking primarily of disarming the aggressors, and of doing it by force. It might take

years or generations, he told Taylor, to achieve disarmament by voluntary means. Hence the Axis states would be disarmed whether they liked it or not.³⁵ *But*, the peace-loving powers would *not* disarm. They were to become the world's policemen for a number of years after the war and they, therefore, would have to remain strong both in the air and on the sea to perform their policing functions. At first only the United States and Britain were considered eligible for this police duty. But later Russia was included, then China, and finally even France. By the spring of 1943 he was visualizing a world in which *all nations* except the Big Four policemen would be disarmed.³⁶ And at Yalta he also expressed the hope that frontiers in the world eventually would be as free of fortifications and armed forces as the United States-Canadian border had been for a hundred years.³⁷ How he proposed to bring about disarmament among the non-Axis nations he did not say.

Roosevelt had little patience with the maintenance of armaments by small nations. Welles has testified that during the thirties Roosevelt often held forth at great length and in great detail on this topic, arguing that the small nations ought to be satisfied to have their security provided by the English-speaking powers and in return should be willing to put their national resources into education and welfare rather than into the armaments that had caused so many wars among them. He used to brush aside references to national pride, declared Welles, and insisted that his disarmament-policing scheme was realistic.³⁸ It is easy to imply, therefore, that if Roosevelt did not plan to disarm the non-Axis states by force, it is quite probable that he would have been quite willing to use a variety of pressures to get them to disarm "voluntarily."

Unfortunately for the student of the theory of international relations, Roosevelt never provided a single comprehensive, reasoned argument as to why he wanted a substantially disarmed world. It may be that he thought the argument for disarmament so self-evident that he saw no necessity for debate. Over the years, however, by a sentence here, a paragraph there he suggested a variety of reasons for his position, some of which have already been mentioned. During the twenties his chief argument was that large military forces, particularly large naval forces, were no longer needed. The German threat had been obliterated by the World War I settlement; Japan was the only conceivable troublemaker on the seas, and by proper handling, the Japanese problem could

be solved by negotiation, toward which the 1922 Washington Treaty was a good start. The trend away from colonialism then visible, the greater effort being made to prevent wars, and the trend toward the settlement of more and more disputes by amicable means, trends visible at least to Roosevelt—all signified the declining need for military forces. All this was part of the new spirit of internationalism, he thought, and this spirit would continue to grow.³⁹

During the thirties Roosevelt's arguments were wrapped largely around economics. As noted earlier, he harped repeatedly on the refrain that armaments were driving governments into bankruptcy, they represented an unproductive squandering of resources, and employment or a national economy dependent on armaments was as weak as a house of cards.⁴⁰ During the war the same theme was repeated, with the President insisting that rehabilitation of the world economy would be impossible if nations, large or small, had to carry burdens of heavy armaments in order to survive. The amount of money spent in past years on armaments instead of on productive industry and agriculture, he wrote President Inonu of Turkey in 1943, has been "disgraceful."⁴¹

During the war Roosevelt also reasoned that both post-war recovery and security would be dependent on disarmament. While on his mission to Europe early in 1940 Welles was instructed to impress upon Mussolini that in the President's view security was the fundamental issue in Europe; and to get real security, there must be real disarmament. If this were achieved, it would then be possible for people to get back to constructive work, to achieve higher standards of living, and to make economic adjustments necessary for permanent peace.⁴²

In 1943 Roosevelt told British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden that once Germany was disarmed, France and Poland would no longer need large military establishments and they, therefore, should also stay disarmed.⁴³

On occasion Roosevelt also used a few other arguments. Excessive armaments promote suspicions that breed wars, he once argued, and the competition resulting from arms races menaces peace.⁴⁴ Disarmament and freedom from fear of aggression were also necessary to preserve human rights, he said on another occasion, as well as to promote social justice and to improve social conditions.⁴⁵

In view of Roosevelt's devotion to the ideal of a substantially disarmed world from the early twenties on, it is little wonder

that he began preparing the United States for war during his Presidency only with the utmost reluctance. Already worried by Japanese behavior in Manchuria at the time he entered the White House, Roosevelt decided immediately after his inauguration to rebuild the Navy to the strength allowed by the 1922 Washington Treaty.⁴⁶ But his rebuilding plans were so modest that as late as 1936 they aimed at achieving this treaty strength only by 1942.⁴⁷ It was not until 1938 that the President asked Congress for as much as a billion dollar appropriation for the War and Navy Departments, and even then he said he was making the request "with the deepest regret" and only because so many other countries were arming so fast that American security was in jeopardy.⁴⁸ In the two years following 1938, moreover, Congress appropriated more money for military purposes than the President requested and probably would have voted even more money had Roosevelt not restrained it.⁴⁹ Although in 1940 Roosevelt frightened pacifists with his rearmament measures, he took every step so slowly that his more bellicose associates such as Ickes and Stimson were repeatedly exasperated.⁵⁰ Interestingly enough, in the presidential election of that year when attempting to present himself as a great advocate of national defense, he reverted to his old World War I argument that armaments now mean peace, not war, that they are a guarantee against the United States being attacked. Thus the United States was arming to keep war away.⁵¹

It was not until 1941, however, that Roosevelt threw himself into the rearmament task with vigor. And even then, he continued to dream and plan for a post-war world disarmed except for police forces.

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THE ABOLITION OF IMPERIALISM

THE SPIRITUAL and moral transformation of international relations required not only the ridding of the world of the evils of fascist totalitarianism and excessive armaments, thought Roosevelt; it required also that the world be rid of imperialism in all its forms; that the exploitation of one group of people by another be stopped; and that in the place of such things as colonialism and spheres of influence, a system of tutelage and international trusteeship be instituted for peoples not yet ready to govern themselves; and *bona fide* independent states based on the principle of self-determination be established for those people able to stand on their own political feet.

Here also Roosevelt experienced something of a conversion; for in the early years of his public life he was a humanitarian imperialist. Like Theodore Roosevelt and many other moralistic liberals of the Progressive Era, he believed it quite justifiable for a good, just, Christian democracy like the United States to impose the blessings of her civilization on more backward and less fortunate peoples, even by the use of force. Unlike Wilson, Bryan, and Daniels, who preached against imperialism with evangelistic fervor but intervened in and entrenched American imperialist dominion in the Caribbean and Central America, Franklin Roosevelt was consistent in both action and thought, in those early years. If for humanitarian reasons he was enthusiastic about shouldering the "white man's burden" in the Caribbean and Central America, for realistic or geopolitical reasons he favored United States domination of whatever land or water was neces-

sary to assure protection of the Panama Canal and the water approaches to the United States. Thus his imperialism was like Theodore Roosevelt's, based on a combination of realism and humanitarianism, rather than like the imperialism of Wilson, Bryan, and Daniels which was based almost solely on humanitarianism.¹

As early as 1912, before joining the movement to make Wilson president, Roosevelt went on a junket to Panama where he looked with great pride on American accomplishment.² As mentioned in the last chapter, in 1914 he virtually "itched" to expand the Mexican incident into a war and clean up the political mess down there. No imperialist adventure of those Wilson years pleased him so much, however, as the intervention in Haiti. For years thereafter he boasted of his role in that enterprise, often with undue exaggeration. But the realistic streak in his imperialism was supremely revealed in a 1920 campaign speech in which he scoffed at the idea that by getting six votes in the League of Nations with her dominions, Britain had hoodwinked Wilson at Paris. The United States, Roosevelt declared, would have far more than six votes in the League. For she could virtually command the votes of nearly all the Latin American states. Haiti and Santo Domingo by virtue of American occupation were entirely in the pockets of the United States; and as the big brother, the trustee of the remaining states, the United States would greatly surpass Britain in the number of votes under her control.³

In the early twenties this attitude was still visible. Roosevelt continued to favor the use of force and strong-arm methods in the Caribbean to clean up and police backward areas, defending even rough Marine methods; and he felt that complete independence for the backward peoples of the Philippines, Puerto Rico, Haiti, and Santo Domingo was "not to be thought of for many years to come."⁴

But the humanitarian, paternalistic, missionary spirit of the imperialism of the liberals of the Progressive Era kept their imperialism from being sordid; and that spirit Roosevelt had in abundance. The promotion of democracy, the ending of internecine violence and perpetual revolution, the establishment of order, the advancement of education and health and general welfare of the natives, and the raising of standards of living were invariably major objectives, and often the only objectives of Roosevelt and those who thought as he did, in every imperialistic adventure. And it was in the achievement of these objectives that Roosevelt took the greatest pride and boasted until the end of his life.

Material profit for merchants was looked upon as acceptable only if carried on legitimately and with consideration for the welfare of the native peoples; and it was the responsibility of the United States, even in a far off naval coaling station like Samoa, "to prevent the natives from being robbed by traders of any nationality."⁵ When in 1934 Roosevelt was preparing to remove the last of the Marines from Haiti he wrote his wife of his hope that the Haitians would "recognize the vast amount of good things we have done for them in these 18 years."⁶ And as late as 1943 when toasting the President of Haiti at a state dinner in the White House, Roosevelt could not resist again boasting of his role in the Haitian adventure and of all the "good" he believed the United States had done there.⁷

But the time was to come when Roosevelt would become an ardent anti-imperialist. He never got over his humanitarian, missionary zeal to improve the lot of backward peoples, but in the late twenties the methods the United States had been using became questionable in his mind. In his 1928 article in *Foreign Affairs* he made clear a realization that the imperialistic adventures of the United States in Latin America, despite their humanitarian achievements, had reaped a whirlwind of ill will. The advantages of putting an end to intervention, of treating Latin American countries as independent sovereign states, and of pushing territories like the Philippines more rapidly toward self-government were quite apparent in that article.

When he became President, moreover, Roosevelt soon made it clear that his urge for imperialistic enterprises was over. His proclamation of the good neighbor policy was followed in 1933 and 1934 by refusal to intervene in the Cuban civil war, by his final withdrawal of the Marines from Haiti, by his approval of the Tydings-McDuffie Act providing for Philippine independence in ten years, and by his authorization to the State Department to negotiate with China for the termination of United States extra-territorial rights.⁸ In the late thirties, as we shall see shortly, his ideas on trusteeship began to crystallize. And in the early part of World War II he gave evidence that whatever acquisitiveness for territory he might have had once was now all gone. Lack of desire to spread the sovereignty of the United States over any of Britain's islands in the Western Hemisphere was made apparent both at the time of the destroyer trade in 1940 (much to the incredulity of the British who Roosevelt thought possessed such a deep-seated acquisitiveness for territory that they could not conceive of

anyone else not wanting it) and again early in 1941 when he rejected the idea of buying some British islands to bolster her dollar reserves.⁹ It will be remembered also that in the Atlantic Charter Roosevelt renounced all ambition for the aggrandizement of territory.

But if by the time of the Atlantic Conference Roosevelt had become a confirmed anti-imperialist, there is no evidence that he had yet begun his campaign to rid the world of colonialism. The exigencies of the war were then major considerations and he seemed to tailor his behavior accordingly. When during 1941 and 1942 he sent assurances to Middle Eastern peoples that their best hope of independence lay in cooperation with the United Nations and also urged Churchill to promise independence to India, Roosevelt's major motive was to get the cooperation of those peoples in the war effort.¹⁰ At the same time, in order to keep France from cooperating with Germany, he sent word to Marshall Petain that one of his "greatest wishes is to see France reconstituted in the post-war period" and "the word 'France' in the mind of the President includes the French Colonial Empire."¹¹

It was sometime during the war, however, when Roosevelt began a vigorous attack on colonialism everywhere. It would probably be going too far to say that Roosevelt's trip to Casablanca in January-February 1943 was the turning point. If the President's son Elliott is correct, the President had made up his mind by the time of the Atlantic Conference not to help England hold on to her colonial peoples.¹² But it is quite clear that the President's trip to Casablanca had a profound effect on his attitude toward colonialism. In British Gambia he saw what he believed was colonial exploitation at its worst, and the sight was so unforgettable that he talked repeatedly about it during the remaining two years of his life. It was the most horrible place he had ever seen, he declared: it was 5,000 years behind American civilization, with the people working in rags for less than 50¢ and a half cup of rice a day and with ignorance, poverty, and disease rampant. "For every dollar that the British have put into Gambia," he charged, "they have taken out ten. It's just plain exploitation of these people." The people were treated worse than livestock, he concluded, and there could be no effective organized peace in the world with such conditions. And while he agreed that the United States had not lived up to her responsibilities in Liberia (where he stopped also) his greatest irritation was reserved for the British.

In French Morocco the colonial rule he saw was more enlight-

ened; and while he was quite interested in the various types of colonization in West Africa, his general conclusion regarding the whole area was that "it hasn't been good," a conclusion he passed on to Churchill.¹³ Shortly after his return from Casablanca he declared publicly that the day of the exploitation of one country for the benefit of another was over.¹⁴ And three weeks after that he recanted to President Benes of Czechoslovakia his earlier desire to see France recover her empire. He expressed to Benes his personal disappointment in France in general, criticized her regime of her colonies as he had seen it in North Africa, and expressed doubt of France's ability ever to recover and develop her colonies.¹⁵ By that time he seemed also to have developed a grudge against France's handling of Indo-China and, as he told Lord Halifax later, he had decided it certainly should not go back to France. France had held Indo-China and her thirty million inhabitants for more than a hundred years, he went on inaccurately, "and the people are worse off than they were at the beginning." France had "milked" Indo-China for a hundred years, he wrote Hull, and the people there "are entitled to something better than that."¹⁶

✓ Meanwhile Roosevelt also publicly refuted Churchill's contention that the Atlantic Charter applied only to Europe. It applied to the entire world, Roosevelt declared on several occasions;¹⁷ and when queried about Churchill's remark to the effect that he, Churchill, had no intention of presiding over the liquidation of the British Empire, Roosevelt told the press off the record that "dear old Winston will never learn on that point."¹⁸ For by the latter part of the war the liquidation of the British and all other empires was one of Roosevelt's ambitions. Not only should India be given her independence, he thought, but the British should also renounce their claims to Hong Kong, Shanghai, and Canton.¹⁹ "Exploitation everywhere" should be opposed, he told the International Labor Conference in May 1944, and again he referred to the horrible conditions of Gambia.²⁰ A few months later he told the American people that hundreds of millions of people in the Pacific area were stirring with a desire for the right to work out their own destinies, and he implied that they ought to have that right.²¹

But if there was no place in Roosevelt's new world order for colonialism neither was there any place in it for spheres of influence. Unfortunately for the student of the theory of international relations, Roosevelt said very little about spheres of influence, but

what little he did say was almost all negative. Spheres of influence, he seemed to think, were simply another means for one people to dominate another and they were incompatible with the kind of postwar world he wanted. If Roosevelt ever favored spheres of influence during the war, Hull implied, he meant for them to apply only to military operations. At Casablanca military spheres were agreed upon; but there was no intention on Roosevelt's part, thought Hull, for economic or political matters to be included although the delineation was not made clear and much effort was necessary to convince the British to that effect.²²

When the question of spheres of influence arose again in the fall of 1944 and some decisions regarding Eastern Europe had to be made, Roosevelt steadfastly resisted all attempts by Britain and Russia to make political agreements with implications that each would have postwar positions of dominance there. Finally he approved purely military spheres of influence for a three-months period; but even that was done with reluctance; for there was a tendency, he feared, for such military arrangements to develop into political and economic arrangements and he wanted no such development in the Balkans.²³

There have been charges that Roosevelt believed Stalin's desire for a Russian dominated Poland as a bulwark against future aggression was quite justifiable;²⁴ and there have been allegations that at Yalta the President approved such arrangements. There is much evidence, however, that regarding Poland and at Yalta Roosevelt did all he considered reasonably possible to insure the establishment of governments in Eastern Europe that would be friendly to but not dominated by Russia. As we shall see later, his demand for free elections in that area was persistent. On his return from Yalta he told Congress that not only had much confusion and unrest developed in the liberated areas of Eastern Europe, but "worse than that, there actually began to grow up in some of them vaguely defined ideas of 'spheres of influence' which were incompatible with the basic principles of international collaboration. If allowed to go unchecked, these developments might have tragic results." No one nation was to blame, he added, but that kind of development is inevitable unless the major powers should cooperate and assume "joint responsibility" for problems of the area; and fortunately, they had decided to cooperate.²⁵

What Roosevelt meant to do and what he did both before and at Yalta about Eastern Europe is still being debated. There seems to be no doubt that theoretically Roosevelt opposed the principle

of spheres of influence and whatever he did to promote them was done either unwittingly or as a gesture of resignation to the inevitable. Frances Perkins has testified that on his return from Teheran the President told her, "You know, I really think the Russians will go along with me about having no spheres of influence. . . ." ²⁶ According to son Elliott, the President looked on Britain's action in Greece at the end of the war as an effort to restore an old imperial sphere of influence, and while Roosevelt could not publicly denounce the action without handing propaganda to the Axis, he was much disturbed by it, a fact verified by Churchill. ²⁷

But although Roosevelt wanted to rid the world of colonialism and spheres of influence he neither expected to see those goals achieved overnight nor did he intend that they result in political vacuums. Certainly he never had any desire to see colonial peoples turned loose to sink or swim. Even in his imperialist days there was an implication in his comments that it was the responsibility of colonial powers to tutor their dependencies in the art of self-government, to improve their economic and social conditions, and to prepare them for ultimate independence. In his 1928 article in *Foreign Affairs* he spoke approvingly of the insistence of the anti-imperialists immediately after the Spanish-American War to make it part of United States policy to educate the Filipinos for self-government; and he seemed to believe that this policy was the precursor of the mandate theory of the League of Nations. In a press conference in 1938 he expressed this theory of colonial gradualism by noting further that the trade arrangements made for the Philippines were designed to bring about a smooth economic transition to independence. Trade relations with the United States were to be adjusted gradually so that by about 1960 they would be the same as the United States' relations with other countries. ²⁸ He was clearly opposed to any effort to strangle Philippine trade with the United States and to the faithless abandonment of economic responsibility there. ²⁹

Strangely enough, however, when badgering Churchill about Indian independence in 1942 Roosevelt compared India with the American situation from 1775 to 1787 rather than to the Philippines. He urged the British to set up a temporary government modeled along the lines of the American Confederation of 1781-89 with a more permanent government to be established after the war when the Indian people could decide what relationship they wished to have to the Empire. ³⁰

Usually, however, Roosevelt used United States policy regarding the Philippines as the model he believed all colonial powers should follow. It was a "pattern" for the future of colonial peoples throughout the world, he declared late in 1942. But it involved two essentials. First, there must be a period of preparation wherein the dissemination of education and social and economic development would be emphasized. Then secondly, there would be a period of training in self-government, beginning with local government and moving up through various steps to complete statehood. Even the United States had gone through these stages in her colonial period, he pointed out; and "such training for independence is essential to the stability of independence in almost every part of the world." Some peoples would take longer than others to develop; some would need more training than others. But this "pattern" followed in the Philippines was "essentially a part and parcel of the philosophy and ideals of the United Nations."³¹

Thereafter Roosevelt referred to the Philippine pattern repeatedly, proudly describing it to Stalin at Teheran as an example of what men of goodwill can achieve.³² This was the kind of tutelage the people of British Gambia needed, he declared in 1944, and the United States ought to help them get it.³³ There is also evidence that Roosevelt persuaded Queen Wilhelmina to use the Philippine pattern of tutelage in the Netherlands Indies, with a considerable degree of autonomy to be granted immediately after the war.³⁴

But no idea for the liquidation of colonialism was dearer to Roosevelt's heart than the idea of trusteeship. Unfortunately, it is difficult to get a clear understanding of precisely what Roosevelt had in mind on this matter. He insisted that his idea of trusteeship differed from the mandate system of the League. But the only significant difference visible to this writer is that Roosevelt seemed to want trust territories administered by international agencies rather than by individual states. But even that is not always completely clear. Yet there is no doubt that Roosevelt became quite infatuated with the trusteeship idea, and by the latter part of World War II wanted to apply the principle all over the world for a variety of purposes: 1) to promote freer transit for international trade, for example; 2) to serve as custodian for colonial areas during the period of tutelage; 3) to administer strategic bases for international police forces; and 4) to politically neutralize certain areas.

Roosevelt's development of the trusteeship idea seems to have begun in the mid-thirties when he was casting about for means to strengthen the Western Hemispheric defense system.

There were many small islands and atolls, especially in the Pacific, that some hostile power like Japan might try to acquire and that might be used as airplane bases. Britain and France were also reviving long dormant claims to some of them; and although these were the claims of friendly powers, Roosevelt was not favorable to any non-American power occupying them. From 1935 on, therefore, the President had the State Department consider the idea of a joint inter-American trusteeship over them; and he more than once became irritated at the slow, legalistic approach the Department took toward the matter.³⁵

A Chilean proposal that the United States purchase Easter Island did not seem feasible to Roosevelt and he proposed that both Easter Island and the Galapagos be placed under Pan-American trusteeship not only to keep them out of non-American hands, but also to preserve them for natural science. Ecuador and Chile, who owned these particular islands and wanted to sell them, could be paid for them over a period of years, the President suggested, by all the American Republics in proportion to the wealth of each, and sovereignty would be vested in the trustees.³⁶

A similar arrangement might be useful for Antarctica, thought Roosevelt. There the problem had little or nothing to do with defense, but it seemed a bright idea that the whole sector of Antarctica lying south of the Americas ought to be held in trust for all the American Republics and managed, in due time, by an inter-American body. He did not say in his memorandum to Welles why he thought this would be a good arrangement. Presumably it would be the right thing to do in the spirit of good neighborliness. But about the arrangement he told Welles: "That is a new one. Think it over."³⁷

A few months later, in April 1940, the President told a group of editors, off the record, that he was giving thought to something like a trusteeship for Greenland. He called it a "new instrumentality" in international affairs; but it was very common in domestic civil affairs, he added. He described a trustee as a person who takes over for the benefit of others their property, looks after their education and physical needs, builds up the estate, protects the trust against accidents, but gets neither remuneration nor profit out of it for himself. It was a new idea, he declared, for relations between a powerful nation like the United States and

little Greenland with 17,000 people. But he was not quite ready to take any action on it.³⁸

A month later when considering the availability of territory in the Guianas for postwar refugee settlement, he sent a memorandum to his wife saying that he would not like to see the United States assume sole responsibility or sovereignty over such an area but he was "considering the broad thought of creating a form of Pan-American trusteeship for situations of this kind. It is a new idea in international or Pan American relationships," he added, "but it is worth studying—especially if there is a possibility that the American Republics may be forced to do something about European possessions in this Hemisphere."³⁹ Regarding this last matter—European possessions in this hemisphere—Roosevelt enthusiastically supported the idea of Pan-American trusteeship for European possessions likely to be transferred to the Axis, and this idea was approved at the Inter-American Conference in Havana the same year.⁴⁰

Thereafter Roosevelt began insisting that the principle of trusteeship ought to be applied all over the world; and throughout the remainder of the war it was one of his favorite topics of conversation. It should be applied to the islands and colonial possessions of states too weak, for example, to provide their dependencies with stable governments; and it should also be applied to the old mandates of the League. Under the mandate system, thought the President, there was a strong tendency for the nation given the mandate to believe it had been given sovereignty also, and it would be much better to have several trustees rather than one. It was equally applicable to colonies which even the strong European powers held, but were not likely to be able to hold much longer, such as Indo-China, Malaya, or the Dutch East Indies, but where the people might not yet be quite ready for independence.⁴¹

A protectorate like French Morocco might also well be a trust area, suggested Roosevelt. The Moors were already causing trouble because they believed France was looking upon them more every year as a French colony and "they do not want to be exploited." Therefore, a trustee of three members, one French, one English, and one American would be much better. He did not think, at any rate, "that a population which is ninety per cent Moors, should be run permanently by France."⁴² Trusteeship would also be the answer, he thought, for Palestine, which could then really be a Holy Land for all three religions associated with it and it could be administered by an international body consisting of a

Jew, a Christian, and a Moslem.⁴³ Korea also should be placed under trusteeship, he thought, and administered by the USSR, the United States, and China during the twenty to thirty years of tutelage it might take to get her ready for independence.⁴⁴

Indo-China was by all odds, however, Roosevelt's pet area for applying the trusteeship principle. He was angered not only at the way the French had retarded the development of the people there but also by the fact that France had allowed the Japanese to move in and make it a springboard for their attack on the South Pacific. To return Indo-China to France was inconceivable, he seemed to conclude. The territory should be neutralized, he thought, and he had proposed that very thing to Japan shortly before Pearl Harbor and before the Japanese had been allowed in. Chiang Kai-shek neither wanted the territory for China nor wanted it returned to France; and since the people were not yet ready for self-government and must, therefore, go through a Philippine-type period of tutelage, the only answer was trusteeship with the trustee agency composed, Roosevelt suggested, of a Frenchman, one or two Indo-Chinese, a Russian (because Russia is on the same coast), and perhaps a Filipino and an American. Chiang and Stalin both approved; and the only opposition came from Churchill, who was, however, a "mid-Victorian on all things like that." The trouble with Churchill, thought Roosevelt, was that he wanted all British territory in the Far East back and feared the trusteeship idea "aimed at independence." But Roosevelt had told Churchill, the President reported, that Britain's 400 years of acquisitive instinct was outmoded, that he was living in a new period of history, and he (Churchill) would have to adjust himself to it. The British, asserted Roosevelt, would take anything—even a rock or a sandbar—and Churchill could not understand Chiang or anyone else not wanting all the territory they could get.⁴⁵

Roosevelt was also in hearty accord with the idea of international inspection and publicity concerning territories left temporarily in the hands of colonial powers. Places like Gambia should be inspected periodically to see if the mother country was moving the colony toward self-government and otherwise promoting the welfare of the inhabitants, and he had told Churchill of his desire to have the coming world organization do this. When Churchill countered that he would then see to it that an inspection committee was sent to the southern United States, Roosevelt answered that he would be delighted to show the world that conditions in the South were not as bad as painted.⁴⁶

International commerce would also be benefited by the trusteeship idea, thought Roosevelt. The international administration of free ports and waterways would promote the security of commercial channels and insure passage for the goods of all nations. Hong Kong, Dairen, and a new port to be constructed at the head of the Persian Gulf, for example, should be internationally administered free ports. He suggested to Eden that it would be a fine gesture of goodwill if the British would return Hong Kong to China; and then China could declare it a free port under trusteeship. Baltic passages like the Kiel Canal and Straits ought also be under trusteeship. And in Iran, to ease friction between that country and the Soviet Union concerning transit, an internationalized railroad should be built running from his proposed free port at the head of the Persian Gulf to Russia, with both the port and the railroad operated by three or four trustees "for the good of all."⁴⁷

The trusteeship principle should be applied also, suggested Roosevelt, for areas needed as military security points in the forthcoming international security system. He recommended for this Truk, the Bonin Islands, Rabaul, or some point in the Solomons, certain points in the Dutch East Indies, Ascension Island in the South Atlantic, Dakar, and a point in Liberia.⁴⁸ The islands in the Pacific mandated to Japan were in this same category. In his memoirs Stimson gives the impression that Roosevelt wanted these islands under United States control, with the right to arm them, but that he had to appear generous and *seem* to apply the trusteeship principle to them.⁴⁹ Stimson's implication is made questionable, however, by Roosevelt's comments to State Department officials in November 1944 in which he laid great emphasis on the trusteeship idea, and made clear his opposition to pressure from the Army and Navy that the United States should control the islands. Such behavior would be contrary to the Atlantic Charter, he declared: it was not necessary; and all it would do would be to provide jobs as governors on insignificant islands for inefficient Army and Navy or civilian officers.⁵⁰ A week before his death he also told the press that the United Nations rather than the United States would be the controlling government for the mandated islands that were to be wrested from Japan.⁵¹ ✓

Thus trusteeship was to be a multi-purpose principle applicable not only to the territory of the Axis, but to territories of all sorts in many parts of the world; and by means of this principle much of the exploitation of one group of people by another would be

brought to an end; and by it also a more secure world, economically and militarily, would be achieved.

If tutelage and trusteeships were Roosevelt's answers for peoples not yet ready to run their own affairs, self-determination was his answer for peoples who were ready. Although Roosevelt probably took it for granted that people such as those in India, when given independence, would have the right to choose their own form of government, when using the phrase "self-determination" he almost invariably had in mind the peoples of the occupied countries of Europe. Both their boundaries and their forms of government, he seemed to think, could be determined by the freely expressed will of the peoples, and he readily approved clauses to that effect in the Atlantic Charter.

This will was to be expressed through plebiscites, a procedure in which Roosevelt had almost unlimited confidence. To Churchill, Smuts, and Myron Taylor in the Vatican he wrote almost the same words of praise for plebiscites, declaring that the plebiscite was one of the few successful results of the Versailles Treaty and it ought to be tried, extended, and developed further. He even favored a series of plebiscites to determine questions difficult to resolve, with one vote taken after another, over intervals, "until one side or the other makes a decision by overwhelming vote."⁵² According to Welles, Roosevelt went beyond Wilson in believing that plebiscites could solve most of Europe's territorial controversies and he felt instinctively that plebiscites freely held would prevent the subjugation of national minorities.⁵³

Thus plebiscites were to be held, Roosevelt hoped, to determine boundaries and forms of government after the war throughout most of Europe. Every time during the war, therefore, when Russia tried to get the Allies to recognize her absorption of the Baltic states and parts of Finland, Poland, and Roumania, Roosevelt vigorously opposed recognition on the ground that free plebiscites must be held first. He agreed that the Soviet Union was entitled to security after the war, but not in a manner that violated the self-determination clause of the Atlantic Charter; and he warned Britain early in 1942 that if she signed a treaty meeting Russia's demands, he might have to denounce it publicly.⁵⁴ Had such an agreement gone through, he told Molotov a while later, "it would have caused almost irreparable damage to the ideals of the war."⁵⁵

Before the 1943 Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers Roosevelt sent word to Stalin that he had no objection to the

Soviet absorption of the Baltic states, but world public opinion would not be satisfied unless assured by something more than the questionable plebiscites already held there.⁵⁶ He intended to appeal to Stalin on moral grounds, he told Hull, and he felt it would be in Russia's best interests to wait until a year or two after the war and then hold plebiscites to see what the people in those disputed areas wanted; for while the plebiscites already held there were considered conclusive by Russia, they had not seemed satisfactory to the rest of the world.⁵⁷ He was certain he could get Stalin to see his way, reported Welles, and he was quite disillusioned at Yalta when Stalin told him the matter was closed.⁵⁸

Plebiscites could also be used to end the friction among the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes in Yugoslavia, suggested Roosevelt. He was not at all sure that Yugoslavia should be reconstituted after the war and he refused to join Churchill in 1942 in a declaration to that effect. The Croats and Serbs had never gotten along well together, he insisted, and he had no intention of forcing them to live together in the same state again against their will.⁵⁹ At Yalta he agreed to a declaration on Yugoslavia that looked toward a reconstitution of that state, but the Declaration on Liberated Europe approved at the same time called clearly for self-determination on the entire continent and there is no reason to believe that Roosevelt looked on a reconstituted Yugoslavia as any more than a provisional state that could be divided later if the peoples involved desired it to be so.⁶⁰

It was Roosevelt's determination not to allow governments to be imposed at the end of the war without the approval of the people that caused much of his trouble with the Free French Movement of General Charles De Gaulle. His repeated refusal to recognize De Gaulle's organization as the government of France was due to his fear, declared Leahy and Stimson, that De Gaulle wanted to impose himself on France after the war, and that to make such a situation possible would violate both the Atlantic Charter and the wartime moral ideals already established. Thus Roosevelt never gave De Gaulle more than partial support.⁶¹

As is well known, however, Roosevelt's most earnest efforts as well as his most heart-breaking defeat came from his attempt to apply self-determination to Poland. His chief objection to the Lublin Government imposed on Poland by Stalin in 1944 was that, as he telegraphed Stalin, there was no evidence that it "represents the people of Poland." Only a small part of the people had been liberated at the time of the government's formation, he

argued, and large proportions of the population had not had a chance to express themselves.⁶³ From shipboard talk on the way to Yalta, the President's physician concluded that there were few things Roosevelt felt as deeply about as Polish independence and he seemed determined to do all he could about it at the forthcoming conference. With Russian troops already in Poland he felt helpless, but he hoped that promises of free elections could be secured and that such elections would alleviate the situation.⁶³ The record is clear, moreover, that at Yalta the President had free elections much on his mind and brought the subject up repeatedly. "The elections must be above criticism, like Caesar's wife," he said at one meeting. "I want some kind of assurance to give to the world, and I don't want anybody to be able to question their purity."⁶⁴

The final agreement on Poland was for Roosevelt, reports Admiral McIntire, a bitter pill to swallow.⁶⁵ When Admiral Leahy pointed out to the President that the agreement was full of ambiguous generalizations that could be interpreted many ways and did not, therefore, really guarantee free elections, Roosevelt answered, "I know, Bill—I know it. But it's the best I can do for Poland at this time."⁶⁶

It is worth noting, however, that in applying the principle of self-determination, Roosevelt wanted decisions made only in an atmosphere of calm deliberation. The chaos existing immediately after a war was not conducive to wise decisions, he seemed to think, and it would be necessary, therefore, for the major powers to establish interim governments and create conditions conducive to genuine expressions of popular will before plebiscites were held. In his 1945 Annual Message he told the Congress that in the liberated areas there was so much internal dissension and there were so many citizens still prisoners of war or away as forced laborers that "it is difficult to guess the kind of self-government the people really want." Thus there must be an interim period, he went on, during which the Allies would have the duty to influence temporary or provisional authorities so that the eventual will of the people would not be blocked. It would be easy to show partiality, he added, to leaders we liked, but the long range task would not be helped by "stubborn partisanship."⁶⁷

In reporting to congress on the Yalta meeting a month later he added that in this interim period the Allies would assist the liberated peoples to wipe out all vestiges of Nazism; help establish conditions of internal peace; carry out emergency relief measures;

form interim governments representative of all democratic political elements, and governments pledged to the earliest possible free elections; and finally to facilitate where necessary the holding of such elections. Thus would be reaffirmed the pledges in the Atlantic Charter and the Declaration by the United Nations to build a new world order under law.⁶⁸

But there was never any intention on Roosevelt's part to interpret the principle of self-determination without limitation. Always there was an assumption, based on his view of the goodness and reasonableness of man, that people left free to choose their own form of government would choose a democratic, decent, and reasonable form of government; and if temporarily a people should be led astray and should choose for themselves an evil form of rule, the other members of the international community had every right to intervene. People have the right to choose their own way of life, he declared shortly after Munich in 1938, but "that choice must not threaten the world with the disaster of war."⁶⁹ No nation had the right, he preached repeatedly, to assert a superior right to rule over other people or to choose a form of government akin to Fascism. "There never has been, there isn't now, and there never will be, any race of people on the earth fit to serve as masters over their fellow men," he declared early in 1941. "The world has no use," he added, "for any Nation which . . . asserts the right to gosestep to world power over the bodies of other nations or other races. We believe that any nationality, no matter how small, has the inherent right to its own nationhood."⁷⁰

But Roosevelt did not worry about the right of self-determination being abused. "No nation in all the world that is free to make a choice," he told the White House Correspondents Association in 1943, "is going to set itself up under a Fascist form of Government, or a Nazi form of government, or a Japanese warlord form of government." Such forms arise, he declared, only by seizure of power and subsequent abridgement of freedom. And in the post-war world the United Nations would not let such conditions occur. "For the right of self-determination included in the Atlantic Charter," he proclaimed, "does not carry with it the right of any Government anywhere in the world to commit wholesale murder, or the right to make slaves of its own people, or of any other peoples in the world."⁷¹

Thus, as already noted, the Franco government had no right to exist in the twentieth century world, thought Roosevelt; and a few weeks before his death, when sending Norman Armour as his

Ambassador to Spain, the President wrote Armour that he did not want him to do anything that would be interpreted as approving the Franco or Falange regime. While it was not the practice of the United States to interfere in the internal affairs of other nations unless there is a threat to the peace, he informed Armour, "I can see no place in the community of nations for governments founded on Fascist principles." He would like to help Spain economically and in other ways, he added, but he could not do so until the regime was changed.⁷²

So far as national minorities were concerned, Roosevelt was quite willing to see them transferred to avoid the minority problems that afflicted efforts to apply self-determination after World War I and that had contributed, as he thought, to the catastrophe of Munich. In 1943 he agreed with President Benes of Czechoslovakia that it would be quite all right to move all Germans out of Czechoslovakia after the war. There might also have to be some transfers, he agreed, from East Prussia and Transylvania.⁷³ Just before the Yalta meeting he also expressed to Stalin his willingness to see minorities transferred where feasible, that is, where it would promote peace and security, and he promised that the United States would facilitate such transfers.⁷⁴

On occasion Roosevelt also applied the principle of self-determination to the recognition of governments. Time and again he refused to grant recognition on the ground that a government was not chosen or supported by the free will of the people. This practice began as early as his first year in the White House when he refused to recognize the Cuban government of Dr. Grau San Martin on the grounds that it would be neither friendly nor just to recognize a government "unless such Government clearly possessed the support and the approval of the people of the Republic," neither of which, he said, the Grau government possessed.⁷⁵ As already mentioned, Roosevelt also adopted the Stimson Doctrine of non-recognition before his inauguration in 1933; and that doctrine was applied repeatedly in the years to come regarding Italy's conquest of Ethiopia, Hitler's absorption of Austria and Czechoslovakia, and the wartime creation in Europe of Axis puppet regimes, none of which were ever granted recognition by Roosevelt. His recognition of Russia, of Franco, and of various Latin American dictatorships indicates that the President assumed a Wilsonian moralistic position and applied the principle of self-determination to the problem of recognition inconsistently and

only when it suited his purposes. But of this seemingly inconsistent attitude he left no explanation.

For the most part, however, Roosevelt was quite consistent, once converted from his early imperialism, in his desire to see colonialism and spheres of influence replaced by trusteeships and independent states formed on the basis of self-determination. As a practical politician faced with specific problems he was often forced to compromise and accept half a loaf. But the ideal of ending the domination of one group of people by another remained brightly before him.

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WORLD-WIDE DEMOCRACY AND FREEDOM

THUS FAR we have seen that Franklin Roosevelt dreamed of a world purged of totalitarianism, relieved of the burden of excessive armaments, and freed of the political domination of one group of people by another. A logical implication is that in the coming world thus reformed, democracy and individual liberty would flourish universally as never before. And that is exactly what Roosevelt wanted.

It must be remembered that during a large part of Roosevelt's public life totalitarian dictatorship was the major alternative to libertarian democracy and Roosevelt's thinking was conditioned by that fact. There is little evidence that he ever gave much consideration to gradations between these two extremes. In his view, therefore, the peoples of the world had only these two alternatives and there was never any doubt in his mind as to which they ought to choose.

It is well to remember also that all during Roosevelt's presidency libertarian democracy was on the defensive throughout the world, challenged by totalitarianism of both right and left; and it was this particular challenge that Roosevelt was forced to meet.

Roosevelt readily conceded the obvious merits of modern dictatorships. They had brought capital and labor together, he agreed, had achieved a substantial utilization of all their material and human resources, had solved at least temporarily such problems as unemployment and idle capital. But he abhorred the methods of dictatorship, he said, and considered the price of total-

itarian achievement far too high for mankind to pay. Its cost in spiritual values was too high, for it deprived people of freedom of expression and religion, it confiscated capital, it produced concentration camps, it caused people to be afraid to walk down the street with the wrong neighbor, it prevented children from being reared as free and dignified human beings, and it made men "pawns molded and enslaved by a machine."¹ Its "shootings and chains and concentration camps" were not simply transient tools, he charged, "but the very altars of modern dictatorships."² Nor was there anything new about these new dictatorships, in his view. Modern dictatorship was merely a "streamlined version of a very ancient system."³ The type of security it provided was the same type of security possessed by the slaves who built the pyramids under the Pharaohs of Egypt, he proclaimed; the same type of security that all the world from Britain to Persia had under Roman proconsuls; that henchmen, tradesmen, and mercenaries had under feudalism; and that most of Europe had under Napoleon.⁴

In this modern machine age, charged Roosevelt, dictatorship also subordinated mankind to the machine instead of letting mankind be master of the machine. A machine civilization was all right, he seemed to believe, so long as it remained under the control of the people and the people received the untold benefits the machine could produce. But in dictatorship the machine was under the control of "infinitely small groups of individuals who rule without a single one of the democratic sanctions that we have known." And when the machine is in the hands of "irresponsible conquerors," it becomes the master, not the servant of the people.⁵

The great bulk of Roosevelt's denunciations of totalitarian dictatorship (and there were dozens of them) were, however, the commonplace complaints against the well-known brutalities, deprivations of liberty, and police state thought and action that characterize modern forms of tyranny.

Nor did he advance any unusual arguments in defense of democracy. He favored majority rule, he declared, simply because he thought there was more wisdom in the population as a whole than there was in any small group, even the best educated small group. Macaulay's old argument that democracy gave power to the poorest and most ignorant part of society was no longer true, he wrote privately; for "under democratic government, the poorest are no longer necessarily the most ignorant part of society."⁶

Democracy was also necessary, he thought, to protect individual

liberty. Many of his domestic foes, he wrote a correspondent, "do not like majority rule because an enlightened majority will not tolerate the abuses which some of the minority would seek to foist upon the people as a whole. . . . They reject the principle of the greater good for the greater number which is the cornerstone of democratic government." Thus "majority rule must be preserved as the safeguard of both liberty and civilization."⁷

Roosevelt also defended democracy on the ground that it was more peace-loving than any other form of government. "The evidence before us clearly proves," he told Congress in his 1936 Annual Message, "that autocracy in world affairs endangers peace and that threats do not spring from those nations devoted to the democratic ideal. . . ."⁸ Particularly in the oligarchies that have replaced democracy in the twentieth century, he said a year later, "militarism has leaped forward, while in those nations which have retained democracy militarism has waned."⁹ A year later he repeated the same theme, declaring that "disregard for treaty obligations seems to have followed the surface trend away from the representative form of government. It would seem, therefore, that world peace through international agreement is most safe in the hands of democratic representative governments; or, in other words, peace is most greatly jeopardized in and by those nations where democracy has been discarded or has never developed."¹⁰

Later when talking to an American youth group the President reiterated the same idea, going back a century and a half for evidence. Since the Napoleonic era, he declared, apparently forgetting the imperialistic movement of the late nineteenth century, there has not been a serious wide-spread aggression by democratic nations. There have been minor episodes by them, to be sure, but no military effort to dominate the globe. But there had been, he insisted, such efforts by non-democratic peoples. Thus the best hope that war will not happen again is to entrust the peace to democracies.¹¹

Roosevelt also defended democracy on the grounds that the decisions made by the democratic process tended to be more sound, better supported by the popular will, and more enduring than those made by dictatorships. He made no apologies for the slowness and long debate required for the making of decisions by the democratic process. He thought it a price well worth paying. In January 1940 he wrote Crown Prince Olav of Norway in an attempt to explain that aid to the Prince's beleaguered country was being sent as fast as possible. In the face of isolationism, he

explained, it had taken a six-weeks debate in the Senate to get the arms embargo repealed and he anticipated other similar delays due to the fact that 1940 was an election year. "However, that is one of the prices that we who live in democracies have to pay," he told the Prince. But it is "worth paying if all of us can avoid the type of government under which the unfortunate populations of Germany and Russia must exist."¹² Later he reiterated this theme to the White House Correspondents Association, emphasizing, however, that once democratic decisions are reached they reflect the will of the whole nation and are far more enduring than the decisions of dictatorships. The great debate on the Lend-Lease Act was a good example of this, he thought. It had been debated not only in the halls of Congress, but also "in every newspaper, on every wave length, over every cracker barrel in all the land; and it was finally settled and decided by the American people themselves." Thus the world would no longer doubt how the American people felt. Dictatorships might get "obedience" from their people, but "loyalty" was the backbone of democratic government, and it must be gotten without coercion.¹³

Roosevelt even took pride in the slowness of the democratic process. It had taken fifteen years of talk, he once reminded his Hyde Park neighbors, to get agreement that the school district there should be consolidated. But who could doubt, he asked, that that decision once made was better than a quick decision handed down from above by someone who proclaimed himself wiser than everyone else?¹⁴

Roosevelt denied categorically that democracy was necessarily less efficient than dictatorship. One day in a long dissertation to the press on the challenge of the corporate state to representative government he insisted that the charges of inefficiency hurled at representative government applied only to the policy-making process, not to administration. In the United States, he agreed, the policy-making process was slow and required patience because of the separation of powers, the check and balance system, and the necessity for working out policy among two or three branches of government. He conceded that it took years for all three branches to agree on such things as an income tax policy and this time-lag made many people think the corporate state with all power in one body was more efficient. But it was not true regarding administration, he asserted; for once policy was agreed upon in the United States, government agencies were just as efficient as business or corporate state agencies in carrying out those policies.¹⁵

Roosevelt also defended democracy on the grounds that it was morally superior to dictatorship. He saw a high correlation between religion, international good faith, and democracy. Where one disappeared, he argued, the others disappeared; where one was attacked, the others were attacked. The defense of one was the defense of the others. The enemy of one was the enemy of the others, and the United States could not afford to become surrounded by the enemies of religion, international good faith, and democracy.¹⁶

But Roosevelt never had any hope of either preserving or promoting democracy by mere reasonable argument. He was firmly convinced that on the defensive as it was, democracy must prove itself by deeds, by rising to meet the twentieth century challenge of human demands. And he believed also that it was up to the United States to show the way. Sumner Welles has testified that he knows of no one in American life more firmly convinced than Roosevelt that the hope of the world lay in a renewal of people's faith in democracy and that that faith could be renewed only by making democracy a successful, living reality in free nations where it was still cherished and especially in the United States. Only by such means, thought Roosevelt, could democracy be made to prevail over the appeal of communism and other totalitarian faiths.¹⁷

Roosevelt hammered away at this theme throughout his Presidency. In mid-1934 when pointing with pride to the achievements of the first year of his administration he noted that "we have shown the world that democracy has within it the elements necessary to its own salvation."¹⁸ And in his 1936 Annual Message he declared that one of the major tasks of his first administration had been "to prove that democracy could be made to function in the world of today as effectively as in the simple world of a hundred years ago."¹⁹ On his December 1936 trip to Latin America he purposely praised the achievements by democratic processes in the Western World and contrasted them with the horrors being visited on people in the dictatorships.²⁰

In his second term Roosevelt reiterated with more vigor than ever the idea that democracy must prove itself by deeds. In his 1937 Annual Message he urged Congress to give evidence with more legislation that democracy "can adequately cope with modern problems. . . ."²¹ In March he emphasized the idea mentioned in Chapter One that peoples elsewhere had deserted democracy for other forms of government only because their democratic

governments had "failed for the time being to meet human needs."²² And in September he gave what Sam Rosenman has described as a "full dress comparison" between democratic and totalitarian concepts. In that "comparison" he argued that since in recent times the idea has developed that government must mobilize the resources of a nation to improve standards of living, "even some of our own people may wonder whether democracy can match dictatorship in giving this generation the things it wants from government." If democracy is to meet the challenge, he proclaimed, it must meet the demands of the masses for economic and social security and higher standards of living; otherwise, internal doubt as to the value of our democracy will arise.²³

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To Roosevelt 1937 was a year of crisis in the testing of democracy in the modern world. When looking back four years later, he allowed himself the satisfaction of considering his fight against the Supreme Court a crucial factor. In the introduction to the 1937 volume of his public papers (written in 1941) he declared that if the anti-New Deal views of the Court had continued to prevail and the Court had not permitted the United States to solve harassing problems as a democracy, "it is my reasoned opinion that there would have been great danger that ultimately it [our democracy] might have been compelled to give way to some alien type of government—in the vain hope that the new form of government might be able to give the average men and women the protection and cooperative assistance which they had the right to expect." That is exactly what had happened in countries that had yielded to dictatorship, he wrote, and it came very close to happening in the United States. His February 5th message to Congress on the Federal Judiciary, he believed, had turned the tide. It was "a turning point in our modern history." And he implied that thereafter the United States had proceeded to prove to the world that democracy still had vitality and capacity to meet man's needs.²⁴

Both publicly and privately Roosevelt continued to express the same sentiments, giving special emphasis to the idea that the United States was obligated, if democracy was to be saved, to give the world "a dynamic example" of a successful democratic government.²⁵ Categorically rejecting the propaganda "that democracy is a decadent form of government," he asserted in 1940 that democracy was the wave of the future. The dictators would take the world back to the "bondage of the Pharaohs," he asserted, but "the command of the democratic faith is ever onward and up-

ward.”²⁵ In a world broadcast after passage of the Lend-Lease Act in 1941 he chided the dictators for attempting to destroy democracy on the assumption that the democracies could not adjust themselves to the realities of war or that they could not fight. The dictators are now learning better, he gloated.²⁷

A month later when Serbian patriots decided to overthrow a weak government and stand up to Hitler, Roosevelt ordered all possible aid to Yugoslavia (which never arrived), and told Yugoslav Ambassador Fotitch that he wanted to show the world that the democracies could act speedily and effectively.²⁸ Needless to say, the war record made by the democracies more than satisfied Roosevelt's desire for evidence that democracy was still virile enough to meet the challenges flung at it.

With his deep faith in the superiority of democracy over other forms of government, his great confidence in the ability of democracy to meet human needs, and his belief that democracy was necessary for peace, it is little wonder that Roosevelt wanted to see democracy spread around the earth.

He seemed to have no doubt that the desire for democracy was universal. His 1936 trip to Latin America confirmed this belief in dramatic fashion. The enthusiastic receptions given him there, he contended, were given him simply because the people down there looked upon him as a symbol of democracy and as one who had made democracy work and keep abreast of the times; and he felt that “the masses of the people of all the Americas are convinced that the democratic form of government can be made to succeed. . . .”²⁹

In both an Armistice Day address in 1940 and in his Third Inaugural in 1941 Roosevelt dwelt at considerable length on the idea that man's desire for democracy was universal. As usual, he talked of both democracy and freedom as if the words were almost interchangeable; and there is no doubt that to him there was almost a hundred per cent correlation between the two. In his Armistice Day address he traced man's struggle for democracy and freedom from antiquity to the present, arguing that even in the darkest moments of history the struggle had never been completely stifled and that beginning with the “era of 1776” democracy took a “vast step forward”; for out of that era in America came “the first far-flung Government in all the world whose cardinal principle was democracy.” Here was truly a new order, he declared, that in the next century spread around the earth in many forms. By the end of the century “almost all peoples had

acquired some form of popular expression of opinion, some form of election, some form of franchise, some form of the right to be heard." America and the British Isles had led in spreading the "gospel of democracy," he added; and the world felt feudalism, conquest, and dictatorship had been discarded forever. World War I was an attempt to destroy this new order of democracy, he asserted, and World War II was another attempt. But Roosevelt did not believe the world would turn back. Those under the heel of dictators eventually would rebel and surely the current attack on democracy could not succeed.³⁰

In his Third Inaugural Address Roosevelt talked in much the same vein, again declaring that the aspiration of man for democracy was as old as civilization and that the struggle toward the democratic ideal would never stop.³¹

But although Roosevelt looked upon democracy as the best possible form of government and was convinced of the existence of a universal urge to achieve it, there is no evidence that he looked upon another Wilsonian crusade as necessary. On the contrary, he seemed to take it for granted that if the evil attack of the dictators upon democracy was beaten back and if it could be proved that democracy could adequately meet the problems of modern times, democracy would spread under its own power. A crusade was not necessary. Both World War I and World War II were "in literal truth, to make the world safe for democracy."³² But to make the world safe for it was enough. The world's peoples would do the rest of their own accord.

At Buenos Aires in 1936 Roosevelt had expressed the view that given the proper conditions, the spread of democracy would be inevitable. "Democracy is still the hope of the world," he proclaimed. "If we in our generation can continue its successful application in the Americas, it will spread and supersede other methods by which men are governed. . . ."³³ The next year in extemporaneous remarks in a small town in New York he expressed only a mild wish, with no crusading fervor, that American democracy should be exported. "We are so much better off in the United States than a whole lot of other nations in the world," he told his audience, "that I wish . . . we could give them some of the fundamentals of our American Democracy."³⁴ In his 1938 Annual Message he told the Congress that the current decline of democracy was only temporary and superficial and he had no doubt at all that the "democracies of the world will survive, and democracy will be restored or established in those nations

which today know it not.”³⁵ In his Third Inaugural he proclaimed that democracy is not dying nor can it die and he implied that it is so rooted in the aspirations of the human spirit that its growth and spread would be inexorable.³⁶ And in his last annual message he simply seemed to take it for granted that the postwar world would be, or in due time would become, an essentially “democratic world.”³⁷

In fact, if there was no room in the world for totalitarian dictatorship, as he had said time and again, and if he frowned also on government by privileged minorities of any kind (as we know he did) it was inevitable that a democratic world was the only kind that would please him.

Since Roosevelt saw an almost total correlation between democracy and individual liberty, he was just as interested in promoting a new world order of freedom as he was in promoting a new world order of democracy. When sending Welles to Europe and Myron Taylor to the Vatican early in 1940 the President told both that in their peace discussions they should keep in mind that a morally justifiable peace should give recognition to the various freedoms of which the common man had been deprived in the Axis states.³⁸ Both publicly and privately throughout the war Roosevelt stressed the desire for a world consecrated to human liberty. A life of freedom and justice, he declared “are the inalienable rights of every man.”³⁹ And “we and our associates in the great alliance of the United Nations are determined to establish a new age of freedom on this earth.”⁴⁰ One of the ultimate objects of the United Nations, he declared, was to build a world in which human beings can think and worship freely and associate with friends of their own choice.⁴¹ And toward the end of the war he put this in only slightly different words, asserting that the United Nations was fighting to make “a world based on freedom. . . .”⁴² After the 1944 election he wrote Henry Wallace that one of the reasons he and the Democrats won again was that the people had faith in them to carry forward the fight “for freedom on this earth. . . .”⁴³

In such pronouncements the President seemed to have in mind the large variety of civil liberties and basic freedoms with which he was familiar in the United States. Throughout the years he mentioned a host of liberties including freedom of labor to organize, freedom of association, and all the well-known rights included in the Constitution. But it was freedom of religion and

freedom of expression (including freedom of information) to which he paid particular attention.

It is doubtful if anything was more important or serious to Roosevelt than religion. Associate after associate and biographer after biographer have testified to the fact that Roosevelt was a sincerely and deeply religious man whose many references to religion and God in his speeches came naturally and were not at all the usual vote-getting clichés of the politician. According to Mrs. Roosevelt his simple, childlike, naive, unquestioning faith was to him both an anchor and a guide. "I think he felt," she said, "that in great crisis he was guided by a strength and wisdom higher than his own, for his religious faith, though simple, was unwavering and direct. . . ." Farley has reported how surprised he was that on the train enroute to Washington for his inauguration in 1933 Roosevelt spent most of his time chatting about religion and said he thought the right way to start his administration was to think about God, particularly in such a crisis as the country was then experiencing, for the religious spirit would be more important than any other single factor in seeing the country through the crisis. He also announced his intention to have his inauguration day begin with a church service which all leaders of the administration were asked to attend; and he concluded that the salvation of all peoples would depend ultimately on their proper attitude toward God. You could joke with the President about almost any other subject, reported Sherwood, "but not this one."⁴⁴

But there was nothing narrowly sectarian in Roosevelt's religious attitude. He respected all religions and all gods, knowing there were many in the world. In his Fireside Chat two days after the outbreak of war in Europe in 1939 Roosevelt declared that one of the tasks of the United States during the war would be to preserve the universal moralities and teachings of religion which would be badly needed later by a "crippled humanity." For he believed, he said later, that it was from our religious teachings that man had learned about "the dignity of the human being, his equality before God, and his responsibility in the making of a better and fairer world."⁴⁵

It is no wonder, therefore, that Roosevelt seemed to look upon religion as the foundation on which a moral social order must rest and he seemed unable to conceive of a satisfactory postwar world that denied man the right to worship, or to worship as he

pleased. It is doubtful if anything the totalitarian powers did caused more pain to his sensibilities than their attack on religion. One of the conditions he laid down for the recognition of Russia in 1933 was that religious freedom be allowed American citizens in Russia; and in at least one of his press conferences he talked as if this was the most important of all his conditions.⁴⁶ In 1938 when resentment against Hitler's anti-religious policy was high Roosevelt attempted to counteract that policy by dramatizing America's attachment to religion. When Cardinal Mundelein of Chicago visited the Vatican that year the President ordered the American fleet in French waters to go to Naples to honor the Cardinal's arrival, and he instructed Ambassador Phillips not only to meet the Cardinal in Naples and escort him to Rome, but to do everything else he could to impress upon Italy the Cardinal's importance in the United States. "At this particular moment," he wrote Phillips, "when religious persecution is on the increase, even in Italy, the significance of what I wish done will not be overlooked by the Italians and I think the effect cannot but be salutary."⁴⁷

✓ When it was discovered that freedom of religion had been left out of the Atlantic Charter inadvertently, the President made haste to assure Congress that of course it should be considered part of the Charter since it was necessary to the kind of world the Charter implied.⁴⁸

It is possible to become skeptical of the sincerity of Roosevelt's desire for religious freedom as a result of the reports of his dealings with the Russians on the matter in late 1941. When pushing Lend-Lease for Russia in September 1941 against domestic opposition, Roosevelt behaved like an opportunist, urging the Soviets to mollify American public opinion by publicizing the fact that they did allow some religious worship and were, therefore, abiding to some extent by the religious freedom clause of their 1936 constitution.⁴⁹ Roosevelt's own story of his efforts to get the Russians to accept a religious freedom clause in the Declaration by the United Nations also makes him look opportunistic. He told Russian Ambassador Litvinoff that he, Roosevelt, had been so greatly criticized for leaving religious freedom out of the Atlantic Charter that he did not dare leave it out of the Declaration by the United Nations and he needed Russia's help to get himself out of a tight spot. The phrase was so broad, he went on, that it really meant the same thing that the clause in the Soviet constitution meant, for to Jefferson—and to the United States—it meant

the right to have any religion, to have no religion, or even to oppose religion.⁵⁰

Such an opportunistic attitude regarding religion is hard to explain and Rosenman claimed he doubted Roosevelt's story although it was told directly to him as well as to others by Roosevelt himself. Hull makes no mention of such an argument, noting only that when the Declaration was being drafted Roosevelt wrote Hull: "I think every effort should be made to get religious freedom into that document. I believe Litvinoff can be induced to agree to this."⁵¹ Churchill, who was at the White House while the Declaration was being written, declared that Roosevelt "exerted his most fervent efforts" to persuade Litvinoff to accept the religious freedom clause, going so far at one point as to have a long talk with Litvinoff "about his soul and the dangers of hell-fire," which elicited from the Prime Minister a promise that if the President lost the next election, Churchill would nominate him for the position of Archbishop of Canterbury.⁵²

If Roosevelt actually behaved like an opportunist on those occasions, it confirms our earlier assumption that he was practical enough on occasion to assume the role of a realist and make deals with the devil although it was contrary to the way he preferred to behave. Here it was not a matter of making a deal with the devil so much as it was a matter of using realistic arguments that he thought might appeal to the realistic Russians; or it might be that he was even being insidious enough to use devious means of getting the Russians to commit themselves on a point which he hoped to hold over their heads later. There is no doubt that Russia's attitude toward religion added fuel to the opposition to grant lend-lease aid to the Soviets; and there is no doubt that a realistic argument to the Russians to publicize their church policy, which had already relaxed somewhat, made sense regarding that particular problem.

Roosevelt also gave special consideration to the problem of freedom of information. One of his purposes in emphasizing foreign affairs in his 1936 Annual Message was to talk to the peoples of the autocracies over the heads of their rulers; but he wrote Ambassador Dodd that he had only small hope his words would reach them, since Wilson's theory of appealing to people this way was unworkable in view of the fact that totalitarian governments controlled the sources of information. He hoped, nevertheless, that a small part of what he said "will seep through."⁵³

When asked by the press one day in 1940 if he thought de-

mocracy ought to be taught in the schools to combat Communism and Fascism he answered that the best way to encourage democracy was by promoting freedom of the press and freedom of information at all levels, not just in the schools, for if people were given all sides of the story they would end up on the side of democracy. And this he would like to see all over the world.⁵⁴ In at least one specific instance Roosevelt refused to content himself with glittering generalities about freedom of information. In October 1943 when the Argentine government suppressed Jewish newspapers, the President made it very clear that such action was reprehensible to the United States and within a matter of hours the ban was lifted.⁵⁵ About the same time the President told Welles and Hopkins that he was going to try to work out for postwar use some form of international news broadcast that would give unbiased factual information to all people everywhere and that countries like Germany, Italy, and Japan would be compelled to use.⁵⁶

It was by his proclamation of the Four Freedoms, however, that Roosevelt dramatized his great hope for a new world order of human liberty. Apparently he had been developing his thinking on these for some time before he announced them in his 1941 Annual Message. Frank Knox claimed that when Roosevelt offered him the Secretaryship of the Navy in December 1939 the President treated him to a long disquisition on what later became the Four Freedoms.⁵⁷ In June 1940 he told the press that there were four fears he hoped to see eliminated after the war: 1) fear of not being able to worship freely; 2) fear of not being able to express one's self freely; 3) fear of armaments; and 4) fear of not being able to have normal economic and social relations with other nations, the normal commercial and cultural relations necessary, he said, to produce economic security so that there would not be an economic breakdown such as had occurred in Germany after the last war.⁵⁸

A month later he gave the press a long dissertation on both democracy and freedom, declaring that both were among his major postwar objectives. This time he listed five freedoms. The first was freedom of information, which he insisted meant far more than just freedom of the press. There could not be a stable world, he asserted, unless all sources of information were free and people could know what was going on everywhere without censorship. The second was freedom of religion, which he believed was essential to peace. The third was freedom of expression, which

everyone ought to have "as long as you don't advocate the overthrow of the government." The fourth was freedom from fear, by which he meant freedom from fear of being bombed or attacked by some other nation; and this in essence meant disarmament. The fifth was freedom from want, which meant the removal of economic and cultural barriers.⁵⁹

Once formally announced in his 1941 Annual Message (with two of the above combined), the promotion of these freedoms, said Hull, became the basis for the administration's consideration of a future world order.⁶⁰ They were repeated time and again during the war and publicized in various ways throughout the world; Roosevelt even appealed to some of his associates, such as Welles and Wallace, to write short books on them aimed at counteracting those who disliked the Four Freedoms or sneered at the possibility of achieving them. He suggested to Welles that he liken the opponents of the Four Freedoms to the nobles of France during the French Revolution, to the noisy minority in England who opposed the Magna Carta, to the rioters of ancient Athens who drove out many wise men, and to the "rambunctious children of Israel who made Moses so angry he smashed the Tables of Stone."⁶¹

Obviously much of what Roosevelt had to say about individual liberty was said for the effect it would have on the war. But the evidence is overwhelmingly to the effect that what he said about it also represented his real feelings. Earlier we noted the private testimony of Hopkins to the effect that when Roosevelt came out with something like the Four Freedoms it was the real Roosevelt, Roosevelt the idealist, who was speaking; and we gave other evidence to the effect that as practical and realistic as Roosevelt was much of the time, there is no doubt that he was, much of the time, an idealist.

But Roosevelt also had a rational argument in favor of global freedom. In the first place, he believed that there existed a universal desire for liberty just as there existed a universal desire for democracy. "The essential validity of the American Bill of Rights was accepted everywhere at least in principle," he said on one occasion. "Even today," he added, "with the exception of Germany, Italy, and Japan the peoples of the world—in all probability four-fifths of them—support its principles, its teachings, and its glorious results." And in Latin America, he noted, every Republic had incorporated the basic principles of the Bill of Rights in her fundamental law.⁶²

Later he referred to the Four Freedoms as "the four freedoms of common humanity" and declared that they were as essential to man as "air and sunlight, bread and salt. Deprive him of these freedoms and he dies—deprive him of part of them and a part of him withers. Give them to him in full and abundant measure and he will cross the threshold of a new age, the greatest age of man." These freedoms, he added, were the right of every man of every creed, race, and land, a heritage already too long withheld from many.⁶³ He saw coming a fusion of East and West, of all continents, of all cultures, and the emerging of a single "world civilization," and the Four Freedoms were among its "high goals."⁶⁴ The Italian people's enthusiastic welcome to Allied Troops in 1943 "proved conclusively," he told Congress, that despite a generation under dictatorship the "love of liberty was unconquerable."⁶⁵

In addition to believing that individual liberty had a universal appeal, Roosevelt also looked upon it as interdependent, arguing that for freedom to be safe anywhere it had to be safe everywhere. In other words, the freedoms the people of the United States were used to and wanted preserved could no longer be guaranteed unless they were respected almost everywhere on the globe. In his 1940 Annual Message, the President reaffirmed the right of people to choose their own form of government; but then he qualified that right by declaring that such choice should be predicated on certain freedoms which he thought were essential everywhere. "We know," he went on, "that we ourselves shall never be wholly safe at home unless other governments recognize such freedoms."⁶⁶

When proclaiming the Four Freedoms in his 1941 Annual Message he declared after each one that it was essential "everywhere in the world." Rosenman has testified that during the preparation of that message Harry Hopkins raised questions about the wisdom of including the phrase "everywhere in the world" and said that he doubted if Americans were going to be much interested in Java after the war. "I'm afraid they'll have to be some day, Harry," Roosevelt is reported to have answered. "The world is getting so small that even the people of Java are getting to be our neighbors now."⁶⁷ On another occasion Roosevelt asserted that the struggle with the Axis "has taught us increasingly that freedom of person and security of property anywhere in the world depend upon the security of the rights and obligations of liberty and justice everywhere in the world."⁶⁸ In a 1943 address he declared that in the future the personal freedom of every American and his family would depend increasingly on the free-


dom of neighbors in other lands. "The whole world is one neighborhood," he said, adding that that was why the war had spread to every continent and involved the lives and liberties of everyone.⁶⁹

Roosevelt made many statements regarding the attainability of the Four Freedoms. In some he sounded as if they were attainable in the near future; in others he sounded as if they were attainable only in the distant future; while in still others he talked as if they were simply ideals toward which man could make progress but might never wholly attain at all. Testimony of Harry Hopkins indicated that Roosevelt certainly believed in the attainability of the Four Freedoms at some time. When presenting the Four Freedoms to Congress in his 1941 Annual Message the President declared that the world of freedom he had just described was not "a vision of a distant millennium. It is a definite basis for a kind of world attainable in our own time and generation."⁷⁰ A few weeks later he contradicted himself somewhat by saying the Four Freedoms were distant ideals rather than immediately attainable objects, but he seemed to think civilization might get close to them. "They might not be immediately attainable throughout the world," he declared, "but humanity does move toward those glorious ideals through democratic processes."⁷¹

A few weeks after making that statement he asserted that the Four Freedoms were attainable in the sense that the ideals of the Magna Carta, the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution of the United States, and the Emancipation Proclamation were attained,⁷² by which he probably meant that such milestones of human progress, as he called them, could be approached if not completely attained. In a still later address he spoke only of "steady progress" toward the Four Freedoms rather than of their attainment. But he poured the most bitter sarcasm he could summon on the "puny prophets" who sneered at the Four Freedoms and called them unattainable. Such people were fiddling "with many sour notes while civilization burns." And while he was aware that such ideals could not be attained easily or over night and would require a long, hard, and bitter struggle, he had no doubt that there could be made "a steady progress toward the highest goals that men have ever imagined."⁷³

This writer's own conclusion is that this last statement by Roosevelt comes nearer to his real views than do the others regarding the attainability of the Four Freedoms, or of a new world order based on democracy and freedom. He knew when praising democracy in Latin America in 1936 that little of it existed there

and that there was only small chance of progress toward it in the near future. But his idealism obliged him to focus people's minds on the stars, and that he did repeatedly. He was not so ignorant as to believe that the Four Freedoms could be made realities in Latin America, Java, and "everywhere in the world" within a generation. Thus it is quite likely that "steady progress" toward them was as much as he hoped to see.



A GLOBAL NEW DEAL

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IN ADDITION to the reforms discussed above Franklin Roosevelt also had many suggestions for what might roughly be called a global New Deal. In general, his suggestions represented a desire to export to all the world the economic and social goals and techniques that had done so much to raise standards of living, cultural as well as material, in the United States throughout her history in general and during the Roosevelt administration in particular. As would be expected, Roosevelt's suggestions were highly impregnated with the concept of social justice which to him seemed to mean the opening of opportunities and the bestowing of benefits to all individuals in society regardless of class. A richer cultural and material life for every man, woman, and child on the globe seems to have been his objective, and there is no doubt that he gave much thought to it.

His desire for universal democracy, for the abolition of colonialism, and for individual liberty was basic, of course, to this aspiration. Thus it is largely the economic aspects of his goal that remain to be considered here.

Roosevelt exhibited strong humanitarian impulses throughout most of his public career, and it is not at all surprising that when at last he began operating on the world stage those impulses were given global range. One biographer has suggested that a sense of social responsibility for the well-being of one's fellow men was perhaps a family characteristic which Roosevelt inherited. Certainly it was among the ideals Endicott Peabody worked hard to impose on Roosevelt and all other boys who went to school under

him at Groton, and it would have been a miracle had Roosevelt not been infected by some of the social gospel teachings he heard there. Freidel has suggested that Peabody's liberalism was that of the English Tories of the 1870s who felt so secure themselves that they felt free to grant the franchise to laboring men and to inaugurate a paternalistic program of welfare legislation to woo workers to the Tory party. But there is no doubt that it was also a challenge to the boys at Groton to right the wrongs of society.¹ In a theme written at Harvard in 1901 Roosevelt complained of the Dutch families of New York who had lost their social conscience, having nothing left but their names; and he contended that the virility of the Roosevelt clan was due to the fact that they had retained their democratic spirit and the belief that there was no excuse for anyone who did not do his duty by his community.²

The concern for the well-being of colonial peoples, which was a major characteristic of Roosevelt's early imperialism, and the aims of his domestic New Deal make it beyond argument to this writer that the President's goal was to enrich the lives of most Americans.

The promotion of social justice everywhere in the world was one of Roosevelt's foreign policy objectives from the time he entered the White House and, according to Hull, the President pushed toward this objective whenever the opportunity arose.³ In 1933 Roosevelt called the attention of all governments to his belief that the World Disarmament and London Economic Conferences had much to do with furthering social justice.⁴ And in his 1935 Annual Message he made clear his belief that social justice was, like individual liberty and democracy, a universal ideal, something toward which all men everywhere in the world wanted to go. "In most nations," he told Congress, "social justice, no longer a distant ideal, has become a definite goal, and ancient governments are beginning to heed the call."⁵

What Roosevelt meant by the term "social justice" or "well-being," both of which he was fond of using, must be gathered from scattered references made largely during the war. In an attempt to show American troops what they were fighting for, he listed in his 1941 Annual Message some economic objectives of a democracy; and while he had the United States in mind, there was an implication that democracies everywhere had or should have these same objectives. They included equality of opportunity, jobs for those who can work, security for those who need it, the

ending of special privilege for the few, and the enjoyment of the contributions of science to a higher standard of living.⁶

In 1942 he told the press that Anglo-American discussions about the economic and social future of the smaller islands of the West Indies had been going on for some time and his major aim seemed to be to lift them out of their poverty, get the franchise extended to them, get compulsory education going, and help them become economically self-sustaining.⁷ When discussing the coming United Nations Conference on Food and Agriculture in 1943 he made it clear that he considered nutrition and the production and distribution of food as global problems that were both economic and social and must be attacked globally.⁸ One of the objectives of the United Nations, he told the Conference when it met, was to build a world order in which all men can have productive work and enough earnings for at least the *needs* of their families.⁹ Good health was also probably essential to Roosevelt's concept of well-being, for at Casablanca the President appealed to both the Sultan of Morocco and to Lord Swinton, governor of the British provinces of West Africa, to give more attention to the health of their peoples. The disease he saw there shocked him, his physician reported, and he suggested that the authorities there take advantage of the discoveries and methods of the United States medical Naval teams in the Pacific.¹⁰

In a Fireside Chat after his return from Teheran the President declared that the Big Three had discussed the "broad objectives" of postwar international relations and all were agreed that the promotion of the social welfare and the raising of standards of living in all countries were among those objectives.¹¹ But the President gave no details as to what those phrases had meant to the Big Three. A few days later, however, he listed for the press the reforms old "Dr. New Deal" had achieved in the United States before "Dr. Win the War" had to be called in, and if it is true that Roosevelt hoped to export the American experience, that list is probably a reasonable clue to what Roosevelt wanted done all over the world. The list included the well-known New Deal programs regarding old age security, unemployment insurance, minimum wages and maximum hours, the reduction of farm tenancy, the abolition of child labor, monopoly control, reciprocal trade, flood control, the conservation of natural resources, the ever normal granary for agriculture, and slum clearance. Those things, he added, were the kinds of things they had talked about at

Teheran in general terms with regard to the postwar world, but, he repeated, it was too early in the war to start talking about them in detail.¹²

During 1944 and early 1945 the President not only added an item or two to his list of proposed reforms; he also made it clearer than ever before that they were global objectives. At the beginning of the year he noted that the United Nations was already busy on such postwar problems as disease, malnutrition, and unemployment, and many other forms of economic and social distress.¹³ In May he endorsed the Declaration of the International Labor Organization, congratulating the conference for having the same objectives the United States had regarding the material and social well-being of mankind. The Declaration, avowed the President, summed up the aspirations of this epoch. It included hope for full employment, wages and working conditions that would insure the fruits of progress to all, the extension of social security, the recognition of the right of collective bargaining, the improvement of child welfare, and adequate educational and vocational opportunities.¹⁴

At Yalta the President reiterated the idea that the world was changing rapidly, that one of the great changes was the increase in opportunity for a better life, but added that there were still, however, many parts of the world where such opportunity hardly existed, and one of the objectives of the Yalta Conference was to promote this opportunity for every man, woman, and child on earth.¹⁵

Much of the motivation for Roosevelt's desire to promote social justice and the well-being of the world's people had its source in his temperamental humanitarianism and in the sense of social responsibility cultivated in him from childhood. The President also had two rational arguments to justify a global New Deal, however.

His first justification was that economically and culturally all nations were so interdependent that the United States could not enjoy prosperity and a rich social life unless all other states enjoyed them also.

It seems likely that Roosevelt was a subscriber to this idea all his public life. Although in his years as Assistant Secretary of the Navy he was a nationalist, he was a rather broad-minded one who did not hesitate to give contracts to lower bidders from other countries and in 1913 he expressed the hope that someday the United States would take a broad view of her economic position.¹⁶ When arguing in a 1923 magazine article that there was room in

the Pacific for both United States and Japanese trade he raised the question as to why, if "within one great nation cooperation rather than cutthroat competition best fosters an honorable and mutually beneficent trade, why is not the same formula true as between two nations . . . ?"¹⁷ In a private letter in the mid-twenties Roosevelt expressed the Democratic Party view, which he probably believed, that the prosperity of the decade was due to the "world economic situation following the war" rather than to Republican Party efforts.¹⁸

Despite the fact that when first in the White House Roosevelt gave first priority to domestic recovery and was pulled for a few months in the direction of economic nationalism by advisors like Moley, in his second Fireside Chat in May 1933 the President warned that the economy of the United States was so tied in with that of other nations that whatever degree of recovery might be achieved by the United States herself "will not be permanent unless we get a return to prosperity all over the world."¹⁹ In 1939 the President predicted that as the air age advanced and air fleets were able to cross oceans as easily as they then crossed small European seas, the economy of the world would become more and more a single operating unit. Then "no interruption of it anywhere can fail . . . to disrupt economic life everywhere."²⁰

Welles has testified that before going to the Atlantic Conference Roosevelt expressed to him his firm conviction that all nations must be given equal access to natural resources and that it would be necessary to convince the "have" nations that an improvement in the standard of living of the "have nots" would benefit the "haves" also, for if the "have nots" developed more purchasing power they would provide better foreign markets for the "haves."²¹ He gave the same argument again late in 1942 to oppose those who were then complaining that the administration's desire to strengthen the economy of the Latin American countries would hurt the United States. It was not true, he declared, and he illustrated his point by showing how the entire United States had been helped by raising the economic level of the South and of helping it get over being an economic colony of the North. The same thing applied, he asserted, to world affairs. Then a few days later he insisted again that no American nation could be happy and prosperous unless all twenty-one of them were.²² ✓

Rosenman has testified that once during the war the President dictated a piece of speech material (never used) in which he defended the general idea that every Hottentot should have a quart

of milk every day. Again he argued that if the people in such places as Dakar, Morocco, Algiers, and even the Hottentots could participate more in world trade and thereby create more employment needs and greater markets for all, it would help even the people of the United States.²³

Throughout the war Roosevelt talked in the same vein. In his 1943 Annual Message he reiterated the idea of global economic and social interdependence, emphasizing that the stability of the American economy was dependent on the stability of the world economy.²⁴ The next year he gave hearty approval to the statement in the International Labor Organization Declaration that "poverty anywhere constitutes a danger to prosperity everywhere." And again he referred to Gambia.²⁵ In a directive written a few months later to his own Foreign Economic Administration he noted that the United States had a big stake in getting world trade going again as soon after the war as possible since the well-being of the peoples of the United States and other nations was interdependent.²⁶ At Yalta he repeated the same idea, arguing that unless countries like Iran developed some purchasing power they could never become good customers for the industrialized nations.²⁷

Thus throughout his public life Roosevelt opposed the old idea that a nation could prosper only at the expense of other nations and he espoused the opposite internationalist idea that the prosperity of one nation was dependent on the prosperity of all.

His second argument in support of a global New Deal was that the maintenance of international peace and security was dependent on the achievement of reasonably satisfactory economic and social conditions throughout the world.

This too was an idea long held. In the Peace Plan he proposed in 1924 for the Bok Award he noted that his proposals for a new international organization were designed to maintain the great humanitarian and economic work of the League because he believed "that the amelioration of international social and economic ills is a necessary part in the prevention of future war."²⁸ Again in 1937 Roosevelt seems to have held the same view, agreeing with Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie King that economic and social problems were at the root of the current international unrest and were therefore a "fundamental cause of war."²⁹ In 1943 he reiterated much the same thought, declaring to the United Nations Conference on Food and Agriculture that the problem of political security and the world food problem were so interdependent that it would be impossible to solve one without solving

the other.³⁰ Early in 1944 he reminded Congress that destroying the current enemy on the battlefield would still not ensure peace, for new enemies were certain to arise if economic reconstruction failed.³¹

After returning from Yalta the President gave the press a long recital about the poverty, ignorance, and hunger he saw in the Middle East and he insisted that "all that is tied up with peace. A country that isn't moving forward with civilization," he added, "is always more of a potential war danger than a country that is making progress." To be sure, he went on, solving such problems would be a long-term matter, but the postwar planners were looking ahead at least fifty years.³² A mere two weeks before his death he reiterated the same idea, declaring that "want" predisposes people toward war or at least makes people ready tools and victims for aggressors. Thus organizations like the Food and Agricultural Organization were badly needed to attack this problem of "want" so that peace might be maintained.³³

The global New Deal Roosevelt advocated called for an enormous variety of reforms ranging from the abolition of child labor to resource development and from expanded educational opportunities to better housing. But mentioning these goals in his public "sermons" and his fatherly talks to "backward" rulers like Churchill and Ibn Saud seem to be all the President said about most of them.

On the subject of international trade, however, he was forced to speak out many times; and while the record is at times confusing, his general attitude is reasonably clear and it became very clear during the years of his greatest maturity.

The one thing we can say with certainty is that Roosevelt was never a high protectionist. As already noted, throughout his public career he called attention repeatedly to the economic interdependence of nations, and in his scheme of things a vigorous flow of commerce among all nations had always been essential to prosperity. Yet it took him many years to become a powerful and sincere advocate of free trade, if he ever became entirely that. What he really advocated in his mature years was a *freer* trade than then existed and there is no evidence known to this writer that he ever hoped to see trade as free of restrictions as was British trade in the nineteenth century.

Although Roosevelt probably always leaned privately toward a low tariff policy, his political instincts seem to have impelled him to compromise on the issue over a long period of years. In two

newspaper columns written in behalf of Al Smith in the 1928 presidential campaign, for example, Roosevelt saw no objection to reasonable protection for either agriculture or business and he opposed only the unreasonably high tariffs that he charged the Republicans had erected for their "pet" industries, tariffs that all too often had contributed much to the promotion of monopolies. No one need fear, he wrote, that the Democratic Party under Smith would inaugurate free trade and close America's factories and farms. All the Democratic Party would do was abolish favoritism to "pet" industries and inaugurate perhaps a "scientifically adjustable tariff" to meet changing conditions from year to year.³⁴ In 1930 he wrote privately to a Nebraska banker that "I am inclined to think that the Democratic Party will be able to make it perfectly clear that we are not for free trade; that we are for protection but that protection does not mean the right for manufacturers to sell their goods here at a higher price than they sell the same goods in other countries."³⁵

It would be tedious to recount the zigzags Roosevelt made on this topic in 1932. It is obvious to any reader of his speeches of that year that he had great fun lambasting the ultra-high Smoot-Hawley Tariff the Republicans had enacted in 1930. But the protectionist farm groups of the Middle West had to be thought of also, and he thought of them. Finding a compromise position between free traders in the Democratic Party like Cordell Hull and protectionists like Senator Thomas L. Walsh of Montana was a problem—an insoluble problem to Moley—but Roosevelt thought he found such a compromise and went gaily down the campaign trail leaving followers like Hull, Walsh, and Moley muttering behind him.³⁶ Privately, however, Roosevelt still *leaned* toward low tariffs, telling Anne O'Hare McCormick during the campaign that "if the present tariff war continues the world will go back a thousand years." The whole world system needed to be revised, he told Mrs. McCormick; but until that was done he was obliged to take a short nationalist view to promote immediate American recovery. But even here there was one consolation: the recovery of the United States would automatically promote world recovery, he insisted, and once the economic crisis was over, the internationalist long-run approach could be applied.³⁷ Hull has also testified that Roosevelt's private attitude toward world trade was internationalist before his election to the Presidency. In many conversations with Roosevelt when the latter passed through Washington on his way to Warm Springs before 1932 Hull found

him, he claims, as "being at one with me" on the need for lower tariffs and full cooperation with other nations.³⁸

The story of the tug of war that went on between the economic nationalists led by Raymond Moley and the internationalists led by Hull in the first year or two of the Roosevelt administration is too well known to be repeated here.³⁹ Suffice it to say that although the President was still trying to thread his way between the two extremes, he thought he had found a compromise position; he denied there was any conflict in the contradictory actions he sometimes took, and his internationalist predilections eventually drove him to side with Hull and the free traders. In private conversation during the period, moreover, he continued to sound very internationalist regarding trade, or so it appeared to such internationalists as Ambassador William E. Dodd.⁴⁰

From 1934 on there was no longer any doubt as to where Roosevelt stood. Thereafter his private and public views were in accord and his appeals for a reduction of trade barriers were many and consistent. This does not mean that he immediately became a vigorous enough supporter of reciprocal trade agreements to satisfy Hull. For Hull reciprocal trade agreements were virtually a life-long obsession and his over-emphasis on that particular program sometimes irritated Roosevelt.⁴¹ It is doubtful if any election-minded President could have backed Hull's program vigorously enough to always satisfy Hull. But by the beginning of 1940 the President was backing even that program enough to please Hull, and from that position he never wavered.⁴² Throughout the war he made it clear that his postwar plans for global prosperity called for such a reduction of trade barriers that "trade and commerce and access to materials and markets may be freer after this war than ever before in the history of the world." Nations were like individuals, he insisted, and if individuals needed freedom of opportunity to prosper, so did nations.⁴³

In addition to his frequent generalized appeals to reduce restraints on world commerce and his final support of the technique of reciprocity Roosevelt also commented from time to time on specific aspects of the problem. He was especially firm in his conviction, for example, that equal access to natural resources should be available to all nations; and before going to the Atlantic Conference he told Welles of his desire to persuade the British to accept the principle.⁴⁴ Roosevelt also frequently expressed the view that the problems of disarmament and the reduction of trade barriers were inextricably interwoven and one could not be

achieved without the other. Thus one of his arguments in favor of the reciprocal trade program was that the expansion of world commerce expected from it would do more to promote disarmament, and therefore peace also, than any other one thing.

During the Depression of the thirties the President also commented frequently on the problem of surpluses. Here he favored international agreements to limit production, to fit such international crops as wheat, sugar, and cotton to the world market, and commodity agreements among the leading producers were, he thought, the best answer.⁴⁵ Surpluses in Latin America were of special concern to him since he feared Hitler might get control of Latin America by providing the Latin American republics with European markets. During 1940, therefore, he gave considerable thought to a customs union for all the Americas wherein the ever-normal granary idea might be applied.⁴⁶

Roosevelt also spoke out frequently in support of international economic competition (as well as cooperation) as opposed to international cartels and monopolies. In his 1923 magazine article on Japan he had taken issue vigorously with the contemporary idea that economic rivalry breeds wars. There were, indeed, he thought, many causes of war, but economic rivalry was not prominent among them and certainly could not, as a general rule, be so considered. The United States and Britain had been economic rivals of one another for 110 years without a war between them, he pointed out, and the United States and Japan could do the same.⁴⁷ In 1925 he reiterated the same view, saying that while "those materialists who assert that all wars are caused by economic and trade rivalries" should not all be in the insane asylum, they were close to it. In many wars, he asserted, trade rivalry had little part.⁴⁸ Again in 1941 Roosevelt talked in the same vein, pointing out that there was plenty of room in the Pacific for both Japan and the United States to trade and there was no point in going to war about it.⁴⁹

Private international monopolies were as repugnant to Roosevelt as public monopolies of trade. In 1944 he wrote Hull that he wanted to see all cartels eliminated after the war. It was unfortunate, he thought, that many European nations had no anti-monopoly tradition and that their governments actually often encouraged cartels. The Nazis especially had used cartels as political instruments, he asserted, and such "weapons of economic warfare" should be eradicated. The United Nations should collaborate to do this; but meanwhile Hull was instructed to keep his eye "on

the whole subject"; for it was bound to come up soon in the discussions on postwar planning.⁵⁰

The struggle of nations to achieve favorable balances of trade was also repugnant to Roosevelt. "The ultimate ideal," he told the press one day in 1934, was for every nation's trade to be on a balanced basis with exports and imports equalized and gold eliminated as a balancing mechanism.⁵¹

National control of the geographic channels of trade also seemed to irritate Roosevelt, or at least control of those channels about which there had been considerable dispute. As already noted, he favored the international administration of the Kiel Canal, assurances that the Dardenelles would be open to the commerce of all nations, and he favored numerous free ports, in such places as Hong Kong, Dairen, Trieste, and Fiume.

Freedom of the air after the war was also one of Roosevelt's objectives. It was quite all right for internal commercial aviation to be owned and operated by each nation; but the privilege of passing over states and of refueling in their ports should be available to all.⁵²

Although the restoration and expansion of world trade by freeing it of its shackles was the most important goal in Roosevelt's global New Deal, during the last two years of his life he began to show a keen interest in developing the world's natural resources. This goal was probably inspired by his trips abroad and his first sight, from Casablanca on, of once rich parts of the world which in more recent centuries had known nothing but the most abject poverty. Everywhere he went in North Africa and the Middle East, even when merely flying over a country, he soaked up all the facts about geography and resources he could find available or had time to hear. Dreams of irrigating the deserts came to him. The Sahara could be made to bloom, he thought, by pumping water from its underground rivers. Gigantic reforestation projects ought to be inaugurated also, he believed, especially in places like Iran which once had plenty of water and timber but had become treeless and desolate. Experiments like the Shelter Belt of trees he had begun in the Middle West of the United States ought to be tried in many parts of the world, he declared, and such experiments illustrated the approach nations like those in the Middle East ought to have toward their natural resources. When in 1944 he appointed James M. Landis as Director of Economic Operations for the Middle East, the encouragement of such developments in the area was one of his duties.⁵³

It appears to have been the old high priest of American conservationism, Gifford Pinchot, who, in 1944, quickened the President's interest in the relation between the conservation of natural resources and peace; and during the last year of the President's life the two men carried on a lively correspondence on the matter. Roosevelt had been interested in conservation nearly all his life. As early as 1912 Pinchot had excited his interest in the subject with pictures of a Chinese walled town which 500 years earlier had been the center of a prosperous and populous countryside, rich in forests, clear streams, and abundant crops; but which by 1912 had become a scene of treeless, waterless, eroded desolation, all due to lack of proper conservation practices. Throughout his public career Roosevelt repeated that story of the Chinese pictures; he studied European conservation practices; and he pushed conservation everywhere the opportunity arose. In February 1944 he wrote King Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia about the matter, expressing the view that Saudi Arabia could have a great future "if more agricultural land can be provided through irrigation and through the growing of trees to hold the soil and increase the water supply."

When Pinchot argued, therefore, that conservation was essential for permanent peace, he found a ready ally in the President, and once the presidential campaign of 1944 was behind him, Roosevelt began pushing the matter. Even during the political campaign he urged Hull to get the State Department busy studying the matter. Many of the world's resources were being wasted or ignored, he wrote Hull, and others could be used for humanity if more was known about them. Some nations were interested, he added, and some were not; some used their resources well while others abused them. And he concluded by suggesting an immediate world conference on the subject. When the State Department answered it was too busy to plan an international conference on conservation, the President wrote back testily that the Department (by then under Stettinius) had failed to grasp the need to do something about the world's resources. Then he recited his favorite story of the plight of Iran where so much had been wasted that the people were destitute and unable to be good customers for anybody. And there were "lots of countries" like Iran, he declared: many non-buying countries that could be transformed into good customers; and although it might take a hundred years to do it, as history goes that was a short time.

Lands with oil resources were in an especially good position to

develop their resources, thought the President. He had "always felt strongly," Mrs. Roosevelt reported, that lands with oil should not turn all their oil resources over to the major powers but should retain enough to develop their own country. The Sultan of Morocco became enthusiastic about the President's dissertation on the matter. But King Ibn Saud in showing no interest whatsoever caused what might fairly be called one of the major disappointments of Roosevelt's life. When he met the Arabian King on his return from Yalta he drew for him a fascinating picture of what could be done to turn Arabia into a modern Garden of Eden. Subterranean streams could be tapped to irrigate the desert, said Roosevelt, reforestation could be tried, and water power could be developed for industry. Glowing pictures of reclamation projects in the United States were painted; projects like Boulder Dam, TVA, and Grand Coulee were described. But the King showed strong objections to modernizing or changing his people in any way, and when the President finished his discourse, the King resumed his tirade against the Jews at the same point he had left off.⁵⁴

But the backward areas of the world were not the only ones Roosevelt wanted developed. The TVA idea ought to be applied in Europe, he thought, in order to relieve Europe's chronic coal shortage. Some European countries had plenty of cheap electric power, moreover, while others fifty miles away had little, and there was no reason why the regional development approach should not be tried to serve them all.⁵⁵

During the war the President also got interested in the development of tourist resources in Spain and he had his ambassador there look into the possibilities. He was particularly interested, he wrote Ambassador Hayes, in finding out what had happened to Spanish art and cultural treasures during the Spanish Civil War; for he felt they would be useful in attracting tourists from the eighteen Latin American republics with Spanish backgrounds. If Spain could become a great mecca for tourists after the war, he concluded, her economic situation would be vastly improved.

Although the above proposals to develop the world's resources were fragmentary and seem to have become important to Roosevelt only during the last two years of his life, it is interesting to speculate on what he might have proposed had he lived longer. It is quite likely that his experiments in the United States in the thirties would have paled into insignificance in the face of his global dreams.

Another problem on which Roosevelt expressed what might be called New Dealish ideas on a global scale was that of the resettlement of refugees. For them he envisioned a new start in life similar to the new start he had tried to provide in the United States for farmers on submarginal lands.

Here, of course, the problem of immigration was directly involved. His own attitude toward immigration into the United States was what might be called moderate. In his 1920 Acceptance Speech he had favored the tightening of "our immigration laws to exclude the physically and morally unfit,"⁵⁶ but he never showed any sign of that extreme fear of a great influx of foreigners that was then so common; nor did he show any indication that his willingness to limit immigration was based on intolerance or a belief in the inferiority or superiority of any national group. His attitude seemed to be based on more practical considerations as to what type immigrants could be readily assimilated into a national society and on what was politically acceptable to public opinion.

In his 1923 magazine article on Japan Roosevelt advocated application of the "Golden Rule" regarding Japanese immigration into the United States. Since large numbers of Americans did not move to Japan, he reasoned somewhat speciously, large numbers of Japanese should not move to the United States.⁵⁷ But there was no proposal to close the door to them altogether. In two newspaper columns in 1925 he again expressed his middle-of-the-road view. Although he did not want the United States to become a dumping ground for foreigners, he said, he had no patience with those who wished to close the gates to all immigration. Selective immigration such as that applied by Canada would provide healthy contributions to our society, he added; and he liked also the Canadian policy of dispersing immigrants geographically so as to avoid pockets of foreign-born minorities. He reminded his readers that all Americans were immigrants not so long ago, that their mingling had strengthened the nation, and that some of the most backward sections of the country contained almost exclusively "pure American stock"—proof that keeping American blood pure was meaningless.⁵⁸

But here, apparently, he had been thinking of only European immigrants; for in his second column on Asiatic immigration his attitude was quite different. Although writing without any trace of an attitude of superiority, he held that Asiatic and European-American stocks had not proved assimilable, that the attempt to

mix them in the Far East had produced "unfortunate results" in nine cases out of ten, and that Orientals objected to the mixing as much as did Occidentals. In the Far East the mixed Eurasians were looked down upon and despised by everyone who lived there. Thus there was some justification for the exclusion of Orientals by the United States although some of the arguments used were not valid and were offensive to such people as the Japanese.⁵⁹ In the 1932 campaign, he held again to his moderate position, approving "restricted immigration" to protect American labor; but he took pains at the same time to berate the abuses which many immigrants were forced to suffer after entering the United States.⁶⁰

When the Spanish Civil War and Nazi persecution produced a refugee problem of considerable proportions in Europe, Roosevelt's solution for it was very much along the lines just described, except that he wanted other nations in the world to cooperate in carrying out the solution. He wanted all possible nations to 1) admit a moderate number of selected immigrants; and 2) disperse them or mix them in a manner that would not produce troublesome pockets of national minorities.

In addition, Roosevelt by then also wanted national governments to develop what might be called resettlement programs to take care of the financial, social, and economic aspects of the problem. And here he called upon his fabulous geographical knowledge to suggest possible resettlement locations. In 1938, for example, he instructed a subordinate in Venezuela to make informal inquiries regarding the possibility of the Venezuelan government admitting immigrants to a large almost unexplored plateau there. Crowded areas of Europe and even of the United States might be relieved by constant streams of emigrants to such unoccupied parts of the world, he suggested. The Spanish Civil War had produced several thousand of the best type of people anxious to leave home and there were thousands more in other European countries. He favored selective immigration into such areas, he wrote, and a thorough mixing of nationalities to prevent German, Italian, Jewish, and other such colonies from developing and which neither Venezuela nor any other country would want. He suggested also that the immigrants be required to pay enough for settling on the land to keep Venezuela out of debt for it and that all efforts be made to make the settlements self-sustaining. Communications could be supplied gradually.⁶¹ A few months later he wrote Mussolini a similar letter suggesting the use of a plateau region in Ethiopia and Kenya for Jewish

colonization.⁶² Meanwhile he took steps to organize an Intergovernmental Committee of 32 nations to work on the problem.⁶³

Like most of the leading statesmen of the day, Roosevelt gave much thought to the problem of a Jewish homeland. As of January 1939 he believed Palestine was not physically suitable for resettling the Jews even if the political difficulties were removed; nor were such proposed sites as Lower California, Madagascar, or the Guianas much better. His own proposal was that Angola (Portuguese West Africa) would be the best place. The Great Powers could buy Angola from Portugal, he thought, and then move at least the young and marriageable Jews into it; and he thought the British, Portugal's old and trusted allies, should be urged to do the negotiating for the territory.

With the outbreak of war in Europe in September 1939 Roosevelt began to envision a refugee resettlement problem of enormous proportions and he suggested to Hull that the State Department begin studying and discussing it with religious agencies here and abroad, such as the Vatican.⁶⁴ Both publicly and privately the President declared that while only about four hundred thousand people were then in dire need, after the war ten or twenty million might need help. Then the problem would be global and many refugees would have to be given an entirely new start in life. "Horried humanitarianism, empty resolutions, golden rhetoric and pious words," he told the officers of the Intergovernmental Committee, would not be enough. Everything then being done was being done too unscientifically and on too small a scale. Surveys should be begun immediately, he thought, of millions of square miles in Africa, the Americas, and Australia for possible resettlement sites. Information regarding soils, crops, irrigation, and health conditions needed to be gathered and plans made for financing new settlements and making them self-sustaining.⁶⁵

The whole business should be envisioned on a grandiose scale, he thought, if people's imaginations were to be captured and financial support acquired. This could best be done, he suggested, by thinking in terms of one or two mammoth settlements measured in terms of a million square miles and millions of settlers who could be organized into a self-contained civilization, with some people on farms, some in small villages, and some in business and public works. About half the cost, he estimated, would have to be provided by gifts from individual governments. He talked also with Secretary of the Interior Ickes about the possibility of settling 10,000 people in Alaska, half of whom would be foreign refugees.

Again he suggested mixing the nationalities and taking care that not more than ten per cent were Jews in order to prevent the development of minority groups that would resist the process of Americanization.⁶⁶ Thereafter whenever he brought up the subject, he stressed substantially the same ideas.⁶⁷

Although Roosevelt failed to comment, so far as this writer is aware, on the kinds of programs he wanted developed to promote education, better housing, better health, and many other reforms on his list, his comments on international trade, the development of natural resources, and refugee resettlement suggest that his global New Deal was fashioned on a mammoth and spectacular scale.

Roosevelt also commented from time to time on the guiding principles he thought would be useful in achieving his proposed reforms, and although his comments have left us with only fragments of his ideas, the general pattern of his approach is visible.

The first point to notice is that Roosevelt seemed to believe that the primary responsibility for improving the well-being of the world's peoples rested with the peoples themselves and their own national governments, or in the case of dependencies, it rested with the mother country or trustee. Roosevelt had little patience with governments unresponsive to the needs of their people and it was his great hope that after the war governments everywhere would act vigorously to solve internal economic and social problems and to raise standards of living.

He seemed to have no fear of or even objection to the spread of the milder types of socialism and seemed to feel that in many countries socialism would be the best thing. In 1934 he praised slum clearance programs that Germany, Austria, and England had undertaken, and regarding the cry that such action was socialistic he answered that socialism "has probably done more to prevent Communism and rioting and revolution than anything else in the last four or five years." And by way of example he noted that Vienna had done a "grand job" of practically clearing out her slums.⁶⁸ According to Mrs. Roosevelt, the President felt that the world was going to be considerably more socialistic after the war and he indicated no regrets about it.⁶⁹ Near the end of the war he told the Conference of the International Labor Organization that the promotion of the well-being of their peoples must be the aim of national governments after the war or there was no hope for the success of the great international goals.⁷⁰

But as a convinced believer in the interdependence of all nations

Roosevelt was aware that there were limits to what each national state could do for herself. National efforts would have to be supplemented, therefore, by international cooperative efforts at many points. Although when first in the White House the President gave priority to national efforts to achieve recovery in the United States, Welles insists that one of his general aims was to effect economic cooperation with all the leading powers of Europe, including Russia⁷¹—a project, it might be added, that was not forbidden by isolationist tradition as was any project of political cooperation. In one of his many joint statements with foreign leaders before the London Economic Conference the President declared that although the solution to the problem of unemployment was chiefly a national one, the efforts of national governments could not attain their best results unless “they can be made a part of a synchronized international program.”⁷² Eight years later, before going to the Atlantic Conference, the President reiterated the same general view, declaring to Welles that he was greatly impressed with the need to find cooperative methods to raise standards of living and arguing that the “have” nations must be convinced that it would be to their own interests to help the “have nots.”⁷³

It was during the war that Roosevelt did most of his talking and virtually all his acting regarding such cooperation, however. When early in 1942 the Anglo-American Caribbean Commission was established it was to Roosevelt an illustration of the type of pooling of efforts that needed to be made to promote economic and social justice abroad.⁷⁴ Thereafter conferences to promote such cooperation proliferated, and Roosevelt was proud of them. In 1943 he told the United Nations Conference on Food and Agriculture that one of the reasons there had never been enough food for everyone in the past was that the nations of the world had never united to do anything about it, but with international collaboration he hoped the problem could be solved.⁷⁵

When celebrating the anniversary of the Atlantic Charter the same year he emphasized that the Charter called for world-wide collaboration to achieve improved labor standards and economic and social security; and he pointed to the United States Social Security Act as an example of the kind of thing that might be achieved everywhere.⁷⁶ In a toast to the President of Haiti the same year the President promised that the United States wanted to help Haiti become self-supporting in food and that in the “new civilization that we are coming to” such cooperation among

nations would be helpful to all.⁷⁷ A few weeks before his death the President touched again on the same theme, telling Congress in support of a renewal of the Reciprocal Trade Act that with the defeat of the Axis, the chief advocates of economic warfare would be out of the way and the world would have a new chance to substitute the principle of cooperation for warfare in economic relations and he hoped the Congress would make the most of the opportunity.⁷⁸

Another guiding principle essential to the achievement of his global New Deal, thought Roosevelt, was the necessity for much planning. The task of international collaboration to improve labor standards, social security, employment, and to provide adequate food, clothing, and housing, and a generally more abundant life for millions of people around the world, he said in 1941, required more than temporary remedies. Planning was required, and surveys should be begun immediately. The planning must, moreover, be designed to achieve permanent cures, and to help establish a "sounder world life."⁷⁹ It ought to be possible to harness science for peace as it had been harnessed for war, he thought, and late in 1944 he requested Dr. Vannevar Bush of the Office of Scientific Research and Development to do some planning on this score and let him know how the doctor thought the wartime experience in harnessing science might be used after the war on such problems as disease in order to produce a more abundant life for everyone.⁸⁰

When at Yalta the President discussed his dreams of developing the resources of Iran, he expressed the hope that the coming world organization would make world-wide surveys about the problems of developing such areas. It was this kind of vision, reported Stettinius, that prompted the State Department to insist on an Economic and Social Council in the United Nations.⁸¹ When reporting to Congress on the Yalta Conference, Roosevelt went out of his way to defend and advocate the need for planning in international relations. Despite the repugnance of the idea to many people, he declared, planning in domestic affairs had brought "many benefits to the human race." It had made possible the reclamation of desert areas, the development of river valleys, and housing programs. And, he added, "the same will be true in relations among nations."⁸²

Although the evidence is extremely fragmentary, it seems quite likely that Roosevelt would have been favorable to both foreign aid and technical assistance programs to further his global New

Deal. During the thirties he showed interest in the beginnings of a technical aid program in Latin America, supporting the projected Pan-American Highway project from 1933 on, and favoring such projects as aid to improve Nicaragua's agriculture, improve the channel in the San Juan River, and provide a director for Nicaragua's military academy. At the same time he also revealed interest in helping Liberia get back on her feet and he suggested that the United States might be able to send her technical experts in the fields of agriculture, public health, and geology.⁸³

His lend-lease program, almost entirely his own idea, was eloquent testimony of his belief in the interdependence of nations and the necessity of aiding one another. At Casablanca when enchanting the Sultan of Morocco with his vision of developing North Africa's resources, the President suggested that engineers and scientists could be trained for the job by some kind of reciprocal education program with some leading American universities.⁸⁴ As the war neared its end the President also made it clear that he favored the use of at least technical assistance during the period of reconstruction to restore war-damaged highways, bridges, and communications.⁸⁵ We know also that Roosevelt was in favor of helping the Soviet Union get into the shipping business and expand her foreign trade; and at both Teheran and Yalta he offered to sell Stalin some of the cargo ships that would be surplus after the war. He told Stalin that while the British never sold anything without interest, he (Roosevelt) had some new ideas regarding surplus property disposal; and he proceeded to describe a method of selling the ships to Stalin that would make the sale equivalent to a gift.⁸⁶ Henry Morgenthau has testified also that Roosevelt planned to keep the lend-lease programs going after the war to lay the foundations for world recovery, and that had that been done, the Marshall Plan and other similar programs might not have been necessary.⁸⁷

Here we have only hints as to what Roosevelt might have done in the postwar world to achieve his global New Deal, but they are enough to justify guesses at the direction his foreign policy might have taken.

It is also quite likely that Roosevelt was in favor of what might be called pilot plant projects around the world to make economic and social experiments. He made frequent references to the Philippines as an example of how peoples could be moved from colonialism to independence. Welles has testified that the President also believed that a Jewish Homeland in Palestine could

become an outstanding demonstration area to all surrounding Arabs of what could be done in the way of economic and social development in the Middle East. He hoped it might even lead to a federation of Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, and Trans-Jordan, within which there would be no currency or trade barriers and within which cooperative projects for irrigation, power development, and communications could be carried on. The obvious benefits, he hoped, would persuade the Arabs to subordinate their racial antagonisms.⁸⁸

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It was Iran, however, that Roosevelt most wanted to see used as a pilot project or demonstration area. It was an ideal place, he thought, to show what an unselfish American program could do to raise living standards. During the war he sent economic and financial advisors there to study the problem, persuaded Britain and the Soviet Union at Teheran to cooperate after the war in providing economic assistance, and then sent Patrick Hurley there to make a special study of the situation. In a memorandum to Hull on the matter early in 1944 he declared that ninety-nine per cent of the people in Iran were in bondage to the other one per cent, and they were able neither to own their own land nor to keep what they produced so as to convert it into money or property. No more difficult place for a social and economic experiment could be found, he wrote Hull, and he was thrilled at the idea of showing what could be done there. He thought the biggest problem would be that of getting the right kind of American experts "who would be loyal to their ideals," not fight among themselves, and be financially honest. If the development program succeeded in its first five or ten years, he concluded, it would become permanent and would cost the American tax payer very little.⁸⁹ A few weeks later he wrote Hurley almost the same words, repeating that he was "thrilled with the idea. . . ."⁹⁰

At Yalta Roosevelt pursued the matter further, declaring Iran was a good example of the type of economic problem that might confront the world if trade was to be expanded. Iran had no purchasing power, he went on, and such countries must be helped to develop it if other countries expected to trade with them. He reminded his audience that before the Turks came to Iran the country had had plenty of timber and water, and a reasonable prosperity, but now there was nothing but poverty. Thus it was an ideal area for demonstration.⁹¹

Another guiding principle Roosevelt seemed to apply in his thinking about a global New Deal was that there must be in it

only a relatively small amount of altruism, but no exploitation, and a great deal of reciprocity. Here again the evidence is only fragmentary, but what evidence there is supports the above statement.

His opposition to economic exploitation of one people by another was long standing. Even in the years of his youthful imperialism he had opposed dollar diplomacy and the protection of merchants who took advantage of backward peoples. The era of exploitation was over, he said many times during his presidency; and one day in 1943 he told the press that when the President of Bolivia had visited him recently he apologized for the past behavior of some Americans who in the twenties had forced loans on Bolivia at exorbitant interest rates and extortionate commission fees.⁹² When in 1944 he sent Donald M. Nelson to China to find out what needed to be done to shore up that wartorn country's economy the President told Nelson he was "particularly anxious that the Generalissimo and his advisers in the economic field understand that we are not going in there as exploiters and yet I feel sure we have a proper function, to help put China on its feet economically."⁹³

To prevent exploitation he repeatedly urged the leaders of backward areas to take care to maintain control over their resources and development projects, as in his advice to Arab leaders to maintain control over their oil resources and to get enough revenue from them to develop their countries. He was especially anxious to promote domestic ownership and control in Latin America. Early in 1940 he gave the press a long background sermon on the resentment many Latin Americans felt regarding the foreign ownership of their utilities, farms, and business firms. President Vargas of Brazil had recently asked Roosevelt how the people of the United States would like such foreign ownership and Roosevelt answered that such a situation in the United States would provoke a revolution. This situation in Latin America, the President went on, tended to give Latin Americans an inferiority complex and he favored a method of financing development there that would overcome such an attitude. He proposed, he said, a financing method that would enable the Latin Americans themselves to own the enterprises after twenty-five or thirty years; and he thought a good place to try the scheme would be with those many British-owned enterprises that Britain would be forced to sell during the war. The United States might buy them and then refinance them so as to achieve eventual local ownership in Latin America.⁹⁴

In 1944 Roosevelt came back to the subject while considering a policy regarding Latin American airline investments. He wrote Hull that while he was not opposed to United States investments in or technical aid to Latin American airlines, "I do not believe that it makes for good relations for American capital to dominate or control . . ." lines there. He much preferred that the lines be owned at least largely by Latin Americans with United States investors in a minority.⁹⁵

Evidence that Roosevelt's postwar New Deal would contain some altruism is only circumstantial, but the character of his domestic New Deal and of his aid to the Allies during the war suggests that he probably intended some of his postwar development programs to have an altruistic basis. Since he intended keeping the lend-lease program going during the period of reconstruction after the war, there is no evidence known to this writer that Roosevelt ever seriously expected more than a nominal repayment for lend-lease aid. His proposal to sell Russia surplus merchant vessels in a way that virtually made the ships gifts indicated a willingness to use the "give away" method of promoting development. His comment that his ideas on helping Iran would not cost the American tax-payer much money suggests that they would, however, cost the American tax-payer some money. But just as the altruism of his domestic New Deal was greatly exaggerated by his critics, so the degree of altruism intended in his global New Deal might easily be exaggerated. It seems safe to conclude that outright gifts to raise standards of living elsewhere were to play a relatively small part in Roosevelt's plans.

Reciprocity was the principle on which he seemed to depend the most. His major means of expanding trade was to be by reciprocal agreements. He wanted all nations to have a balanced trade with favorable and unfavorable balances of trade made things of the past. He approved the most-favored-nation principle in trade agreements but wanted even the United States to apply it only with other states which granted us the same privilege. Thus in the thirties when Germany and Australia discriminated against our products, the most-favored-nation clause in treaties with them was canceled.⁹⁶ In 1944 he wrote Hull that regarding post-war foreign trade "while we shall not take advantage of any country, we will see that American industry has its fair share in world markets."⁹⁷

He also seemed to believe that the development of backward areas such as those in North Africa and the Middle East and

Latin America could be carried out in a way that could be called an investment rather than a "give away." As already noted, he wanted new enterprises in Latin America developed in a way that would provide eventual local ownership, but they would not be gifts. American investors were entitled to a reasonable profit on their development loans or investments, he thought, even in Arabian oil. Roosevelt simply opposed what might be called exploitation in the unfair sense of that word and he opposed the use of foreign investments to produce economic colonialism. After his return from Teheran he wrote his old schoolmaster, Endicott Peabody, about the poverty, disease, and barrenness of North Africa and the Middle East and then added, "But we can help those countries in the days to come—and with proper management get our money back. . . ." ⁹⁸ Thus his global New Deal was to produce mutual benefits, and not necessarily only indirect ones.

A final guiding principle in Roosevelt's thinking regarding a global New Deal was that international machinery for economic and cultural cooperation would be necessary to produce any appreciable results. He wanted a variety of autonomous international agencies and organizations—"a workable kit of tools" in his words—through which action could be taken. He had always been an ardent supporter of the economic and social work of the League of Nations and favored its expansion; but he did not think, apparently, that the League had possessed sufficiently effective agencies for these matters, and on one occasion he went so far as to say that the League had no machinery for such things as international food and finance. ⁹⁹ He had long lent his support also to some of the existing autonomous organizations for economic and social problems. He boasted one day in 1934 that the United States had not even been a member of the International Institute of Agriculture until 1933 when he had put through a \$50,000 appropriation for it, and he asserted that his administration was interested in all such things. ¹⁰⁰ About the same time he had also approved Labor Secretary Frances Perkins' efforts to get the United States into the International Labor Organization, although his knowledge about the organization was only very general. ¹⁰¹

It was not until about 1943, however, that Roosevelt began to give extensive consideration to the kind of machinery needed for a global New Deal. During that year he devoted much attention to the problem of getting nations to cooperate on such matters. At that time he favored the holding of a variety of functional conferences, each dealing with a different problem and each in a

different part of the world. A conference on food and agriculture might be held in the United States, he thought, one in London on finance, one in Moscow on oil resources, one in Rio de Janeiro on the distribution of raw materials, and so on. Then once each conference agreed on postwar policies, on objectives, it could decide on the best kind of machinery needed to achieve those objectives.¹⁰² To get action started he personally initiated the 1943 conference on food and agriculture in Hot Springs, Virginia, and others followed from which the specialized agencies of the United Nations developed.¹⁰³

Roosevelt hoped that the new machinery for economic and social collaboration would be as successful as had the wartime Combined Boards for food, raw materials, production, and resources. They had provided a "strikingly successful example" of economic cooperation among the Allies during the war, he declared, and there was no question but that "the experience gained by them will be very valuable to any work that we have done by the United Nations. . . ." The Combined Boards had proved that former rivals could work together on very difficult problems.¹⁰⁴

When asking Congress to approve the Bretton Woods agreements the President pointed to organizations such as the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development as the "cornerstones" for postwar economic cooperation. And it was through such organizations, he implied, that the national states might get "more goods produced, more jobs, more trade, and a higher standard of living for us all."¹⁰⁵ About two weeks before his death he indicated to Congress that he was reasonably satisfied with the progress made in creating machinery needed for a global New Deal. Agreements had already been reached in the fields of food and agriculture, aviation, finance and monetary problems, and others were on the way concerning trade and other matters. When all is done, he asserted, the world would have a reasonably good "workable kit of tools" for international collaboration and would then be equipped to deal with social and economic problems as well as with the problem of security.¹⁰⁶

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A COLLECTIVE SECURITY SYSTEM

✓ **F**RANKLIN ROOSEVELT'S final proposal for a new world order was that the whole new system of international relations must be held together by a collective security system under the guardianship of the five Big Powers.

> We have already noticed that Roosevelt originally looked upon the plan for a League of Nations as a utopian dream and that he was not converted to either the League or to the principle of collective security until the latter part of 1919. Once converted, however, Roosevelt favored the principle of collective security—although not always the League—for the rest of his life; and he spent no little time during the following twenty-five years in a search for the proper vehicles and methods to apply the principle.

Characteristically, Roosevelt never made any detailed analysis of the principle of collective security. His great interest was in achieving the chief objective of the principle: cooperative action by states for the maintenance of peace. Despite the interest he showed occasionally in the details of international organization, especially from the beginning of 1943 and on, he seems to have had few deep convictions regarding the details or structure of the machinery of collective security. He was willing to accept almost anything in the way of machinery so long as it produced cooperative action; and during the thirties when he felt his objective could not be achieved through the League, he seemed willing to work without any machinery at all other than the traditional facilities of conference and diplomacy.

In his search for collective security vehicles and methods Roose-

vult began by accepting the League of Nations. Once converted to the League and the principle of collective security in 1919 Roosevelt immediately became a vigorous advocate of both, battling strenuously throughout his ill-fated vice-presidential campaign of 1920 during which he made more than 800 speeches in support of the League. The burden of his argument at that time was that some kind of international organization was needed to give nations stability internally and to preserve the peace, and while the Covenant of the League might have many flaws (he did not say what they were), it was better than nothing. It could be improved with experience, he argued, and he felt also that there was no reason for Americans to be afraid of membership in the League.

As was characteristic of Roosevelt, his emphasis in 1919-20 was on the general objective of the Covenant, not its details, and he was quite willing to accept whatever reservations or strings senators or anyone else wished to attach to the Covenant in order to move toward the general objective. He was quite willing, for example, to see the Covenant amended to give recognition to the Monroe Doctrine and to assure that the United States would not be called upon to interfere in European questions unless it was absolutely necessary to prevent another world war. He admitted freely that the Covenant contained many details to which he objected. But the Constitution of the United States had also been defective, he declared, and like the Constitution, which had been amended eighteen times, the Covenant also could be changed as time and experience dictated. At least it was more than a mere treaty of peace; it was an agreement "stronger than the Hague Conventions"; it was a practical solution to a practical problem, and that was about all one could ask.¹

Much of his effort in the League debate was aimed at calming the fears of those Americans who saw in the League a threat to United States sovereignty. In 1919 he had said the grand objective of peace was worth giving "up something, even if it be a sovereign right of our nation. . . ."² But in 1920 when the issue had become more partisan, he preferred to give assurances that the League would in no way impair the nation's sovereignty. "No supernational, binding us to the decisions of its tribunals, is suggested," he declared. All that was being created was machinery through which America's moral force and power could be thrown into the scales for peace; and if anyone feared that the Covenant or the League conflicted in any way with the American form of govern-

ment "it will be simple to declare to him and to the other nations that the Constitution of the United States is in every way supreme."³ Thus the League was essentially a convenience, a tool being provided for the voluntary use of sovereign states and it was by no means an end in itself.

It is quite clear that Roosevelt was among those who believed the League could not possibly succeed without the membership of the United States. The disinterestedness, the moral influence, and the power of the United States were so necessary to make the machinery work properly that without her the League would eventually degenerate into a tool of the British and French and thus a tool in the European game of power politics, a game in which the League might actually become a new Holy Alliance, as he called it, hostile to the United States.⁴

United States membership in the League would be advantageous not only to the League; membership would offer the United States the opportunity for world leadership, thought Roosevelt, to which she had so recently risen and which she should continue to assert for both her own sake and the sake of the world. Roosevelt's belief in the desirability of United States leadership of the world was then a deep conviction and he saw the League as an admirable vehicle through which that leadership might be exercised. In the 1920 campaign he compared the League to a fire department organized by neighbors. A chief was still needed, however, and the United States should be that chief.⁵

When it became clear in the early twenties that there was almost no possibility of the United States joining the League, Roosevelt went so far as to propose that the League be scrapped and a new organization acceptable to the United States be created in its place. This was the essence of the peace plan he drafted in 1923-24 under the inspiration of the Bok peace plan contest and of his wife's desire to keep alive his interest in public affairs while recovering from his attack of polio.⁶

"No plan to preserve world peace can be successful without the participation of the United States," he said in that proposal.⁷ He favored, therefore, an organization much like the League, but modified so as to be acceptable to the Senate; he would abolish the much discussed Article X of the Covenant so there would be no risk of the United States becoming involved in purely regional disputes abroad and include provisions giving assurance that foreigners could not compel the United States to use her armed forces without her own consent. His "Society of Nations" would

operate primarily through an Assembly and an Executive Committee, eliminating what he thought was a "dual system" in the League wherein the Council was essentially an upper house. The Executive Committee was to sit almost continuously and act as an executive to carry out the policies of the Assembly. When the Assembly was not in session, however, the Committee had the Assembly's powers.

His Executive Committee was composed of eleven members with the United States, Britain, France, Italy, and Japan having permanent seats for the first ten years. What was to happen after ten years he did not say. The remaining six members were to be elected by the Assembly except that semi-independent states such as the British dominions were ineligible for seats on the Committee. In place of the unanimity rule in the League he favored both the Assembly and the Executive Committee requiring only a two-thirds vote for substantive questions and a simple majority vote for procedural questions.

Definite assurances were given that the constitutional law of each member nation was superior to the acts of the Society. While there were ambiguous provisions suggesting the use of force in extreme emergency for the settlement of disputes, nothing stronger than economic sanctions was seriously envisioned. Emphasis was placed on the pacific procedures of inquiry, arbitration, and judicial settlement. In no case did the Society have power to do more than *recommend* national action—a word that Roosevelt believed made action less obligatory and more acceptable to the Senate than the Covenant's phrase authorizing the League to "advise upon the means" of handling aggression.

In view of the way the League developed, Roosevelt's proposal was not as different from the Covenant as it probably seemed to him it was in 1923-24. It contained one novel provision, however. Roosevelt argued that "a survey of history will prove that most recent wars have been commenced on the pretext at least of some attack on so-called national honor. The 'diplomatic indiscretion' prior to the Franco-Prussian War, the sinking of the Maine before the Spanish War, the murder of Sarajevo, the recent Corfu episode, are but examples." Thus the Executive Committee was given the task of figuring out a way of eliminating such insults to national honor; and meanwhile, revenge should be had not directly against the offending state, but through the new Society. It would be the Society that would seek redress, apology, or compensation from the offender while the offended state would be

obliged to hold her temper for 30, 60, or 90 days while the Society acted.⁸

The significance of this proposal was that it showed Roosevelt willing to kill the League to get an organization acceptable to the United States and he was willing to make it as weak as necessary to appease American opinion. A step at a time was quite agreeable to him provided it was in the right direction, and he was willing to sacrifice any details that were obstacles to going toward the general objective.

In 1925 he again expressed this general attitude by reiterating his earlier desire for United States membership in the League. "I don't care how many restrictions or qualifications are put upon our [participation]," he declared. "In other words, I seek an end and do not care a rap about the methods of procedure." At the same time he deplored Lord Robert Cecil's proposal for a League air force because he feared it would further frighten American public opinion.⁹

Since it lacked machinery, the Briand-Kellogg Pact was not a useful substitute for the League in Roosevelt's eyes. The Pact was nothing more than a "glorified" declaration which while harmless was unreal, for "war cannot be outlawed by resolution alone." There had been treaties of peace and friendship for two thousand years, he asserted, and all had failed because they lacked machinery to eliminate "the causes of disputes before they reach grave proportions." Thus the Pact of Paris failed in two respects: (1) it tended to create a false belief that it was a great step forward; and (2) it contributed nothing toward the settlement of international disputes.¹⁰

We noted earlier that by the end of the twenties Roosevelt retained little respect for the League and had lost all hope of the United States joining it. But this did not mean necessarily that he had lost faith in the principle of collective security. Although the League had proved itself a weak and inadequate vehicle, the spirit that had produced it was still valid in his eyes, and in 1930 he wrote Viscount Robert Cecil that he thought it very important that the *spirit* of the League be kept alive.¹¹ Meanwhile he continued hoping that the United States would join the World Court.¹²

All this supports the contention that when in the pre-convention campaign of 1932 Roosevelt made his so-called repudiation of the League to mollify William Randolph Hearst, he expressed a view fairly close to his real feeling. It is worth noting, however,

that while in that speech of repudiation Roosevelt gave assurances that he had no thought of taking the United States into the League, he did not denounce the principle of collective security and he insisted that the main reason the League had degenerated to the point where it was not worth joining was probably due to the fact that the United States had not joined it. Had the United States joined, he asserted, the League might have remained the kind of organization conceived by Wilson. Instead it had become a forum for European problems and United States membership would no longer serve a useful purpose. When accused of having in this "repudiation" deserted both his Wilsonian ideals and his internationalist friends Roosevelt retorted privately that his loyalty to Wilson's ideals was as strong as ever and all he had repudiated was the League as a means of attaining them. Those who thought the twelve-year-old League was still "the best modern vehicle" to reach their ideal needed, in his view, to do some more thinking.¹³

The contention that Roosevelt's 1932 "repudiation" did not necessarily mean loss of faith in the principle of collective security is borne out by his behavior during his first year in the White House. In three instances in 1933 he approved United States participation in or cooperation with League bodies involved in security problems. He approved United States participation in the Advisory Committee handling the Leticia border conflict between Colombia and Peru, and in a commission on the Far East. He also urged the Latin American republics to give the League a chance to settle the Bolivian-Paraguayan dispute over the Gran Chaco.¹⁴ On one occasion during his first year or two in the White House the President also told Secretary of State Hull that he was turning over in his mind the idea of appointing an ambassador to the League but feared it would cause too much of a row in the United States.¹⁵

Early in 1933 the President made one other gesture toward cooperation with the League. When it appeared that the Disarmament Conference in Geneva was breaking down, that Germany had intentions of rearming in violation of the Versailles Treaty, and that both Britain and France as well as other nations were afraid to apply sanctions if trouble arose so long as the United States insisted on her right to trade with a condemned state, Roosevelt gave public assurances that the United States was willing to engage in at least limited cooperation to restrain aggressors. The United States was not only willing to consult with other

nations in case of a threat to the peace, he promised; but she was also willing, if sanctions were applied by others, to waive her freedom of the seas and neutral trading rights if she agreed the sanctions were justified.¹⁶

This willingness to consult with other nations in the face of a threat to the peace was nothing new, Roosevelt assured the press. Both major party platforms had endorsed the idea; mere consultation would commit the United States to nothing; but some machinery for consultation was needed and he strongly favored, he said, the proposal Britain's Prime Minister MacDonald had presented to the Disarmament Conference providing machinery to determine the aggressor and decide on cooperative action against her. It would be a means of implementing the Briand-Kellogg Pact (the League was not mentioned) and who could be against that!¹⁷

It would be wrong to attach much importance to Roosevelt's willingness to cooperate with the League, however. By the time he entered the White House he seems to have given up all hope of getting the United States to join the League and his lack of respect for the organization was then so great that his efforts to cooperate with it were both spasmodic and half-hearted.

Whatever he did during his Presidency in behalf of collective security was done largely, therefore, outside the League. From about the end of 1933 to mid-1937 he seemed to lack interest in doing anything at all collectively. After the failure of both the London Economic Conference and the Disarmament Conference, Roosevelt seemed so disgusted with Europe that he concluded the best way for the United States to help the world was by setting her own house in order, by using her influence independently whenever an opportunity arose, and by preaching and preaching again in favor of disarmament, the liberalization of international trade, and the pacific settlement of disputes. Collective action with the degenerate powers of Europe seemed useless.¹⁸ In the application of the embargoes of the Neutrality Act to the Italo-Ethiopian War and the Spanish Civil War it is true that Roosevelt kept one eye on what the League was doing, but those actions were taken independently to a large extent.

It is true that during these years 1933-37 Roosevelt also tried to get the United States into the World Court; and when in 1935 the Senate defeated that effort, the President privately raised questions as to the reception the anti-court senators would receive when they arrived in Heaven.¹⁹ But joining the Court was not

looked upon as quite the same thing as joining the League. All presidents since Wilson had favored it; and it was hardly a sign that Roosevelt's interest in the League had quickened.

Roosevelt's inauguration in 1936 of the inter-American collective security system is a good example of his effort to promote collective security outside the League. The 1936 special Inter-American Conference at Buenos Aires was inspired largely by Roosevelt's desire to capitalize on the new spirit of good neighborliness already visible in the hemisphere; and while we must take care to note that Roosevelt's major objective in that conference was to organize a defensive hemispheric alliance against the dictators abroad, an important secondary objective was to begin steps toward the development of machinery to handle disputes, such as the Chaco War, within the hemisphere.²⁰ Although the President characteristically left the development of the system and its organization in later conferences to Hull and Welles, he supplied the inspiration and general objective.

There is some evidence that in his search for collective security vehicles and methods Roosevelt early in 1937 again considered the idea of a new international organization which, unlike his 1923-24 proposal, would not entirely replace the League, but would have the effect of remolding the League into a different kind of organization. At that time, after the League's failure in the Italo-Ethiopian dispute, much thought was being given to a reform of the League. All we know of Roosevelt's thinking on the matter, unfortunately, is in some notes Prime Minister Mackenzie King of Canada made of a conversation with Roosevelt in March 1937 and that are published among the President's *Personal Letters*. The notes were made the following morning, were read to Roosevelt that morning, and according to the Prime Minister they reveal "ideas we explored together in conversation the evening before, and which we thought might be deserving of further consideration."²¹ The implication is that the notes represent agreed views of both men, but it is impossible to determine whether or not Roosevelt agreed with all of them or even took any of them seriously. When we recall the amazing receptivity of Roosevelt's mind to ideas it is easy to believe that he was at least willing to consider the ideas in the notes. The editor of the notes declared that they showed the President's "trend of thought in connection with a possible world peace meeting." But they must be read with caution.

The notes assert that the root of the world's troubles at that

time was a lack of social justice, that all nations should cooperate to do something about it, that an international conference ought to be called to take action, and permanent machinery should then be set up, probably at Geneva, to handle the problem. The job of this new organization would be to consider the problems causing social and economic unrest in the world, investigate alleged injustices (i.e., complaints by Germany and Italy), and by ascertaining the facts focus world opinion on the situation.

This was the only kind of collective security that could be successful, the notes declare. Collective security based on force, armaments, and economic sanctions, as was then the principle prevailing in the League, was utterly futile and so risky that many nations would not cooperate through fear of being drawn into war. The only alternative to collective security by force was collective security based on reason and world opinion. "Collective security of nations lies in the sense of social wrongs, and the power of an organized public opinion founded upon same," said King's memorandum. "Most social evils are more effectively prevented and cured by public opinion than penalty," for world opinion is a powerful factor.

A collective security system based on investigation and a righting of economic and social wrongs, rather than on force, would automatically promote disarmament since nations have armaments primarily because reliance is still on force, the notes assert. A collective security organization designed to promote social justice would also in time get the League back on the path Wilson intended it should be on, with reliance upon public opinion rather than on economic and military sanctions. Then when the League was reoriented away from the concept of force, the two organizations probably would merge into a single world organization with universal membership.

The immediate task, if war is to be prevented, is to get nations once again around the conference table, the notes went on. If both members and non-members of the League can again be brought into an international conference, "the path to peace will at last open out before all."

It is possible only to guess at how close the above comes to Roosevelt's real views. At the time of the reported conversation, March 1937, the President was in the thick of his battle with the Supreme Court and his major charge against the Court was that it forbade the national government power to act positively to promote social justice. Thus it is justifiable to assume that the

problem of social justice was then much on his mind. But idealist that he was, Roosevelt never before or after this conversation so deprecated the use of force and relied so heavily on the exposure of facts, on reason, and world opinion, as much as he esteemed those elements. In this respect the notes are incredible; and if the President expressed himself in that vein, the conclusion is warranted that he was engaging in his old pastime of dreaming dreams.

Roosevelt's most famous effort to find an effective way to apply the principle of collective security during the thirties, however, was his quarantine proposal made in October 1937, about six months after the above conversation with Mackenzie King. Ever since Japan's attack on China in July 1937 Roosevelt had been casting about for a way not only to stop Japan's aggression but also to warn those planning future aggression that their crime would not pay. Immediately after Japan's assault on China the President had told Welles that he had in mind a plan of imposing a trade embargo on Japan enforced by the United States and British navies. Japan was so dependent economically on the United States and Britain, he felt, that this pressure would bring her to her knees.²² In September he told Ickes that in order to prevent such future incidents as Japan's attack on China he was thinking of suggesting to all peace-loving nations that if any nation invaded or threatened another in the future, all the rest would isolate the aggressor by cutting off all trade and denying her raw materials.²³

Three weeks later this idea of the collective application of economic sanctions to Japan was dramatized by Roosevelt in his famous Quarantine Speech, although he did not say publicly that it was economic sanctions that he had in mind. All he was willing to indicate in that speech was that war is a contagion that has a tendency to infect even remote states; that in any contagious epidemic the community joins in a quarantine of the patients in order to protect the health of the whole community; and while the United States was determined to stay out of war, it was to her interest to give thought to how to protect herself against contagion. Quarantining the aggressors was merely an obvious implication and the idea that the quarantine should take the form of an economic blockade was not even suggested.²⁴

As is well known, the storm of protest aroused by this speech caused the President to retreat publicly, if not privately, and caused him also to instruct Norman Davis, his delegate to the

Brussels Conference called as a result of the speech, to devote his time largely to mobilizing public opinion and the moral force of the world against Japan.²⁵ But privately the President continued to favor economic sanctions against Japan and felt that if he could get the cooperation of other nations, the sanctions would be successful. He also told the cabinet that if economic sanctions were applied by enough states, he would also move the Army to the West Coast for show although he would not expect to have to use it.²⁶

It is worth noting that in the quarantine affair the President appears to have given no thought to the League and was seeking a way to apply the principle of collective security through the traditional diplomatic mediums of negotiation and international conference. Sumner Welles has suggested that by this period Roosevelt had given up all hope of effective international organization for the immediate future. Welles declared that "in the many talks I had with the President between 1936 and the summer of 1941 on the subject, he was never once willing to agree that an organization composed of all non-totalitarian countries was as yet feasible. Even less did he believe that the United States should or would attempt to participate in its construction"; and it was not until after Pearl Harbor that he changed his mind and began to see the renewed possibility of international organization.²⁷

What the President was veering toward by this time was a Big Power trusteeship or guardianship for the peace of the world. We noted earlier Welles testimony that during the thirties Roosevelt lost patience with most of the small powers outside the Western Hemisphere because they were spending money for armaments that he thought were useless and even harmful to them and everyone else. He believed the small nations should devote their national resources to education and welfare programs and that they ought to be satisfied to entrust their security to English speaking powers, particularly to the United States and Britain, who should be given the task of policing the world.²⁸

By the time of the Atlantic Conference in August 1941 this idea of an Anglo-American policing system for all the world was rather firmly fixed in the President's mind. There might be some feasibility some day, he agreed, in reconstituting an organization like the League; but that day was far off; the world was then in too much chaos even to give serious consideration to it; and even when such an organization might be rebuilt it would not be much use, he thought, in handling the problem of security. Bodies like

the League Assembly were so large, he asserted, that they were too conducive to disagreement and inaction to handle the security problem. Such large bodies were all right for discussions on many problems and certainly they were useful for providing the smaller powers with a forum for complaints, grievances, and suggestions. But only the Big Powers who had the means to do policing should have such responsibility; and at that time the only Big Powers he could conceive as respectable enough for that role were the United States and Britain.²⁹

When Welles protested that many small or medium powers like Norway, Belgium, the Netherlands, and the American republics might not like being excluded from responsible work of this sort even during the transitional period after the war, Roosevelt answered that some "ostensible" participation might be worked out for them; but it must be kept "ostensible," for none of the smaller powers had the means to participate effectively in a policing system.³⁰

The major development in Roosevelt's thinking in this matter during the year after the Atlantic Conference (1942) was that the Soviet Union and China must be included among the world's policemen. Roosevelt had concluded by then that all other nations, including France, should be disarmed after the war. But for a variety of reasons the President concluded during 1942 that the Soviet Union and China could not be excluded from the international policing force. The major task of the policemen, the President asserted, would be to see that no disarmed nation secretly re-armed. If caught doing so, the culprit would first be threatened with quarantine; and if that did not work, she would be bombed. Inspection would go on continuously.³¹

On occasion Roosevelt stated that the Big Power policing system he had in mind was designed only for a transition period after the war, until a more permanent security system could be established and made strong enough to take over the policing function. At the time of the Atlantic Conference, however, that transition period was envisioned as of such an indefinite length of time that the President seemed unable to see beyond it to the day when a comprehensive international organization would take over.³² Thus his refusal to accept any more than a very weak statement on a future international organization in the Atlantic Charter was due not only to fear of alarming American opinion, but to lack of interest on his own part as well.³³

It was this idea of a Four Power Condominium or a sort of new

Holy Alliance that Roosevelt had firmly fixed in his mind early in 1943 when he began his many discussions with Hull, Welles, and others on plans for the United Nations, and it is doubtful if Roosevelt ever gave up this vision. According to Welles, the President gradually saw that his Big Power policing scheme would not work, that Britain would be too weak after the war to help much, that great new revolutionary forces were at work in the world and that even the United States would not be able to cope with them.³⁴

But Roosevelt clung to his idea of Big Power guardianship until the day of his death. When British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden visited Washington in March 1943 the President emphasized to him his desire for Big Power control not only of policing but of all important postwar decisions. It was the Big Powers that were going to have to write the peace treaties, he told Eden, and he did not want to have to do a lot of bargaining with the small states about it. The smaller states had all sorts of conflicting ambitions and any attempt to satisfy them would get nowhere. The important thing was to make settlements conducive to world peace.³⁵ With regard to security, he told Eden, the Big Powers would have to maintain troops in the defeated Axis states and in such strong points as Tunisia, Bizerte, Dakar, and Formosa; and regardless of what kind of a general international organization existed, the Big Four would have to make the decisions regarding security and police the world for many years to come.³⁶

In September 1943 he was again expressing the same view, although he declared that he was advocating a Big Power Condominium for only a transition period of three or four years. He told the press one day, however, that if the experiment of the Big Powers keeping the peace looked good to other nations, they all might want to keep it even after the transition period was over.³⁷ To George Norris he likened the Big Four police to "sheriffs" who would maintain world order while the world's people recovered from the shell-shock of the years of fear and violence they had gone through.³⁸ And again he justified his idea by the argument that a large group of nations could not handle security problems effectively. Where military matters would be involved, he told the press in October 1943, the Big Four simply would not have time to consult thirty-two other nations. On matters about which there was "time to turn around," such as deciding ultimate objectives, all nations should have a place in the "picture." But not on a "military thing."³⁹

At Teheran the President again talked a great deal about his Four Policemen idea; but this time it was to be a permanent part of a full-fledged international organization, not a temporary arrangement for a transition period. His concept of the future international organization, he declared, included a world-wide assembly, an executive committee of about ten members to deal with such *non-military* matters as economy, food, and health, and an enforcing agency which he called "The Four Policemen." The Four Policemen would have power, he said, to deal with any sudden emergency, such as Italy's 1935 attack on Ethiopia. Had such an agency existed then, he asserted, it could have blocked the Suez Canal and prevented Mussolini's attack. Minor threats to the peace by revolution or civil war in a small country could be dealt with by the quarantine method. Major threats such as aggression by a larger power, could be met by an ultimatum from the Four Policemen, by bombardment, and even by invasion if necessary. According to Sherwood, there is no evidence of any discussion of the possibility of aggression by one of the Four Policemen. Among themselves the policemen would work out the problem of the future location of strong points for stationing military forces in such a way that they would not start arming against each other.⁴⁰

But this Big Four guardianship of the world did not mean Big Four domination of small nations, said the President after his return from Teheran. The rights of every nation large and small were to be respected and guarded as jealously as were the rights of individuals in the United States. The doctrine that the strong should dominate the weak was an Axis doctrine and the Big Four rejected it. The only objective of the Big Four was to keep the peace and to do it by force "for as long as it may be necessary."⁴¹

Until such materials as the Hull papers are made available it probably will be impossible to trace what happened to Roosevelt's Four Policemen idea after Teheran. The Dumbarton Oaks proposals give the impression that the idea was modified considerably. But Roosevelt himself probably was not overly displeased. The provisions granting the Big Powers a predominant position in the Security Council of the United Nations, of assigning security matters to the Security Council, of having the Council meeting continuously so it could act quickly, and of providing for a military staff committee composed of the Big Five might have looked enough like his police proposal to satisfy him. After the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, at any rate, he again referred

to the contingents of world "policemen" who were going to be available to the Security Council and he wanted the Council to have power to use them quickly and decisively to keep the peace.⁴² A few months earlier he had announced that the members of the coming UN would be asked to provide military contingents according to their capacities;⁴³ but unless he had by then changed his mind about the capacity of other nations to maintain armaments, the chances are that he expected only the Big Powers to furnish contingents, with the other nations supplying facilities for the use of the forces of the Big Powers.

At Yalta the President indicated again, although in a somewhat different context, that the idea of Big Power guardianship of the world had not been dispelled from his mind. He agreed with Stalin, for example, that it would be ridiculous to give small nations like Albania equal power with the great nations in postwar affairs, and he agreed that the Big Powers should write the peace treaties.⁴⁴ At a press conference after his return from Yalta the President also talked in a very paternalistic tone about the small nations, declaring that one of his objectives was to provide machinery to protect the "many little nations," and to give them a chance to be heard. He hoped, he said, that all nations would eventually become members of the UN Assembly. Little countries like Saudi Arabia ought to have a place where they could tell other nations of their needs. But it was awfully difficult to handle matters of importance in a large body, and he implied that important matters should be left to the major powers.⁴⁵

Although his Four Policemen concept was modified in the evolution of the United Nations Charter, the fact that the security system of the UN is based on Big Power unity and control is probably due in large part to the President's tenacity in clinging to his concept.

In the development of his concept of Big Four guardianship of the world Roosevelt began with the assumption that only the United States and Britain (including perhaps the Dominions) were qualified for so momentous a role. China and Russia gained eligibility in his mind in 1942, and finally in late 1944 France acquired the same status.

At the time of the Dumbarton Oaks Conference the President agreed with Hull that Brazil also should have a permanent seat on the coming UN Security Council, partly because her population, territorial size, and resources justified it and partly because her contribution to the UN war effort had been outstanding.⁴⁶

Whether or not Roosevelt believed Brazil was qualified for any significant role as a policeman, however, is not known. One day in 1940 while avowedly doing some thinking out loud to a group of newspaper editors he had suggested that in the disarmed post-war world which he envisioned the American republics might well play the role of inspectors since European and Asiatic nations had so little trust in each other.⁴⁷ But he failed to pursue the matter further, and when Britain and Russia opposed the inclusion of Brazil, the President dropped the idea.

His reasons for including Britain and France among the Big Powers needs little comment. Ever since he had begun his study of Mahan at the age of fifteen he had recognized the strategic community of interest among the English speaking peoples, particularly on the seas; and a great deal of his later geopolitical thinking had been built around the concept of an informal Anglo-American alliance. It was quite natural for him, therefore, despite his irritation with Britain during the twenties and thirties, to include her among the global trustees; and after the beginning of his cordial relationship with Churchill, partnership with Britain was taken for granted.

But France was not accepted as a possible global guardian until almost the last weeks of Roosevelt's life. He became so disgusted with France during the thirties and after her defeat in 1940 that he saw little hope of her ever regaining her pre-war power and prestige. At Casablanca he told General Eisenhower that he saw little chance for a restoration of the French position and he doubted very much her ability to hold her empire during or after the war.⁴⁸ Moreover, he assumed that once Germany was disarmed, France would have no further need for arms and she ought to be disarmed also.⁴⁹ What caused Roosevelt to change his attitude toward France is uncertain. Welles suspected that Churchill was responsible for the President's change of mind;⁵⁰ and it might be that the trouble with Russia which began to appear in late 1944 caused the President to take the precaution of developing a counter-weight to Russia on the European continent. But about the matter we can now only speculate.

Roosevelt's reasons for including China among the world's guardians are more available, for the President talked about them a great deal and felt so strongly about the matter that Churchill and Stalin were unable to argue him out of his stand as they did easily regarding Brazil.

Roosevelt had always felt a sentimental attachment to China

and defended his support of the Stimson Doctrine to Moley in 1933 on the grounds that his ancestors had traded with China, he had always had the deepest sympathy with the Chinese people, and he did not see how anyone could expect him not to support China against Japan.⁵¹ At Cairo in 1943 he talked to General Joseph W. Stilwell in much the same vein.⁵²

But Roosevelt's reasons for including China as a Big Power were based on far more than sentimental attachment. He was under no illusions about either Chiang Kai-shek or the weaknesses of China. Many internal reforms were needed, he agreed, to make her not only an effective but even a morally acceptable partner; and he assumed that it would take two or three generations of education, training, and reform to make her an important factor in world affairs.⁵³ But a stabilizing power was needed in Asia, he reasoned, and with Japan down, China was the only available candidate. There would have to be some power there to hold both the Soviet Union and Japan in check, he thought, and if China were built up she could be that check. She could be especially useful in policing Japan, he declared, and she could also be useful in guiding the vast revolutionary movements then on foot throughout Asia. The recognition of China as a great power would also, he insisted, prevent charges that the white races were determined to dominate the world. The West must abandon the idea that Asiatics were inferior, he believed, and must work wholeheartedly with nations like China to prevent a basic East-West cleavage in years to come.⁵⁴

Roosevelt also argued that another reason he wanted China among the guardians was that "he was thinking far into the future and believed that it was better to have the 400 million people of China as friends rather than as possible enemies."⁵⁵ This was an idea that went back to the latter part of the nineteenth century when many prophets of Western civilization began worrying about the results of wakening Asia and began to predict the rise of a "yellow peril." Alfred Thayer Mahan had written much about this at the turn of the century, arguing that by sheer force of numbers the yellow races could engulf and destroy Western society if ever they went on the rampage; and Mahan appealed to the West to take hold of those awakening peoples, guide them, and do the utmost to imbue them with Western-Christian-liberal principles so that when they became strong and fully awake they would behave as civilized people rather than as the barbarians Mahan then thought them to be. Reared as he was with such a

view, it was quite natural for Roosevelt to believe that China could become a great source of trouble to the world in the future unless handled properly. Unless her internal quarrel between the Kuomintang and Communists was patched up there might be a civil war in which the Big Powers would get on opposite sides as in the Spanish Civil War and another global conflict might result.⁵⁶ There was also a possibility that if Chinese ego and aspirations were not guided in the right direction she might in time become aggressive like Japan; and he asked Churchill what he thought would be the result if the 500 million people of China developed in the same way as the Japanese in the nineteenth century and got hold of modern weapons.⁵⁷ The prospect was horrible to contemplate. Thus when the President, largely through Hull, persuaded the Soviet Union to include China in the Four Power Declaration in 1943, he wrote Lord Mountbatten that he looked upon it as a "great triumph" and he was delighted to be assured that the hundreds of millions of Chinese (425 million this time) would be on the Allied side in the postwar transition period he then had in mind.⁵⁸

Roosevelt's selection of the Soviet Union as a guardian of the world's peace was of more consequence than his selection of the others, of course; but so much has already been written about his attitude toward Russia that it will be treated here only briefly and largely for the sake of completeness.

Although from 1917 until after the Nazi attack on Russia in 1941 Roosevelt blew hot and cold regarding the Soviet Union, he never ceased being intrigued by the social and political experiment going on there. William C. Bullitt, the President's first ambassador to Russia, has stated that Roosevelt's recognition of the Soviet Union in 1933 was inspired largely by the President's disgust with Europe and Japan and a faint hope that he might get Russia's cooperation to maintain peace in Europe and Asia. Russia's failure to live up to her 1933 commitments, however, produced a mild reaction, promoted reservations about Soviet trustworthiness, and caused the President considerable disappointment.⁵⁹ When he sent Joseph E. Davies to Moscow in 1937, therefore, he instructed Davies to make the President's disappointment clear and to leave it up to the Soviets to make overtures.⁶⁰ He still hoped for Soviet cooperation to stop aggression, however, and in January 1938 directed Davies to explore the possibility of Russian help to check Japan. But nothing came of the effort.⁶¹

It was not until Russia's attack on Finland in late 1939, how-

ever, that the President publicly condemned the Russians with vigor. In February 1940 he told the American Youth Congress that in the early period of the Soviet experiment he had possessed the "utmost sympathy" for the effort of the Russian leaders to bring better health, education, and opportunities to Russia's millions and he had hoped that in time the reign of terror and irreligion of the regime would pass and Russia would begin evolution toward a democratic, peaceful, and respected member of the family of nations. But the attack on Finland shattered all that hope and the USSR stood revealed as "a dictatorship as absolute as any other dictatorship in the world," and as an aggressor also.⁶³ Meanwhile he suggested to Hull that the State Department consider retaliation for the repeated minor irritations promoted by the Soviets for such things as searching consuls' luggage and regulating telephone calls from Moscow.⁶⁴

But after the Nazi attack on Russia in June 1941, and particularly after the Soviets revealed unsuspected power and endurance, Roosevelt expressed many reasons why Russia should be accepted as one of the guardians. It is quite likely that, as one observer said, Roosevelt always looked on the idea as a calculated risk; he once told Polish Premier Stanislaw Mikolajczyk that "in all our dealings with Stalin we must keep our fingers crossed."⁶⁵ But he had a strong hunch, reports Bullitt, that his gamble would pay off. When Bullitt presented Roosevelt with a strong memorandum against cooperation with Russia, the President argued that while Bullitt's facts and logic made sense, nevertheless "I just have a hunch that Stalin is not that kind of man. Harry [Hopkins] says he's not and that he doesn't want anything but security for his country, and I think if I give him everything I possibly can and ask nothing from him in return, *noblesse oblige*, he won't try to annex anything and will work with me for a world of democracy and peace."⁶⁶

But Roosevelt seems to have begun with the assumption that he had little choice in the matter, for he considered Russian cooperation *necessary* for peace. As early as May 1939 he implied this to President Benes of Czechoslovakia;⁶⁷ Welles got the same impression;⁶⁸ and so did Churchill.⁶⁹ Thus as Roosevelt saw the matter, he had the choice of cooperating with Russia for peace or of having no peace at all.

As Roosevelt saw the Soviet Union reveal the muscles of a super-power he seems also to have accepted the idea that the interests of both the United States and Russia had become world-

wide and the two giants would have to cooperate whether they wished to or not. This was the reason, Hopkins told Stalin after Roosevelt's death, why the President had gone to such great lengths to arrange conferences with the Russians and to put their relations on a workable foundation.⁶⁹

Roosevelt also argued optimistically about the prospects of co-operating with Russia. Relations with her would not be a bed of roses but their differences could be worked out.

In the first place, the Soviet record regarding peace was good, with the exception of her attack on Finland. After joining the League in 1934, she had worked conspicuously for peace and the President believed she would function in the UN as she had in the League. Her record of cooperation as an ally during the war had also been good, no important point of friction developing until the Dumbarton Oaks Conference. Dissolution of the Comintern in 1943 had raised hopes of an even better record to come.⁷⁰

The President's second reason for being optimistic about Russian cooperation was his belief, despite the attack on Finland, that the Soviets had no aggressive ambitions. Immediately after Hitler's attack on Russia the President wrote Admiral Leahy that he did not think "we need worry about any possibility of Russian domination."⁷¹ A few weeks later he wrote the Pope that while the Soviet Union was under as rigid a dictatorship as Germany, the only weapon the Russians were using outside their borders was propaganda, and while that caused a certain amount of harm, the Russians were not even in the same class with the Germans who menaced the world with *both* propaganda and military aggression.⁷² At Cairo Roosevelt told General Stilwell that he had little fear of the Russians trying to get Manchuria from China. "Stalin doesn't want any more ground. He's got enough," said the President; "he could even put another hundred million people into Siberia."⁷³ In 1944 Roosevelt publicly said the same thing, declaring that the Russians were not trying to "gobble up all the rest of Europe or the world." They did not have "any crazy ideas of conquest," he asserted; and especially since Teheran he did not think there was anything in the fear that the Russians were going to dominate Europe. "They have got a large enough 'hunk of bread' right in Russia to keep them busy for a great many years to come without taking on any more headaches," he said.⁷⁴

A third reason for Roosevelt's optimism regarding Russian co-operation stemmed from his idea of progress and theory of history which held that the course of history is ever upward and onward

toward a better, more democratic, more libertarian society. And it was this theory of history which convinced Roosevelt that no society was static and that Russia was bound to undergo evolutionary changes away from tyranny and dictatorship and toward freedom, tolerance, and peace. In his talks with Litvinoff in 1933 Litvinoff had told him he thought that although the United States and Russia had been poles apart in 1920 they had come much closer together in the ensuing thirteen years. "Perhaps Litvinoff's thoughts of nine years ago are coming true," he wrote a friend in 1942.⁷⁵ The two nations might never get closer together than in a 60-40 ratio, he once told Welles, but that would provide a workable relationship. Since 1917, he argued, the USSR had moved a long way toward a modified state socialism while the United States had gone in much the same direction in her progress toward political and social justice. Thus conflict between the two was not inevitable, provided Russia abandoned her doctrine of world revolution, and that, he thought, was receding also.⁷⁶ If, therefore, a head-on clash between the two giants could be prevented until the new international security system had a chance to strengthen itself, he believed Russia's standards of living would rise, her foreign trade would increase, her walls of isolation would go down, her cultural and intellectual ties with the West would multiply, and the Russian people would eventually obtain freedom of information about the outside world. Then Russia would be so transformed that cooperation with Russia would not be difficult. The big question was whether or not the necessary time for these developments would be available, for the whole thing would require years.⁷⁷

Admiral McIntire has reported that in shipboard bull sessions on the way to Teheran the President showed no fear of not being able to bridge the gulf between the United States and Russia. The President argued that the Kremlin's leaders had already discarded or modified many Marxist tenets, that Communist philosophy was too materialistic to have lasting appeal for the minds and souls of men, and he expected the trend in Russia to swing toward nationalism and old Czarist imperialism.⁷⁸ He implied, supposedly, that that was a system with which we could get along.

A fourth reason for Roosevelt's optimism regarding Russian cooperation was his great confidence in his personal ability to win Stalin over to the idea of working in harness with the other powers. One reason for his repeated efforts to arrange his first meeting with Stalin, despite the latter's elusiveness, reports his son, was

that he wanted to turn his personality on Stalin and gain the dictator's confidence.⁷⁹ He looked on his first meeting with Stalin at Teheran as a challenge, his wife reported, because the Russians were so suspicious; and while he was not certain when he came home that he had dissipated any of Stalin's distrust, he showed no sign of giving up the campaign.⁸⁰

A final reason for Roosevelt's optimism regarding Russian cooperation was his belief that cooperation in keeping the peace was so obviously in Russia's best interest that she could be made to see it and would act accordingly. Welles claimed that by August 1943 the President was convinced that the Soviet Union would recognize that her security and legitimate objectives could best be achieved by cooperating fully with the United States and an international organization.⁸¹ Stettinius testified to the same point, declaring that Roosevelt emphasized many times that although Russia might be difficult to get along with, the United States must continue trying with patience and determination to get the Soviets to realize that it was to their own selfish interest to win the confidence of the rest of the world, that cooperation would be to their advantage, and it was the only hope for peace.⁸² Even after Soviet intransigence began to cause him concern in the last few months of his life, the President continued to feel that Russia needed peace and opportunity to develop her resources to raise her standards of living so badly that he still had faith Stalin could be brought around by appeals to reason and self-interest.⁸³

It was the United States, however, that Roosevelt most wanted to be one of the guardians of the postwar collective security system; and he wanted the United States to be not only a guardian, he wanted her also to be the leader of all the others.

The idea that the United States should lead the world was such a strong conviction with Roosevelt from at least 1920 on that one is somewhat puzzled by his refusal to assume that role during the thirties. Preoccupation with domestic affairs, fear of isolationist opposition, and the timidity of the politically almost indispensable Hull are obviously part of the answer; but anyone going over the material on Roosevelt is very likely to get the feeling that they are not the whole answer.

In his 1920 acceptance speech Roosevelt called for American leadership of the world, declaring that "America's opportunity is at hand."⁸⁴ He called for membership in the League of Nations with his argument that the United States should join the League because it would give the country a vehicle for world leadership

and a forum to spread her doctrines of liberty and representative government.⁸⁵

United States leadership was imperative, he often argued, because of all the Big Powers she was the only one with a disinterested point of view. She had no traditional enemies, had no territorial desires, was interested only in peace and the advancement of civilization, and was, therefore, the only Big Power the world was willing to follow.⁸⁶

He argued repeatedly also that United States leadership was essential for promoting better standards of international morality and goodwill. Throughout her history, he wrote in 1928, the United States had been influencing the world in these respects. The Monroe Doctrine, her relations with Canada, the peaceful methods used by her in the Far East with the Perry Expedition and Townshend Harris, the Alabama Claims and Bering Sea Fisheries cases, her final decision to reject imperialism and prepare the Filipinos for self-government, and her help to the people of Cuba had all helped establish the United States as a moral leader. The Hay Open Door policy, the Boxer indemnity, aid in helping to organize the Hague tribunal, aid in the Treaty of Portsmouth and the Algeciras Conference, and Wilson's diplomacy had all helped lead the world toward more international goodwill. The only blots on "our liberal leadership" he could then think of were the seizure of Panama, Taft's dollar diplomacy, interventions in the Caribbean, and the Panama tolls legislation. But Wilson's diplomacy had made up for most of those mistakes, he asserted, and had shown the way to a new relationship among nations. The goodwill and high moral purpose of the United States had already had much influence on the world, he concluded, and this influence could continue.⁸⁷ The moral power of the United States, he asserted near the end of World War II, was even greater than her political, economic, and military power; and he implied that she should continue to wield it.⁸⁸

Another reason for United States leadership of the world, in Roosevelt's mind, was his belief that as Europe disintegrated into chaos, Western culture might disappear unless the United States preserved it and assumed leadership in perpetuating and restoring it. Here was another idea that Roosevelt might have gotten from Mahan in his youth, for as early as 1894 Mahan had expressed the view that the Anglo-American peoples must be the protectors of modern civilization, a civilization based on individual freedom and respect for law. By the time of Munich, Roose-

velt felt that Europe had already disintegrated so much that in the years to come it would be up to the United States to "pick up the pieces of European civilization and help them to save what remains of the wreck. . . ." ⁸⁹ The United States was the heir of European culture, he declared a year later, and it was up to her to keep that civilization alive. ⁹⁰ In 1940 he asserted again that the United States (along with the other American republics) must become the "guardians of western culture, the protectors of Christian civilization," and he implied that United States leadership was essential for that task. ⁹¹

Roosevelt also seemed to think that peaceful relations among the guardians might also be dependent on United States leadership. It would be her task to serve as moderator in the conflicts that must inevitably arise among Britain, the Soviet Union, and China, all of whom were suspicious of each other, and all of whom would need a referee. ⁹²

A final argument Roosevelt presented for United States leadership among the guardians was that the postwar world would offer the United States a large opportunity to shape the kind of world she wanted, and unless she took hold of the opportunity this time, she might never have another chance. "It is the destiny of this American generation," he said in the 1940 campaign, "to point the road to the future for all the world to see. It is our prayer that all lovers of freedom may join us—the anguished common people of this earth for whom we seek to light the path." ⁹³ Late in 1944 he reminded the country that after World War I the United States had failed to organize the kind of world conducive to peace. "Opportunity knocks again," he added. But "there is no guarantee that opportunity will knock a third time." ⁹⁴ A few weeks before his death he reiterated this idea, arguing that the United States had a rendezvous with destiny. Ahead lay both promise and danger. The world could go forward toward unity and a widely shared prosperity or it could go backward and break up into competing economic blocks. The decision was in the hands of the United States, or at the very least the United States could influence that decision mightily. If, therefore, the American people wanted the world to go in a direction conducive to their way of life, they had better lead the way. ⁹⁵

It is obvious that Roosevelt's conception of a collective security system under the guardianship of the Big Powers led by the United States was very paternalistic and clearly placed all the medium and small powers in the position of children in the fam-

ily of nations. It seems likely that Roosevelt finally agreed to accept some small powers on the Security Council of the United Nations only on the assumption that their role would be minor and their participation would be of only the "ostensible" type he had told Welles in 1941 might be acceptable. He was willing, however, to have an assembly or some sort of forum wherein the lesser powers could express their views. His hopes for a global New Deal and a good neighbor climate of opinion had great bearing on the problem of security; and while his attitude toward smaller nations was that of a father, it was the attitude of a good father and a twentieth-century somewhat democratic and benevolent father who had the best interests of the children at heart; and if he could not quite bring himself to let the children have a vote in important family decisions, he nevertheless wanted them to express their views, be treated with decency, and be made to feel important.

Although Roosevelt from time to time entertained a number of ideas about various other aspects of collective security and international organization in general, there were almost none that he held with deep conviction; and it is probably safe to say that the United Nations Charter, as well as the charters of other international organizations written during Roosevelt's administration, all reflect the views of others rather than of Roosevelt himself. As noted earlier, the President's life-long interest was in general objectives, not details; and while he became famed for a relentless, Dutch stubbornness in the pursuit of objectives, it was usually relatively easy to persuade him to change his mind on details or to get him to accept any reasonable plan that showed promise of achieving his objectives. If the inside story of the formulation of the United Nations Charter is ever written,⁹⁶ therefore, it is likely to show that Roosevelt had no detailed plan of his own and was usually willing, although sometimes only after strong argument, to accept whatever plans were presented provided they seemed conducive to achieving his general objective.

The way the President changed his mind regarding the principle of regionalism as opposed to the principle of universalism illustrates his susceptibility to persuasion. Unfortunately, there is too much discrepancy in the Hopkins, Welles, Hull, and Benes reports of the President's views on the matter for us to get a clear picture. Welles reports that when he first presented Roosevelt with the draft for a postwar organization early in 1943 in which the idea of regionalism was dominant, the main question raised

by the President was doubt as to the possible effectiveness of regional agencies in weak areas like the Near East and Asia where the people had so little experience in self-government.⁹⁷ According to Hopkins' report of Roosevelt's views at about the same time, the President favored a combination of regionalism and universalism, a structure with the Big Powers making all major decisions, a universal advisory body beneath them, and similar regional advisory councils under that.⁹⁸ According to Hull, however, the President in the spring of 1943 vehemently opposed any universalism (except among the guardians, supposedly); all organizations—political, economic, and social—were to be regional; and the President's only concession to universalism was grudgingly and jokingly to tell Hull he could have the Pentagon or Empire State Building for a world secretariat to handle international conferences.⁹⁹

Whatever degree of regionalism the President favored in the spring of 1943, however, by summer Hull had him veering toward universalism and by the time of Teheran the President seemed considerably opposed to regionalism—a shift in views that occurred in only a few months.¹⁰⁰ This shift does not mean that Roosevelt was finally unwilling to accept any regionalism at all, for he had no intention of scrapping the inter-American system that was still in process of development.¹⁰¹ It means only that he was finally won over to the view that in the general organization to be created, universalism was to be predominant.¹⁰²

Roosevelt's attitude toward additional votes for the Soviet Union in the UN General Assembly illustrates again the President's mental flexibility on such matters. When the Soviets first asked for the admission of each of their sixteen republics at Dumbarton Oaks the President became indignant and made clear his unalterable opposition. On his second day at Yalta he still felt the same way.¹⁰³ But after hearing Stalin's plea that at least two Soviet republics be admitted, Roosevelt immediately conceded, telling the press later "it is not really of any great importance," especially since the Assembly was not empowered to decide anything. Thus "this business about the number of votes in the Assembly does not make a great deal of difference." He had agreed to it out of sympathy for Stalin who was having trouble holding his devastated republics in the USSR and who thought such a gesture would please the people there who had suffered so much. Stalin had also shown signs of having trouble with some members of his Politburo and wanted to appease them. And since Britain

still controlled India and would have her vote, the idea of extra votes was not preposterous.¹⁰⁴

When Roosevelt in turn got Stalin to agree to support a proposal for three votes for the United States, it was done only at the behest of the President's advisers, Roosevelt himself seeming to care little about it.¹⁰⁵

On some details, however, the President was willing to argue, and on a few he never backed down. For some time, for example, he had what might almost be called an obsession in favor of the various agencies of the United Nations meeting in various places around the globe. He was bitterly opposed to meetings in big cities where delegates would be subject to influence by pressure groups and the press. In places like Paris or London pressures were so enormous that delegates could not engage in the frank, informal, friendly, neighborly, "around the table" type of discussion he believed necessary. At Paris in 1919 the pressures on the delegations were very harmful, he thought.

While organizations like the International Labor Organization might be able to return to Geneva, he preferred political bodies like the UN Security Council and General Assembly to meet in delightful but isolated places like the Azores and Hawaii. And so serious was he about the matter that, much to Hull's irritation, he ordered the State Department to prepare maps and memoranda for him to take to Quebec where he planned to discuss the matter with Churchill. The President also thought that obliging delegates to attend meetings in various places would improve their knowledge of the world and of other countries; and it had worked so well in the Inter-American system that he thought it would be effective in the UN and the functional agencies as well. As late as mid-February 1945 the President was still talking this same way and there seems to be no evidence that he changed his mind.¹⁰⁶

With regard to voting and the veto in the Security Council the President seems to have readily accepted what the State Department brought him and much of his discussion on the matter was devoted simply to getting a clear understanding of how the mechanisms would work.¹⁰⁷ It is quite clear that he was adamantly opposed to Russia's desire for an unlimited veto and he argued vigorously and to the end against a veto on discussion in the Security Council and against a Big Power voting in disputes in which she was a party (until the application of sanctions came into question). Wide-open discussion in the Security Council would not hurt anyone, Roosevelt argued, nor would it promote

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disunity; rather it would prove to the world that the guardians had confidence in each other and in the justice of their policies. Unity among them would be strengthened by discussion, not weakened.¹⁰⁸

The Soviet desire for the right to vote (or veto) when party to a dispute was especially distasteful to Roosevelt. It completely violated the ancient principle that a man should not be the judge of his own case, declared the President, and it went contrary to ideas firmly imbedded in American law. It was to argue the Russians out of this demand that Roosevelt called Soviet Ambassador Andrei Gromyko in for a bedside discussion during the Dumbarton Oaks Conference at 7:30 o'clock in the morning and argued with the taciturn Russian for an hour. The Russian position, declared the President, was equivalent to a quarreling husband and wife both sitting on their own jury.¹⁰⁹ And at Yalta the President finally won his point.

It would be possible to cite additional ideas Roosevelt entertained from time to time regarding international organization. He told Frances Perkins once, for example, that he liked the International Labor Organization's system whereby peoples as well as governments were represented; but he believed there was too much prejudice to apply the idea to a political organization in the immediate future.¹¹⁰ We know also that he wanted a UN Charter that was flexible and amendable so it could be adapted to social, economic, and political changes in the future.¹¹¹ But such ideas were often so ephemeral or so commonplace that they played no part in his conception of collective security worth discussing here. Roosevelt's major concern during the most mature years of his life was the promotion of a collective security system under Big Power guardianship and in the face of that objective all his other ideas fade into insignificance.

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CONCLUSIONS

GREATER thinkers than Franklin D. Roosevelt have had their ideas ripped to shreds by multitudes of critics; and it would be folly to argue that the President's theories are invulnerable to attack. Obviously, his thinking was faulty at many points.

✓ Surely, the President was often in error in his psychological reasoning. It is quite clear, for example, that he was overly obsessed with the problem of evil and gave entirely too much emphasis to his "devil" theory of politics. His attitude toward morality is also open to question; for there is considerable doubt that individual morality and state morality can be the same, as Roosevelt insisted they should be. The President's assumption that there existed a universally accepted moral code and that most people and most states understood it and knew when they were violating it is also open to considerable doubt. His faith in the effectiveness of world public opinion as a sanction was also quite exaggerated; for we know now that totalitarian states are decidedly immune to public condemnation and that it is effective only when applied to states that have a strong tradition of responsiveness to the public will. The President's belief that there exists a universal urge for liberty and democracy is almost totally denied by the available evidence of social psychology.

Roosevelt's support for the doctrine of self-determination also raises the question as to whether it is now wise to continue encouraging the fragmentation of the world when interdependence is demanding more and more integration. The President's faith

in multi-power trusteeships is also questionable; for surely the experience the world has had with multi-power administrations is not encouraging.

Roosevelt's assumption that the American freeing of the Philippines was a good example to all other colonial powers is equally debatable; for what the President does not seem to have considered is that that grant of independence hurt neither the American economy nor American prestige; but the colonial possessions of all the other imperial powers were intimately bound up with both factors. The American example could not be accepted by the other colonial states, therefore, as a very useful precedent.

The President's idea that all but the Big Powers should be disarmed and that all the little and medium powers should be both willing and happy to entrust their security to the Big Powers has, of course, great merit. But it seems almost weird to believe that the small and medium powers might agree to such a development; for history has taught them the grim lesson that Big Powers are not to be trusted any more than little neighbors are to be trusted and that it is, in fact, the Big Powers that invariably cause the Big Troubles of the world. There is also reason to wonder if it is possible to square Roosevelt's demand for a world of welfare states, all supposedly with managed economies, with his demand for a world in which international trade is relatively free. Even if the two demands are not basically inconsistent, the possibility of persuading welfare states used to managing their economies to relax their management of their imports and exports to the degree essential for a relatively free world trade is very remote.

And so we could go on condemning or debating the validity of many of Roosevelt's ideas.

It is equally obvious, however, that for all the defects and debatable points in his thinking, the President's theory of international relations contains many great merits. Despite its incompleteness, for example, the President's explanation of the breakdown of the old world order is an astute one. His emphasis on the failure of democratic governments to meet the modern needs of their peoples is as good an explanation as we are likely to get of the decline of democracy and the rise of totalitarianism in our time.

The President's geopolitical theory is also something that has stood the test of time; and the implications he drew from it appear more logical with every passing year despite the efforts of the so-called "revisionists" to prove that Roosevelt maneuvered us into a war we had no business entering.

The President's proposals for a new world order are meritorious also in that they show a lively awareness of most of the inexorable trends of the era and of the large place given to solving the problems implied in those trends. The anti-colonial movement was given considerable consideration, for example; nor was Roosevelt behind the times in his recognition of the mass aspiration for higher standards of living that has become characteristic of this century. His global New Deal was aimed literally at wiping poverty, ignorance, and disease off the earth. The President was even willing to ride the modern wave of nationalism, asking only that it be diluted with a sufficient degree of internationalism to allow people to recognize their interdependence. The only major trend of the time that Roosevelt bucked was the trend toward totalitarianism, and for that we cannot blame him.

Except for his faith in multi-power trusteeships, Roosevelt's proposals on trusteeship were sound also; and it is quite likely that had his tutelage ideas been applied, the transition of many peoples from colonialism to independence might have been less painful, even less bloody, and the Korean War might have been avoided altogether; for the President invariably proposed trusteeship for Korea, rather than immediate independence.

Roosevelt's faith in classical diplomacy—that is, being confidential, quiet, and frank—among leaders who know each other personally and whose word is their bond also has much in its favor. It is good to note further that the excessive legalism said to be characteristic of American thinking on international relations is nowhere visible in Roosevelt's thinking, for he recognized correctly that most of the problems that plague relations among states are political rather than legal problems.

Most meritorious of all in the President's thinking, however, is his practical idealism, his practice of asking men to hitch their wagons to stars, to keep ideals ever before them and to plod toward those ideals in the most practical manner possible, never expecting actual attainment but remaining constantly aware that even one small step in the right direction is progress.

But the merits and demerits of Roosevelt's theory of international relations are not nearly so important as his over-all approach. The central thesis of his theory is that the centuries-long pattern of the behavior of states can be changed and a new type of world order can be created based on the concept of the good neighbor. He was practical enough to warn that progress toward such a new order would be at a snail's pace. He was realistic enough to note

that the transformation from a world dominated by power politics to a world dominated by reason, goodwill, and enlightened self-interest might never be fully achieved. For he knew that such a change would require a fundamental revolution in the intellectual and moral attitude of the bulk of mankind; and he was aware that centuries-old attitudes and patterns of behavior change slowly. His own personal ambition seemed to be limited to getting civilization turned around and started in the direction of his goal and he would have been happy merely to know before he died that mankind was going in the right direction.

It is not too far-fetched to say that Roosevelt looked upon the basic problem of transforming international relations as something of a psychiatric problem. He remembered the nineteenth century as a period when the game of power politics was played with restraint and there was a considerable degree of reason and enlightened self-interest in interstate relations; and he recalled with no little nostalgia the days when he had been able to ride a bicycle around a Europe in which the general atmosphere among peoples was friendly.

But during the twentieth century all that had changed. Most of the peoples of the world, and especially the peoples of Europe, had become mentally deranged. Nationalism, war, depression, and the new technology had produced problems they had been unable to solve by reasonable means. Their frustrations had produced an emotional disturbance and they had become obsessed with fears, suspicions, hatred. Even the United States had experienced this mental and moral collapse during the Depression. In their desperation the semi-crazed peoples of the world had turned to all sorts of false panaceas as a frustrated man turns to drink. Some had turned to aggression, violence, brutality, and racism while others had turned to isolationism, appeasement, and pacifism. Mankind was indeed a psychopathic case in bad need of a good doctor.

It will not strain the imagination very far to picture Roosevelt entering the White House in 1933 determined to be that doctor. He had, it is true, only a vague idea as to what kind of psychotherapy he ought to apply to either his domestic or his foreign patients. But his Inaugural Address made it quite clear that he was out to change his patients' attitudes. His exuberant and optimistic assurance to the American people that they had "nothing to fear but fear itself" was obviously aimed at lifting a frustrated and desperate people out of their slough of despond. The President's transformation of the United States in a matter of months into a

beehive of activity with millions of people busy on a myriad of projects is uncannily like what is often done in psychiatric hospitals where patients are put to work on handicrafts.

It was in his Inaugural Address also that the President began to apply his therapy to the outer world, for it was then that he announced his good neighbor policy.

It was in the late twenties that Roosevelt had begun puzzling over the causes of Latin American hatred toward the United States, and had come to the conclusion that the United States' methods of dealing with Latin America had been all wrong and that friendly, good neighborly methods might very well produce a friendly, good neighborly response. On entering the White House, therefore, the President began applying a good-neighbor approach in Latin American relations, and toward the end of his life he was convinced that his psychotherapy had worked and that the international political system of the Western Hemisphere was well on the way toward being transformed.

However, when Roosevelt had attempted to apply this same psychotherapy to the rest of the world he was greatly disappointed that outside the Western Hemisphere it had not worked. Rather his Eur-Asian patients had become worse, their behavior becoming ever more anti-social and finally exploding into violence.

Furthermore, Roosevelt considered that when the "madmen" of Germany and Italy and Japan had sneeringly rejected the therapy he proposed, their rejection had made them largely responsible for the worsening mental derangement of other states in the family of nations. It was as if two or three members of a large family had become so mentally deranged—nearly to insanity—that they had caused unusual emotional disturbances in everyone else in the household. At such a point, of course, forcible confinement and treatment of the dangerous cases is a logical step; and this seems to have been the goal of the President's quarantine proposals, his aid to the allies, his conclusion that American military power must be used, his policy of unconditional surrender, and his postwar proposals to reform the Axis peoples. The idea of a fight to the finish or to unconditional surrender and the eventual rooting out of all vestiges of totalitarianism from the Axis states appears very much like the psycho-therapeutic application of shock treatment to a patient on whom more mild treatment does not work. But whatever we call it, there is no doubt that Roosevelt's goal was to transform the attitudes or personalities of the Axis peoples, to create within them a total revulsion

toward war, militarism, aggression, racism, and sadism; and there is no doubt but what exactly that happened to a large proportion of those people to such a point that when a post-Roosevelt United States begged them to re-arm and join the cold war against the Communists, they did so with extreme reluctance.

The psychotherapy the President applied to the USSR was much more mild; for the conclusion of his diagnosis of the Russians and particularly of Stalin was that they were afflicted only with a relatively mild case of distrust and suspicion. It was an obsession—a fear obsession—but mild withal. On one occasion Roosevelt pointed out privately how Stalin's youthful activities as an underground party worker in Czarist Russia and his work of acquiring and holding power in Communist Russia had contributed to make Stalin abnormally troubled by fear, suspicion, and distrust. And the President was quite aware that the Soviet Union had been treated in the family of nations in a manner that had accentuated rather than ameliorated Russian distrust of the outer world.

But the therapy the President prescribed for the USSR was very much like the therapy he had been applying to Latin America. He hoped to dispel her suspicions of the outer world by first proving that the United States sincerely wanted to be her friend. Refraining from criticism of Russia, giving her aid to drive out the Germans, getting personally acquainted with Stalin, taking Stalin's side occasionally against Churchill, and not retaliating to rude or provocative behavior were all aimed at the goal of proving that America desired Soviet friendship and was the kind of friend in whom confidence could be placed. And at the time Roosevelt died he seemed to think his therapy was working; for although he was quite aware that much yet remained to be done, he had at least persuaded the Soviets to commit themselves to joining the forthcoming United Nations and participating in some vague form of postwar cooperation.

We know now, of course, that Roosevelt's diagnosis of the Soviets was inadequate. We know now that he greatly underestimated the depth of Stalin's mental derangement and discounted too much the possibility that his antisocial behavior might become berserk. Obviously, Stalin was much sicker than Roosevelt imagined. If Khrushchev's report to the Twentieth Party Congress in 1956 is even approximately accurate Stalin was already incurably on the road to insanity when Roosevelt began working on him.

But does Roosevelt's failure to grasp the extent of Stalin's mental illness invalidate his general approach: his looking at the USSR and indeed his looking at the whole world as essentially a problem in psychiatry, a problem of transforming personalities, attitudes, or whatever it is that psychiatrists try to transform? This question raises a further question central not only to all political science but central also to all society. For if Roosevelt's approach was correct there is then vast hope for a better world. But if Roosevelt was wrong mankind has a dark future.

History, unfortunately, provides overwhelming evidence that Roosevelt was wrong. For history shows that throughout the ages the behavior of men and states has almost invariably followed a pattern best explained by the theory of power politics. According to this theory of political behavior, power is so often useful or even essential to the attainment of one's objectives that a struggle for power is going on practically all the time. So essential is power and so ubiquitous is the struggle for it, that it seems likely that the struggle for power is inherent in the very nature of organized society. This contest, moreover, is so often for high stakes—for the power to make decisions of vital importance—that it cannot be carried on like an amiable election of officers in a Rotary Club. Rather it is so often bitter, sometimes even violent, that the general atmosphere surrounding it is one of hostility. Whoever wins the struggle, moreover, will naturally use the power acquired to make decisions in his own interests and there is no assurance that the interests of the power-holder and the interests of others in the community will be the same; for people differ as to what they like and dislike and what they consider best for the community.

In international relations power politics are more visible than elsewhere; and it is quite obvious that throughout history generally interstate relations have been governed by a struggle for power carried on most of the time in an atmosphere of hostility, and accompanied by a type of decision-making that is based on the will of the power holder.

Now it is all this that Roosevelt proposed to change. But if the struggle for power and the surrounding atmosphere of hostility are *inherent* in the very nature of organized society, can they be changed? Or if they can be changed, can they be changed to the extent Roosevelt proposed? Can the general atmosphere of international relations be made friendly rather than hostile. Can an international system be devised in which decisions would be made

via rational discussion around a table rather than via coercion or threat of coercive power? Coercion was to be used apparently only in the interests of the whole community against aggressors—a few of whom we might have with us always.

The persistence of the struggle for power throughout history and in virtually all known societies suggests that it is, indeed, inherent in society. True enough, there have been periods when the struggle was more mild and the accompanying atmosphere less hostile than at other times. The nineteenth century appears now to have been a period when the game of power politics was played with almost unbelievable restraint and the atmosphere of hostility was relatively mild. The twentieth century, on the other hand, has been one of the most violent and hate-filled periods of history.

But Roosevelt wanted to do more than merely restore the situation of the nineteenth century. His goal was a New Order. His theory of history insisted that civilization moves ever upward and onward, despite occasional relapses, and his target was a world better than that of the nineteenth century.

The idea of achieving an intellectual, moral, and spiritual transformation is not, of course, new. It has been the goal of all the great religions. It was Woodrow Wilson's goal. And today, Jawaharlal Nehru, with his theory of the psychosis of war or the psychosis of fear is a steadfast believer in the Roosevelt thesis and has applied it repeatedly in his efforts to ameliorate the cold war. It is a basic tenet of Marxism, moreover, that a new kind of society not only can but is going to evolve on this earth.

Intellectual, moral, and spiritual transformations have also actually taken place on numerous occasions discernible in history. They are visible in all civilizations that have declined and then experienced a renaissance as did Western civilization at the end of the Middle Ages. Through the oratory of Danton and others like him in the French Revolution the personality of France was considerably transfigured. The psychological change Gandhi produced in the Indian masses still looks miraculous despite the seeming relapse into violence that accompanied partition. The change Hitler wrought in the German people was also as remarkable as it was terrible.

But none of these proposed or actual transformations has done away with power politics and some of them were not even designed to that end. Granted, therefore, that such a thing as a mental, spiritual, and moral transformation of mankind is pos-

sible, is the *kind* of transformation Roosevelt called for possible? History seems to shout a categorical NO to such a possibility.

If we turn to psychology rather than to history, however, it is possible to see that support for the Roosevelt thesis might be forthcoming; for it is now widely believed among social psychologists that virtually all social behavior is *learned* behavior. This belief implies that men can be led in almost any direction—toward the kind of world Hitler wanted or toward the kind of world Roosevelt wanted. It implies that society can be made essentially competitive or essentially cooperative. It implies that men can be taught to behave in either a hostile or a friendly manner.

It is very doubtful that Roosevelt believed that power politics could ever be abolished completely and it is quite likely that the comments he made to that effect in a few of his speeches were inserted by the State Department and delivered without much thought. The weight of the evidence indicates that Roosevelt was entirely too practical to believe that his ideals could ever be more than aimed at and approximated. Even though, therefore, Roosevelt's goal was a world order in which the struggle for power was far more restrained than in the nineteenth century and in which a cooperative attack would be made on the problems of ignorance, disease, and poverty surpassing any previous effort ever known, it is doubtful that he expected the transformation of international relations to involve more than modest progress toward his goals.

Roosevelt's major objective was simply to turn the world around, to stop the trend toward more hell and chaos, and to get the world going again in the right direction. Unfortunately, his psychotherapy was not sufficiently effective to prevent the cold war. But is it not possible that his psychiatric approach was a sound one and that the major problem of international relations—of all politics—lies in the attitudes of men, as the UNESCO thesis holds, and that the problem can be much ameliorated, even if not solved, by the thesis that a good neighbor approach will, if pursued long enough, produce a good neighbor response from all except a small group of incurables?

NOTES

MOST of the materials used in this study are in the form of publications that are widely available. However, the complete verbatim transcripts of the President's press conferences, 1933-1945, are available only in typescript at the Franklin D. Roosevelt Memorial Library, Hyde Park, New York, although a few microfilm copies covering the years through 1941 have been made for a few university libraries.

All the unpublished letters cited are also in the Roosevelt Library at Hyde Park and the particular file in which they are located is indicated, in most cases, as follows: (PPF) President's Personal Files; and (PSF) President's Secretary's Files.

A complete citation is given below only the first time an item is cited.

PREFACE

1. Edward Reilly Stettinius, *Roosevelt and the Russians* (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1949), 30.
2. See Daniel R. Fusfeld, *The Economic Thought of Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Origins of the New Deal* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1956).
3. See James MacGregor Burns, *Roosevelt: The Lion and the Fox* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1956), 90, 334-35; and Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *The Crisis of the Old Order, 1919-1933* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1957), 395-96.
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5. This proposal is printed in full in the appendix to Eleanor Roosevelt, *This I Remember* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1949), 353-66.

6. Frank Burt Freidel, *Franklin D. Roosevelt* (3 vols., Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1952-56), II, 126-27.
7. James Aloysius Farley, *Jim Farley's Story* (New York: Whittlesey House, 1948), 56.
8. This is seen repeatedly in the two volumes by William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, *The Challenge to Isolation, 1937-40* and *The Undeclared War, 1940-41* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1952-53). It is also emphasized in Burns, *Roosevelt*, 262; and by William C. Bullitt, "How We Won the War and Lost the Peace," *Life*, August 30, 1948, p. 87.
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I

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3. *Ibid.*, April 8, 1923; Eleanor Roosevelt, *This I Remember*, 362-63.
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5. Herbert Feis, *Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), 21, 67-68.
6. Eleanor Roosevelt, *This I Remember*, 363; *Public Papers*, 1936 vol., 422-23; *ibid.*, 1940 vol., 670; Roosevelt, *Personal Letters*, 1928-45, I, 664-66.
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9. *New York Times*, October 6, 1920; *Public Papers*, 1928-32 vol., 636-38, 677, 698, 723-26.
10. Schlesinger, *Crisis of the Old Order*, 428.
11. Press Conference, November 23, 1934; *Public Papers*, 1936 vol., 607.
12. *Ibid.*, 1936 vol., 289-90; *ibid.*, 1937 vol., 285; *ibid.*, 1940 vol., 5; FDR to Nobel Peace Prize Committee, January 13, 1938 (PSF); Roosevelt, *Personal Letters*, 1928-45, I, 652-53; *ibid.*, 1928-45, II, 875-76.
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16. *Public Papers*, 1928-32 vol., xii-xiii.
17. Roosevelt, *Personal Letters*, 1928-45, I, 118; *Public Papers*, 1928-32 vol., xi-xii, 100; Rexford G. Tugwell, *The Democratic Roosevelt* (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1957), 204.
18. *Public Papers*, 1936 vol., 384-86, 640; *ibid.*, 1937 vol., 116.
19. *Ibid.*, 1928-32 vol., 649; *ibid.*, 1935 vol., 16; *ibid.*, 1937 vol., lii, lix-lx.
20. Press Conference, September 25, 1936.

21. *Public Papers*, 1936 vol., 606; *ibid.*, 1938 vol., 242, 398-99.
22. Stettinius, *Roosevelt and the Russians*, 276.
23. Carroll Kilpatrick (ed.), *Roosevelt and Daniels* (Chapel Hill, N. C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1952), 181-82.
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30. FDR to Jesse I. Straus, February 13, 1936 (PSF).
31. U. S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations*, 1933, I, 210.
32. Welles, *Time for Decision*, 50; Sumner Welles, *Where Are We Heading?* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1946), 4; Roosevelt, *Personal Letters*, 1928-45, II, 1175.
33. *Public Papers*, 1934 vol., 239-42; U. S. Department of State, *Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941* (Washington: U. S. Govt. Printing Office, 1943), 229.
34. Hull, *Memoirs*, I, 379-80; Roosevelt, *Personal Letters*, 1928-45, I, 463; *Public Papers*, 1936 vol., 606; Press Conference, December 29, 1936.
35. Roosevelt, *Personal Letters*, 1928-45, I, 680, 689, 699-700.
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37. *Public Papers*, 1928-32 vol., x.
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39. Press Conference, September 7, 1934; *Public Papers*, 1936 vol., 236.
40. Langer and Gleason, *Challenge to Isolation*, 16, 347; Bullitt, "How We Won the War and Lost the Peace," *Life*, August 30, 1948; Press Conference, July 13, 1937; Ickes, *Secret Diary*, II, 511; Edvard Benes, *Memoirs* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1954), 76.
41. *Public Papers*, 1940 vol., 8, 545; *ibid.*, 1944-45 vol., 162.
42. Freidel, *Roosevelt*, I, 241, 260.
43. FDR to George C. Sweet, November 10, 1937 (PPF); Roosevelt, *Personal Letters*, 1928-45, I, 716-17, 734-36; U. S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations*, 1937, IV, 170.
44. *Ibid.*, 1938, I, 121; Roosevelt, *Personal Letters*, 1928-45, II, 766, 776; McIntire, *White House Physician*, 111; Henry L. Morgenthau, Jr., "The Morgenthau Diaries," *Collier's*, October 18, 1947.
45. Press Conference, April 18, 1940.
46. *Ibid.*, June 5, 1940.
47. Freidel, *Roosevelt*, II, 122; *Public Papers*, 1939 vol., xxxvii.

II

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UNITED STATES

1. *Public Papers*, 1933 vol., 131.
2. *Ibid.*, 1941 vol., xxx, 182; Roosevelt, *Personal Letters*, 1928-45, II, 1154.
3. Leahy, *I Was There*, 348; Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, 713.
4. Morgenthau, "The Morgenthau

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5. *Public Papers*, 1939 vol., 198-99.
 6. Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, 160.
 7. Joseph C. Grew, *Turbulent Era; A Diplomatic Record of Forty Years, 1904-1945* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1952), II, 1260; *Public Papers*, 1941 vol., 529-30; *ibid.*, 1942 vol., 105; Press Conference, January 24, 1943.
 8. Schlesinger, *Crisis of the Old Order*, 396.
 9. *Public Papers*, 1942 vol., 115; Press Conference, January 2, 1942; *ibid.*, October 27, 1942.
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 11. *Public Papers*, 1944-45 vol., 202-04.
 12. Roosevelt, *Personal Letters*, 1905-28, pp. 237-40.
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 14. *New York Times*, August 14, 1920.
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 19. Roosevelt, *Personal Letters*, 1928-45, II, 751; *Public Papers*, 1939 vol., xxxix, 367-69.
 20. Arnold, *Global Mission*, 178.
 21. Press Conference, November 15, 1938; *Public Papers*, 1940 vol., xxxi, 198-200; *ibid.*, 1941 vol., 188-89.
 22. *Ibid.*, 1939 vol., 2-3; *ibid.*, 1940 vol., 238-39; *ibid.*, 1941 vol., 264-71.
 23. *Ibid.*, 1936 vol., 290.
 24. *Ibid.*, 1937 vol., 407-08.
 25. *Roosevelt's Foreign Policy, 1933-1941* (New York: Wilfred Funk, Inc., 1942), 148; Joseph Alsop and Robert Kintner, *American White Paper: The Story of American Diplomacy and the Second World War* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1940), 19; Press Conference, April 8, 1939.
 26. *Ibid.*, April 20, 1939; Tully, *F.D.R., My Boss*, 244; *Public Papers*, 1939 vol., xxxix; *ibid.*, 1940 vol., xxviii-lv; *ibid.*, 1941 vol., 183-84, 367, 439-40; Langer and Gleason, *Undeclared War*, 595; Roosevelt, *Personal Letters*, 1928-45, II, 1106.
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 31. Roosevelt, *Personal Letters*, 1928-45, II, 968.
 32. *Ibid.*, 1928-45, II, 1093.
 33. Freidel, *Roosevelt*, I, 246-47, 261; Roosevelt, "On Your Own Heads," *Scribner's*, April, 1917, p. 415; *New York Times*, January 18, 1914; October 22, 1914; December 6, 1914; June 10, 1916.
 34. *Public Papers*, 1939 vol., 463; *ibid.*, 1941 vol., 397-98.
 35. *Ibid.*, 1940 vol., 463-64; *ibid.*, 1941 vol., 186-87, 391.
 36. Press Conference, April 20, 1939.
 37. *Ibid.*, September 15, 1939; *ibid.*, September 22, 1939.
 38. Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, 146; Winston S. Churchill, *The Second World War* (6 vols., Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1948-53), II, 517-18; *Public Papers*, 1941 vol., 185-86, 229-30, 367, 388.
 39. U. S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations*, 1935, IV, 519; *ibid.*, 1937, III, 971; *ibid.*, 1938, II, 77; FDR to Bishop Oldham, March 3, 1936 (PPF); Freidel, *Roosevelt*, I, 273; McIntire, *White House Physician*, 118.
 40. Press Conference, April 20, 1939; *ibid.*, February 19, 1940; *ibid.*, February 27, 1940; *ibid.*, April 18, 1940; *ibid.*, September 3, 1940; *Public Papers*, 1940 vol., xxiv.
 41. Ickes, *Secret Diary*, II, 571; Press Conference, February 3, 1939; *ibid.*, February 17, 1939; *ibid.*, April 20, 1939; *ibid.*, June 23, 1939; *ibid.*, May

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43. Kilpatrick, *Roosevelt and Daniels*, 182-83; Ickes, *Secret Diary*, II, 568; Langer and Gleason, *Challenge to Isolation*, 206; Press Conference, June 23, 1939; *ibid.*, May 30, 1940; *ibid.*, June 14, 1940.
44. *Public Papers*, 1941 vol., 386-87.
45. Freidel, *Roosevelt*, I, 335-36; Langer and Gleason, *Challenge to Isolation*, 125, 137-39, 713; McIntire, *White House Physician*, 115; Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, 125-26; Press Conference, May 23, 1940.

III

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2. Burns, *Roosevelt*, 61; Freidel, *Roosevelt*, I, 268-69.
3. Morgenthau, "The Morgenthau Diaries," *Collier's*, October 11, 1947; Welles, *Seven Decisions that Shaped History*, 68-69.
4. Eleanor Roosevelt, *This I Remember*, 207; FDR to Madame Sandos, December 12, 1935 (PPF); Ickes, *Secret Diary*, II, 473, 481; Langer and Gleason, *Challenge to Isolation*, 203, 218; Roosevelt, *Personal Letters*, 1928-45, I, 547; Hull, *Memoirs*, I, 683-84.
5. *Ibid.*, I, 400, 416; U. S. Department of State, *Peace and War*, 23; *Public Papers*, 1935 vol., 346; *Roosevelt's Foreign Policy*, 60; Press Conference, December 29, 1936.
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7. Hull, *Memoirs*, I, 402; Press Conference, December 12, 1934; *Public Papers*, 1936 vol., 91; *Roosevelt's Foreign Policy*, 196.
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12. U. S. Department of State, *Peace and War*, 23; Hull, *Memoirs*, I, 228; Press Conference, October 6, 1937; Roosevelt, *Personal Letters*, 1928-45, II, 878.
13. U. S. Department of State, *Peace and War*, 271; Hull, *Memoirs*, I, 410, 414-15.
14. Press Conference, April 17, 1937; *ibid.*, April 20, 1938.
15. *Ibid.*, April 21, 1938; *Public Papers*, 1937 vol., 191-93; Ickes, *Secret Diary*, II, 380, 569-70.
16. Roosevelt, *Personal Letters*, 1928-45, II, 873; Langer and Gleason, *Challenge to Isolation*, 50, 142; Hull, *Memoirs*, I, 643.
17. Roosevelt, *Personal Letters*, 1928-45, II, 810-11.
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20. *Ibid.*, II, 702.

21. Langer and Gleason, *Challenge to Isolation*, 202.
22. *Ibid.*, 283; Ickes, *Secret Diary*, III, 75, 202; Nancy Harvison Hooker (ed.), *The Moffat Papers: Selections from the Diplomatic Journals of Jay Pierrepont Moffat, 1919-1943* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1956), 311.
23. Press Conference, December 17, 1940.
24. Ickes, *Secret Diary*, II, 469, 474, 481.
25. *Ibid.*, II, 481; Davis and Lindley, *How War Came*, 27-28; Alsop and Kintner, *American White Papers*, 18; Hull, *Memoirs*, I, 612; Langer and Gleason, *Challenge to Isolation*, 136-37; Roosevelt, *Personal Letters*, 1928-45, II, 900.
26. Hooker, *Moffat Papers*, 311.
27. Schlesinger, *Crisis of the Old Order*, 447; Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, 100; Sir Ronald Lindsey to Viscount Halifax, September 20, 1938 (PSF); Langer and Gleason, *Challenge to Isolation*, 202.
28. Ickes, *Secret Diary*, II, 523; Langer and Gleason, *Undeclared War*, 458, 735, 860; Public Papers, 1941 vol., 444-45.

IV

THE ROOSEVELTIAN APPROACH
TO A NEW ORDER

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2. Freidel, *Roosevelt*, II, 17, 129; Roosevelt, *Personal Letters*, 1905-28, pp. 477, 503.
3. *Public Papers*, 1928-32 vol., 646.
4. *Ibid.*, 1937 vol., 378.
5. Press Conference, May 16, 1933.
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7. Press Conference, February 12, 1943.
8. *Ibid.*, March 30, 1943; *ibid.*, October 29, 1943; *ibid.*, October 17, 1944.
9. *Public Papers*, 1944-45 vol., 498.
10. *Ibid.*, 1944-45 vol., 553.
11. Roosevelt, *Personal Letters*, 1905-28, pp. 237-40.
12. Quoted in Freidel, *Roosevelt*, I, 241.
13. *Ibid.*, I, 260.
14. *Ibid.*, II, 17; Burns, *Roosevelt*, 70.
15. Quoted in Freidel, *Roosevelt*, II, 129.
16. *Public Papers*, 1938 vol., 445.
17. Press Conference, February 12, 1943; Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, *On Active Service in Peace and War* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1947), 545; Churchill, *The Second World War*, IV, 635.
18. Press Conference, December 17, 1943.
19. *Public Papers*, 1940 vol., 89, 91; *ibid.*, 1942 vol., 352.
20. Roosevelt, *Personal Letters*, 1928-45, II, 466-67.
21. *Public Papers*, 1938 vol., 586.
22. *Ibid.*, 1928-32 vol., x-xi.
23. Roosevelt, *Personal Letters*, 1928-45, II, 963.
24. Quoted in Burns, *Roosevelt*, 423.
25. *Public Papers*, 1943 vol., 112-13, 328.
26. *Ibid.*, 1943 vol., 368.
27. FDR to Walter Lippman, November 8, 1943 (PPF).
28. Press Conference, December 22, 1944; *Public Papers*, 1944-45 vol., 499, 579.
29. Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, 266. With regard to the last sentence in this quotation, Roosevelt himself occasionally indicated a belief the Four Freedoms could be attained; and he once wrote William Allen White saying, "I think that in a quarter of a century the firm of White and Roosevelt might be able to bring the Four Freedoms at least to this nation of ours." FDR to W. A. White, February 9, 1943 (PPF). Other statements by Roosevelt and his general attitude toward such ideals have convinced this writer, however, that to Roosevelt such ideals as the Four Freedoms were simply ideals — approachable but never entirely attainable — and were to be used by humanity simply as guiding stars.
30. Roosevelt, *Personal Letters*, 1928-45, II, 1372.
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32. Burns, *Roosevelt*, 95-97.

33. *Ibid.*, 117.
34. *Public Papers*, 1933 vol., 3-4.
35. *Ibid.*, 1935 vol., 16.
36. *Ibid.*, 1936 vol., 159, 165.
37. Roosevelt, *Whither Bound?*, 6, 15-16.
38. Roosevelt, *Personal Letters*, 1928-45, I, 219.
39. *Ibid.*, 1928-45, I, 338-40.
40. Freidel, *Roosevelt*, II, 16.
41. Roosevelt, *Personal Letters*, 1928-45, I, 118-20.
42. *Ibid.*, 1928-45, I, 98.
43. *Public Papers*, 1928-32 vol., 649.
44. *Ibid.*, 1936 vol., 384-86, 390.
45. Rosenman, *Working with Roosevelt*, 55.
46. Gunther, *Roosevelt in Retrospect*, 37-38; Burns, *Roosevelt*, 476.
47. Frances Perkins, *The Roosevelt I Knew* (New York: Viking Press, 1946), 17-18.
48. Moley, *After Seven Years*, 390-91. See also Rosenman, *Working with Roosevelt*, 24.
49. *Public Papers*, 1941 vol., 8.
50. *Ibid.*, 1935 vol., 236-37.
51. Quoted in Rosenman, *Working with Roosevelt*, 216.
52. Langer and Gleason, *Challenge to Isolation*, 35; Press Conference, March 16, 1945; Ickes, *Secret Diary*, III, 115-16.
53. Sir Robert Lindsay to Viscount Halifax, September 20, 1938 (PSF); *Public Papers*, 1939 vol., 454, 511-12.
54. Press Conference, November 18, 1938; *ibid.*, June 2, 1944; *Public Papers*, 1944-45 vol., 163-65; Morgenthau, "Morgenthau Diaries," *Collier's*, November 1, 1947, p. 65; Sumner Welles, *We Need Not Fail* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1948), 24-25.
55. Roosevelt, *Whither Bound?*, 6-13, 20-28.
56. Freidel, *Roosevelt*, II, 78.
57. Roosevelt, *Personal Letters*, 1928-45, I, 451.
58. *Roosevelt's Foreign Policy*, 210.
59. *Public Papers*, 1942 vol., 416.
60. FDR to Sam Rosenman, March 19, 1943 (PPF).
61. *Public Papers*, 1944-45 vol., 524.
62. Press Conference, December 22, 1944; *ibid.*, February 23, 1945.
63. Hanson W. Baldwin, *Great Mistakes of the War* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1950), 7.
64. Eleanor Roosevelt, *This I Remember*, 68.
65. Burns, *Roosevelt*, 475.
66. Perkins, *The Roosevelt I Knew*, 5-6.
67. Burns, *Roosevelt*, 476.
68. FDR to William E. Dodd, November 13, 1933 (PPF); Roosevelt, *Personal Letters*, 1928-45, I, 370; *Public Papers*, 1936 vol., 605.
69. Press Conference, December 27, 1935.
70. *Ibid.*, December 29, 1936.
71. *Public Papers*, 1937 vol., 409-10.
72. Roosevelt, *Personal Letters*, 1928-45, II, 1298.
73. *Public Papers*, 1939 vol., 197.
74. *Ibid.*, 1928-32 vol., 756.
75. Freidel, *Roosevelt*, I, 259-60.
76. Burns, *Roosevelt*, 85.
77. *Public Papers*, 1928-32 vol., 21.
78. Freidel, *Roosevelt*, III, 60.
79. *Public Papers*, 1933 vol., 60.
80. *Ibid.*, 1933 vol., 394.
81. Roosevelt, *Personal Letters*, 1928-45, I, 672.
82. *Public Papers*, 1941 vol., xviii.
83. Roosevelt, *Personal Letters*, 1928-45, I, 719.
84. *Ibid.*, 1928-45, II, 757.
85. *Public Papers*, 1942 vol., 278.
86. *Ibid.*, 1942 vol., 1054.
87. Press Conference, October 12, 1943; *Public Papers*, 1942 vol., 417, 483-84.
88. Perkins, *The Roosevelt I Knew*, 384; Tully, *F.D.R., My Boss*, 86.
89. James A. Farley, *Behind the Ballots: The Personal History of a Politician* (New York: Harcourt, Brace Co., 1938), 209.
90. Eleanor Roosevelt, *This I Remember*, 166.
91. Rosenman, *Working with Roosevelt*, 511.
92. *Public Papers*, 1944-45 vol., xiii, 354, 360.
93. FDR to John F. Carew, March 10, 1943 (PPF).
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95. Press Conference, April 18, 1940.
96. Roosevelt, *Personal Letters*, 1928-45, II, 1349.
97. *Ibid.*, II, 1156.
98. *Ibid.*, II, 1298-99.
99. Quoted in Freidel, *Roosevelt*, II, 30.
100. Roosevelt, *Personal Letters*, 1928-45, I, 118.
101. FDR to H. G. Wells, February 13, 1935 (PPF).
102. FDR to H. G. Wells, March 29, 1937 (PPF).
103. Roosevelt, *Personal Letters*, 1928-45, II, 751.
104. FDR to William E. Dodd, August 5, 1936 (PSF).
105. *Public Papers*, 1938 vol., 248.
106. Roosevelt, *Personal Letters*, 1928-45, II, 1300.
107. *Public Papers*, 1944-45 vol., 498.
108. *Ibid.*, 1944-45 vol., 548.
109. Freidel, *Roosevelt*, I, 220, 335-36.
110. Roosevelt, *Personal Letters*, 1928-45, II, 967.
111. Hull, *Memoirs*, I, 597; Welles, *Time for Decision*, 74.
112. Benes, *Memoirs*, 196; *Public Papers*, 1943 vol., 30.
113. Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, 560.
114. Benes, *Memoirs*, 196; *Public Papers*, 1943 vol., 32.
115. *Ibid.*, 1943 vol., 547; FDR to C. C. Burlingame, May 29, 1944 (PPF).
116. Benes, *Memoirs*, 196.
117. *Public Papers*, 1944-45 vol., 33-34.
118. Press Conference, October 17, 1944; U. S. Department of State, *The Conferences at Malta and Yalta*, 661.

V

THE GOOD NEIGHBOR IDEAL IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

1. *Public Papers*, 1943 vol., 33-34.
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3. Freidel, *Roosevelt*, II, 235.
4. *Ibid.*, II, 236-37.
5. *Ibid.*, II, 236.
6. *Ibid.*, II, 237.
7. FDR, "Our Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs*, VI (April, 1928), 583-85.
8. Welles, *Time for Decision*, 191.
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10. *Ibid.*, 1933 vol., 130.
11. *Ibid.*, 1933 vol., 323-24; Welles, *Time for Decision*, 194-97.
12. *Public Papers*, 1942 vol., 530-31.
13. *Ibid.*, 1934 vol., 270-71.
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X

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XI

A COLLECTIVE SECURITY SYSTEM

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